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ABSTRACT 
My model-theoretic realist account of science places linguistic systems and the 
corresponding non-linguistic structures at different stages of the scientific process. It is 
shown that science and its progress cannot be analysed in terms of only one of these 
strata. Philosophy of science literature offers mainly two approaches to the structure of 
scientific knowledge analysed in terms of theories and their models, the "statement" and 
the "non-statement" approaches. In opposition to the statement approach's belief that 
scientific knowledge is embodied in theories (formulated in some (first-order) symbolic 
language) with direct interpretative links - via so-called "bridge principles" - to reality, 
the defenders of the non-statement approach believe in an analysis where the language 
in which the theory is formulated plays a much smaller role than the (mathematical) 
structures which satisfy that theory. 
The model-theoretic realism expounded here retains the notion of a scientific 
theory as a (deductively closed) set of sentences, while simultaneously emphasising the 
interpretative role of the conceptual (i.a. mathematical) models of these theories. My 
criticism against the non-statement approach is based on the fact that merely "giving" the 
theory "in terms of' its mathematical structures leaves out any real interpretation of the 
nature and role of general terms in science. Against the statement approach's "direct" 
linking of general theoretical terms to reality, my approach interpolates models between 
theories and (aspects of) reality in the interpretative chain. 
The links between the general terms of scientific theories and their interpretations 
in the various models of the theory regulate the whole referential process. The terms of 
a theory are "general" in the sense that they are the result of certain abstractive 
conceptualisations of the object of scientific investigation and subsequent linguistic 
formulations of these conceptualisations. Their (particular) meanings can be "given back" 
only by interpreting them in the limited context of the various conceptual models of their 
theory and, finally, by finding an isomorphic relation between some substructure of the 
conceptual model in question and some empirical conceptualisation (model) of relevant 
experimental data. In this sense the notion of scientific "truth" becomes inextricably linked 
with that of articulated reference, as it - given its model-dependent nature - should be. 
Key terms: science; theory; model; interpretation; reference; truth; reality 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The statement and non-statement accounts of science 
In this thesis I shall offer a model-theoretic realist interpretation of the processes and 
products of (natural) science built on recent work in the philosophy of science dedicated to 
analysing the natural sciences in terms of conceptual (mathematical) models of theories and 
the various semantic relations between such models, theories, and (aspects of) reality. 
Although analyses of theory-reality and model-reality links have long been a part of 
philosophy of science, I shall concentrate on the more recent developments concerning these 
issues in a model-theoretic context. Such analyses touch on core questions of the philosophy 
of science, such as questions regarding the nature of scientific theories, the usual realist 
inspired questions about the possibility and character of relations between scientific theories 
and reality, the notion of scientific truth, and, in general, on the nature of scientific progress. 
A model-theoretic realism offers, via analyses of the structure of scientific theories and the 
processes of science, a scientific realism that needs no metaphysical substructure as 
justification. This particular kind of realism is a very common sense kind of realism in the 
sense that rather than trying to justify everyday features of the science-reality relationship -
such as the underdetermination of scientific theories by their data - it not only acknowledges 
these features, but uses them to strengthen its realist claims. The underlying aim of this 
thesis is to show that claiming - as a model-theoretic realism does - that reality exists 
"outside" of human practice, neither means that reality is unknowable nor, at the other 
extreme of the scale, that science simply mirrors it. By analysing the structure of scientific 
theories model-theoretically (Chapter 2), it will be shown (Chapter 5) that a model-theoretic 
approach to science and its processes and products offers the best kind of scientific realism 
- i.e. a scientific realism with as little metaphysical content as possible. 
First a few words on the notion of "science" as it will be used in this thesis. In principle, 
my model of science is applicable to all sciences (natural, behavioural, human, social, 
economic, and so on). I shall in this thesis however put the emphasis almost exclusively on 
the natural sciences, and in particular on physics, for the following reason: all of the three 
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main aspects of my model (or interpretation) of science (namely empirical models, conceptual 
models, and theories) are - mostly - more simple and more clearly delineated in the case 
of the natural sciences (and in physics in particular) than in the other sciences. In Section 
1.2.4 I briefly discuss the use of the notion of "model" in econometrics to illustrate the 
applicability of a model-theoretic approach outside the natural sciences. See more on the use 
of terminology in this thesis in Section 2.2. 
The use of the notion of models is nothing new in either philosophy of science or the 
(empirical) sciences themselves. Writers such an Achinstein (1968), Hesse (1963), and, more 
recently, Redhead (1980) have paid much attention to the heuristic uses of models in the 
development of scientific theories. In his article, entitled A comparison of the meaning and 
uses of models in mathematics and the empirical sciences, Patrick Suppes (1960) reviews 
the various uses of the notion in mathematical statistics, psychology, economics, and physics. 
Nancy Cartwright (1989, 1995a, 1995b) also often makes use of the analogies between the 
ways in which models are used in econometrics and theoretical physics to illustrate her views 
of the nature of scientific theories. In Section 1.2 I shall give a brief overview of some of the 
different interpretations and uses of the notion of "model" in philosophy of science. 
In current philosophy of science, the most interesting questions centre around the 
ways in which writers distinguish between and assign roles to theories and the mathematical 
structures that interpret them and in which they are true, i.e. between scientific theories as 
linguistic systems and their non-linguistic models. In this context I shall in Chapter 2 set out 
my own model-theoretic account of the processes and products of science. 
Philosophy of science literature offers us mainly two approaches to the structure of 
the products of science analysed in terms of linguistic and non-linguistic systems, the 
"statement" or syntactic approach, and the "non-statement" or semantic approach. The 
statement approach is characteristic of philosophers and logicians like Carnap, Hempel, and 
Nagel. The advocates of this approach use the tools of mathematical logic to depict theories 
as axiomatic systems in some well-defined language, and study the syntax and semantics 
of theories via the proof and model theories of language. The advocates of the non-statement 
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view of science's products emphasise the tools of algebra and set theory. This approach 
originated with Poincare's work in geometry and mechanics and has started developing 
through semantic analyses of non-statement reconstructions of certain scientific theories 
done by Von Neumann (1955), Adams (1959) and Suppes (see McKinsey, Sugar & Suppes 
(1953), Suppes (1959)), and also Montague (1962). 
The statement or "received"' approach depicts the rational reconstruction of the 
language of science as a syntactic system with an axiomatised deductive theory formulated 
within that system. Its defenders usually characterise theories in terms of two parts. First they 
identify an abstract formal calculus (a symbolic language) in which the primitive symbols 
(which in this case are terms that do not have obvious relations with "observation" terms, i.e. 
so-called 'theoretical" terms like "electron", "particle", "mass", and so on) of the theory are set 
out. The second part of the structure of a scientific theory they depict as a set of rules (called 
"correspondence rules" by Camap2 and "bridge principles" by Hempel) that assigns empirical 
(observational) content to the logical calculus by providing "co-ordinating definitions" or 
"empirical interpretations" for at least some of the primitive and defined symbols of the 
calculus, and in that way - supposedly - establishes direct links between elements of the 
theory and elements of reality. 
Advocates of the "non-statement" or semantic approach view the rational 
reconstruction of the language of science in terms of a syntactic system and a family of 
interpretations (or models) of that syntax. In opposition to the statement approach's belief that 
theories are formulated in some (first-order) symbolic language with direct links to reality, the 
defenders of the non-statement approach believe in an analysis where the language in which 
the theory is formulated plays a much smaller role. They hold that foundational problems in 
the various sciences can in general be better addressed by focussing on the models these 
sciences employ than by reformulating the products of these sciences in some appropriate 
language. 
The non-statement approach has had several branchings since Patrick Suppes has 
emphasised - against the metamathematical musings of the advocates of the received view 
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- the clarifying advantages of set-theoretical reconstructions of empirical theories. I shall 
discuss Suppes's approach in section 3.2. The structuralist programme led by Sneed, 
Stegmiiller, Moulines, and Balzer offers a structural analysis of science, and I shall discuss 
this programme in section 3.3.3 The semantic approach offers an examination of the content 
of theories via Beth's notion of state-spaces and is supported by Van Fraassen, Suppe, and 
the (naturalistic) view of science offered by Ronald Giere. These notions are discussed in 
sections 3.4 and 3.5. Finally, I shall discuss the approach offered by a kind of affiliation to the 
semantic approach, which is headed by Wojcicki, and Przelewski' - who both concentrate 
on offering an empiricist semantics for science while also working on the problem of 
"analyticity"5 - and also followed by Tuomela and Rantala6, who apply this approach 
respectively to problems concerning the nature of theoretical terms and the problems of 
definability and indefinability in science. W6jcicki's approach is briefly discussed in section 
3.6. 
The choice between the statement and non-statement approaches seems trivial as 
far as theories formulated in first-order languages are concerned. As Theo Kuipers 
(Kuokkanen, 1994:5) points out, the set of models (that is, structures for which the statements 
of the theory are true) of theories formulated as a set of statements of some first-order 
language is exactly the kind of (set of) structures that the defenders of the non-statement 
approach view as the building blocks of empirical theories. In other words (ibid.), possible 
interrelations between the two approaches exist in so far as an axiomatised theory may be 
characterised by a class of interpretations which satisfy it, and an interpretation (or class of 
interpretations) may be characterised by a set of sentences which it satisfies (and in neither 
case will the characterisation be unique)7. I believe though that clarification of certain core 
problems in philosophy of science - such as the relations between scientific theories and 
reality and the notion of scientific truth - is more likely when following the emphasis on 
models that the semantic approach offers, while retaining the statement view's analysis of a 
theory as a (deductively closed) set of sentences. I thus do not go along with either of the two 
approaches. In the empirical sciences no theoretical entity is ever such a "free creation" of 
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the human mind that its possible links with reality may be discarded in an examination of the 
various truth relations in which the theory (albeit via its models) stands during the various 
stages of the scientific process. I shall set out my own approach in Chapter 2, before 
continuing to discuss - in Chapter 3 - some of the main views in the non-statement school 
of thought, using my approach as a unifying meta-view. 
In Chapter 4 I shall, within the context of my model-theoretic account, review the 
troubled attitude of Nancy Cartwright towards the "fundamental laws" of science, i.e. the 
axioms of the deductive set of sentences I refer to as a scientific theory. Cartwright's work is 
important in my terms since she is currently probably the most influential philosopher of 
science - writing on the issue of the realism of scientific theories - who does not subscribe 
to either the statement or the non-statement approaches to science. I do not think that she 
succeeds either in reconciling or superseding these two approaches though. A model-
theoretic account however solves a remarkable number of statement as well as non-
statement problems and so supersedes these approaches, reconciling their best features. 
Cartwright pays much attention to general realist issues (think of her pre-occupation with the 
so-called "lying" laws of physics). In Chapter 5, I too, shall concentrate on realist issues and 
offer a model-theoretic interpretation of scientific realism, before concluding on the merits of 
a model-theoretic realist interpretation of science in Chapter 6. 
However, let us first examine the meaning and use of the notion of model in 
philosophy of science. 
1.2 The interpretation and use of the notion of "model" in philosophy of science 
1.2.1 Introduction 
One intuitive idea of a model is a possible realisation in which a theory is satisfied in 
the Tarskian sense8 . Suppes (1960: 290) points out that the most important distinguishing 
feature of the relation between a theory and a model of a theory is that a theory is a linguistic 
entity consisting of a set of sentences, and models are non-linguistic entities in which the 
theory is satisfied. The notion of "model" is used in widely different ways by philosophers of 
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science and scientists alike. However, if one examines these various interpretations and uses 
a little more closely, it is possible to find common features in the ways in which the notion of 
a model is applied that show the advantages of this notion in terms of clarifying the intricacies 
of the processes and products of science. Suppes (1960: 289, 290) remarks rightly that the 
concept of "model" in the sense of Tarski may be used without distortion and as a 
fundamental concept in any discipline. In this sense he claims that the meaning of the 
concept of model in mathematics is the same as in - or very close to that of - the empirical 
sciences, and finds the difference rather in the various uses of the concept, in the sense that 
"mathematicians ask a certain kind of question about models and empirical scientists tend 
to ask another kind of question" (ibid.)9 . However, rather than perhaps obscuring the role of 
models in rational reconstructions of science, these different kinds of "questions" that may 
be asked about models merely illustrate and strengthen the validity of using the notion of 
"model" in these kinds of rational reconstruction. 
Suppes (in Morgenbesser, 1967: 57) apparently agrees, although perhaps with certain 
reservations, since he remarks that "[qjuite apart from questions about direct empirical 
observations, it is pertinent and natural from a logical standpoint to talk about the models of 
a theory ... [since these] models are highly abstract, non-linguistic entities, often quite remote 
in their conception from empirical observations". Therefore, he acknowledges the apparent 
logical problem underlying questions concerning that which the concept of a model actually 
has to add to the usual discussions of empirical interpretations of theories. He comments 
(ibid.) that mostly philosophers find it easier to talk about theories than about models of 
theories, because mostly, their examples are simple in nature and can be discussed in purely 
linguistic {first-order logic) terms, while introducing the notion of the model(s) of a theory adds 
a higher mathematical element to the discussion. However he offers the main part of the 
answer to these questions himself when he (in Morgenbesser, 1967: 58) points out that 
dealing with more complicated theories, like quantum mechanics, and classical 
thermodynamics, we are not always involved with "simple" examples at all. In these cases 
he claims (ibid.) we also need the general results of set theory as well as many results 
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concerning the real numbers, since direct formalisation of such theories in first-order logic is 
rather impractical, given that the degree of complexity of theories of this sort is similar to that 
of theories studied in pure mathematics. He writes (ibid.): "In such contexts it is very much 
simpler to assert things about models of the theory rather than talk directly and explicitly 
about the sentences of the theory, perhaps the main reason for this being that the notion of 
a sentence of the theory is not well-defined when the theory is not given in standard 
formalisation". Also, some calculations are simply too complex to do in any other context than 
in that of some model of the theory in question - think for example of a leaf blowing in the 
wind. To predict where it will come to rest, i.e. to describe its movement, it is possible to use 
Newton's laws of motion and his law of gravitation 10. However, the actual calculations would 
be really complex, and therefore it would be more practical to work in some model of his 
"theory'' that focuses only on certain of the aspects of the real system. 
1.2.2 Heuristic uses of the notion of "model" 
Redhead (1980: 146) comments that early depictions of "theoretical models'', such as 
Achinstein's (1968), almost always implied these models to be false. The reason for this is 
that mostly, at that stage 11 , models were used in the heuristic sense of suggesting new ways 
to look at certain problems and the notion of "theoretical model" was generally explained in 
terms of a set of assumptions about some system, attributing some kind of inner structure to 
the system, and thus being a "simplified approximation" (Redhead, 1980: 146) of the system 
modelled. Also, these models were used - and are of course, still used for these reasons 
- to justify the production of predictive theories - i.e. theories formulated to explain one 
group of phenomena (one kind of real system) which then prove to have the ability to predict 
events concerning another type of system. 
Thus, after the positivist reign, most of the initial philosophical reflection concerning 
models was concerned with the role of models within some kind of "logic of analogy". In these 
cases it is obvious that models will turn out to be "false" of the system in reality on which the 
development of the theory in question is focussed, since they are not interpreted in terms of 
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mathematical models (and their empirical substructures) of the theories concerned. This 
usage of the notion of model should however not be confused with a Tarskian interpretation 
of the notion in the sense of models "making" the theories they interpret '1rue• .12 
A related way in which the notion of "model" has also entered into philosophy of 
science debates is via the well-known use of "iconic" models by Hesse (1963), Achinstein 
(1968), and Redhead (1980). Both Nagel (1961) and Hesse (1963) view the empirical 
interpretation of a scientific theory in terms of mathematical and iconic models. Achinstein 
(1968) defines an iconic model as a set of simplified and approximate assumptions about 
some system. These assumptions attribute a certain inner structure to the system and are 
proposed within the context of some more "basic" theory. Hesse (1963: 19) sees these 
models as also possibly exhibiting analogies between the system modelled and some other 
system. Da Costa and French (1990: 258) explain these notions in terms of the example of 
the billiard ball model of kinetic gas theory. Viewed as an iconic model, it offers an image or 
representation (picture) of a system of gas atoms. There also exists positive analogy in 
Hesse's terms since there is a similarity between certain aspects of the system itself and 
certain aspects of the model. The billiard ball model is, however, also a mathematical model 
of the kinetic theory of gases, in the sense that a semantic interpretation is given to the theory 
in terms of the billiard ball system such that the axioms of the theory are true under that 
interpretation. 13 
The main problem with this kind of approach is, as Da Costa and French (1990: 258) 
point out, a realist one. The mathematical model is supposed to somehow say something 
about how the world is (offer an empirical interpretation of the theory), while the same is not 
expected from an iconic model. Van Fraassen, for instance, ignores these kinds of problem 
by arguing that scientific theories are indeed nothing more but iconic models of phenomena 
(observable objects). Da Costa and French (1990: 259) go on to claim that on the "realist 
view'' it seems that the difference between a theory and models of the theory is that the 
theory may be true and its models can only be false. This is the same kind of explication that 
Redhead (1980) offers. The problem is that these kinds of approach view the role of models 
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purely in instrumental terms, that is, in terms of clarifying the axioms of the theory, or 
extending the domain of a theory, or perhaps even in limiting the domain of theory. 
A model-theoretic realist, however, I claim, understands that the role of models in the 
scientific process is far more important than that. Such a philosopher of science 
acknowledges that the use of the notion of model in the Tarskian sense as a mathematical 
interpreting structure is by far the most important one as far as discovering possible links with 
reality is concerned, and thus such a philosopher only speaks of theories being true in 
particular models, and not of either theories or models being true or false per se, in the literal 
absolute sense of the word. 14 Do not take me wrong, the powerful role of these kinds of 
(iconic) models and also of models as "approximations" to theories - Redhead's (1980: 147) 
"impoverishments" of theories 15 - in elaborating the domains of scientific theories, cannot 
be ignored. 16 However, it should be noted that this is a different use of the term than that of 
the term as a mathematical model, and also that mathematical models can indeed also be 
used with these kinds of aim in mind. 
Redhead (1980: 162) makes an interesting remark about the role of models in 
science, that reminds much of Cartwright's (1983) kind of approach. He (1980: 162) writes 
[i]f we always tried to solve every problem with absolute accuracy, and 
neglecting no 'accidental' aspects, science would never get started. Science 
depends on the possibility of ignoring accidents, of isolating certain key 
features in a situation. These are captured by models, although in the very act 
of idealisation or approximation we convince ourselves that the model is 
indeed false. It is moreover in respect of modelling that the imaginative and 
intuitive element in theoretical physics is most clearly seen ... Modelling is 
certainly an art, involving a number of logical gaps .... 
Of course mathematical models are also idealisations of some real system. The problem that 
I have with Nancy Cartwright's kind of approach, and therefore with this kind of remark, is 
however that the conceptual models of some theory, despite their potentially idealised nature, 
may still be found to be related to some real system(s). I argue that it is not "truth" in terms 
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of so-called "false" (or "distorting") idealisations of real systems that philosophers of science 
should be concerned with at all, but that rather they should concentrate on the Tarskian 
notion of truth in terms of satisfaction. This kind of (satisfaction) relation establishes 
(semantic) links between some theory and the models of the theory. It also may determine 
relations of empirical adequacy in terms of a modified version of Tarskian satisfaction 
established by (possible) links between the models of the theory and some system(s) in 
reality. See Chapters 2, 4, and 5 for more on this issue. 
Redhead (1980: 147) also discusses the notion of "enriching models". This kind of 
model is more interesting for my purposes, since it seems to play a role very close to that 
which I ascribe to the "initial" or "intended conceptual" models in my analysis of the process 
of science.17 Redhead claims (ibid.) that these enriching models may come into scientific play 
whenever a theory seems to be "incompletely specified" such that "considerable latitude" is 
allowed in the selection of the detailed structure of the theory. He (ibid.) offers the example 
of axiomatic field theory where any number of fields may possibly satisfy the axioms of the 
theory, and claims that an "enriching model" may then be introduced to fill in "missing detail". 
Obviously here the model is not believed to be contradicting the theory, since no "completed" 
theory has yet been formulated. However, as soon as the model "resembles an exact theory'' 
it is called a "theory'' and not a "model" any longer. 18 
Another more heuristically related use of the notion of "model" is the application of the 
notion in the construction of Gedanken experiments - usually done in the empirical sciences. 
Here, again, I see this as mainly done in the beginning stage of theory development, except 
when, as Suppes (1960: 296) points out, the notion of model is used in arguments against 
the general plausibility of a theory. In these cases the theory is (conceptually) extended to a 
new domain (where the scientists expect the results in the new domain to be different from 
those predicted by the theory) by constructing a model of the theory in that domain. I agree 
with Suppes that this aspect of the use of models need not however be restricted to 
Gedanken experiments. 19 
Giere (1991: 23 - 27) also discusses the various kinds of model that scientists use 
11 
through the course of the scientific process. He identifies four different kinds of model, but 
I shall here discuss only the two more heuristic ones: 
• Scale models are physical models built to scale and are rarely used, although they 
may play important roles in the formulation of theories, for example the model of DNA, 
built by Watson and Crick. 
• Analog models are most useful in the beginning stages of scientific research, since 
they are usually discarded after theory formulation. He (Giere, 1991: 23, 24) cites the 
familiar example of the solar system as an analog model for an atom. In this model 
the electrons and the nucleus of an atom are said to be analogous to the planets 
circling the sun. (The idea being that if an atom could be magnified by whatever 
measure required, one would have an observable object with a structure similar to 
that of the solar system correspondingly reduced.) This model was very fruitful to 
scientists working in the first half of the century, especially in the ways in which it 
showed atoms not to be analogous to the solar system, the general point being that 
"a good analogy leads to its own demise" (Giere, 1991: 24). 
1.2.3 Variations on non-statement uses of the notion of "model" 
W6jcicki (1979: 158) sums up the different usages of the notion of model that 
philosophers of science should keep in mind as follows:" ... while the semantic concept of a 
model is in common use among logicians and mathematicians, empirical scientists almost 
unanimously opt for the 'mathematical' meanings of 'model' in its syntactic (a set of 
equations) or semantic (a mathematical entity which is to represent an intuitive concept) 
sense" (ibid.). 
The followers of the "semantic" approach (Suppe, Van Fraassen, Giere, W6jcicki, 
Przelewski, and the various structuralists) also have among them a few variations on the use 
of the notion of model. In general all of these support the idea that a scientific theory has to 
be logically reconstructed in terms of a description of its set of models, which is taken as the 
structures in which the theory's domain can be modelled. They also view models in the 
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Tarskian sense in so far as these models are taken to be relational structures "for which all 
the sentences of a theory express true properties about the structure when the latter acts as 
an interpretation of the theory" (Da Costa & French, 1990: 250). I shall here only comment 
on Van Fraassen and Giere's uses of the notion of "model", since the intricacies concerning 
the structuralist interpretation of the notion are best discussed as part of their programme -
which shall be done in Section 3.3 - and W6jcicki's notion of theoretical models - see 
Section 3.6 - differs only marginally from what follows. 
Van Fraassen (1980: 43) states clearly that any structure that satisfies the axioms of 
a theory by making the axioms true is called a model of the theory. He (Van Fraassen, 1980: 
44) points out that scientists usually use "model" as referring to "type of structure" rather than 
a specific structure, in the sense that some parameters are left unspecified in their description 
of the structure - he gives the example of the Bohr model of the atom which was intended 
to fit hydrogen atoms, helium atoms, and so on. Van Fraassen's own use of the term is 
directed by his notion of empirical adequacy and thus focuses on the identification of 
empirical substructures of models of theories, since establishing the empirical adequacy of 
a theory depends on being able to show that the structures which are described in 
experimental and measurement reports concerning the theorl° are isomorphic to the 
empirical substructures of a model of that theory. A more in-depth discussion of Van 
Fraassen's semantic approach follows in Section 3.4, but I want to point out briefly that my 
notion of empirical models - see Chapter 2 - is very close to his notion of empirical 
substructures, although I completely differ from his attitude towards the role of theoretical 
terms in all of this. More about this in the following chapters. 
I have referred in the previous section to Giere's identification of the various uses of 
the notion of "model". The semantic notion of "model" that he discusses is in terms of what 
he refers to as "theoretical models". According to him (Giere, 1991: 24), this interpretation of 
the notion of "model" is the kind most often used in science. Giere (ibid.) uses the analog of 
maps to set out the characteristic features of theoretical models. A map is not the same thing 
as the thing it represents, although some kind of relationship does exist between a map and 
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the object "mapped". This relationship is according to Giere (1991: 25, 26) a relationship of 
similarity. A theoretical model (map) exhibits a certain similarity of structure with the thing 
mapped. Although theoretical models are incomplete in the sense that they exhibit only 
selected features of their subject (as maps do), still they are " ... similar in some specifiable 
respects and to some specifiable degree of accuracy'' (Giere, 1991: 26). I shall comment fully 
on the notion of '1heoretical model" in my discussion of Giere's semantic approach in Section 
3.5, and thus suffice it to remark here that although Giere seems to see some kind of 
semantic or perhaps interpretative link between theoretical models and certain aspects of 
reality, he still claims these models to be "false", and thus creates a few uncertainties 
concerning his notion of "similarity of structure" referred to above. 
Apart from the distinction between models used as analogies and mathematical 
models, what often happens in the applied sciences is that the notions of "model of a theory" 
and "theory of the model" are not always distinguishable. Suppes (1960: 289) points to an 
example of such confusion often found in the behavioural sciences and mathematical 
statistics. Here the word "model" is usually used to mean the set of quantitative assumptions 
of the theory, which in logical terms are synonymous with the axioms of the theory. The 
model is here a linguistic entity in contrast to the Tarskian use according to which a model 
is a non-linguistic entity in which a theory is satisfied. 
Suppes (1960: 291) claims though that the set-theoretical use of the notion of "model" 
is more primary than the empirical scientific use of it. In my approach the so-called "physical 
model" used in the empirical sciences21 may perhaps play a role at the lowest most concrete 
level of the construction of what I refer to as the "conceptual intended model" in the beginning 
stages of theory formulation (see Chapter 2). However, the Tarskian notion of "model" -
equivalent to Suppes's "set-theoretical" notion - is much more important and is applicable 
both to the role I assign to models in the initial stages of theory formulation and the role I 
assign them in the interpretative or application stage of the theory's development.22 
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1.2.4 The implications for philosophy of science of the use of the notion of "model" in 
econometrics 
As an example of the use of the notion of "model" outside the natural sciences, I 
briefly look at certain aspects of the meaning and use of this notion in econometrics. This 
illustrates that my model of science is not necessarily limited to the natural sciences. I shall 
refer to the economic sciences again in Section 2.4 when I discuss the meaning of the notion 
of an "empirical model". Nancy Cartwright (1989, 1995c) often employs the econometric use 
of the notion of "model" to make this point too, and also to exemplify certain features of the 
relations between theories, their models, and reality. 
In econometrics a "model" is generally a class of models in the logical sense. Note 
however that as early as 1968, John Harrod {in Wolfe, 1968: 180) points out the difference 
he sees between physics and economics and the various uses of "model" in the two sciences 
as resting on the fact that in physics, because there is no direct access to reality, "one can 
never compare the model with the reality'', while in the case of economics, "all the entities 
with which economics deal are, in principle at least, directly observable" {Harrod in Wolfe, 
1968: 183). This I find difficult to agree with. What does an actual instance of a ''free market" 
look like then?23 It seems far more probable if modern economics and econometrics are taken 
into account, that economists are in general likely to confuse the notions of "theory" and 
"model" such that their theories are mathematical models in the Tarskian sense, and their 
models are the linguistic expressions that the supporters of the statement approach call 
theories. 24 
Be that as it may, Nancy Cartwright's various references {especially in Nature's 
capacities and their measurement, Cartwright, 1989) to the similarities between the 
interpretation of equations or sets of equations in econometrics and the interpretation of 
scientific theories offer perhaps the best example of the versatility of the notion of "model". 
Understanding the intuitions behind these econometric calculations also goes a long way to 
illustrate the problems concerning the idealised nature of models that will be discussed in 
what follows. Therefore I shall briefly here set out an example she discusses in this text 
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(Cartwright, 1989). 
Cartwright (1989: 149) uses the methodology of econometrics and the nature of its 
equations and the relations between them to illustrate the kind of stability she associates with 
the capacities of nature. I shall discuss her notions about the so-called "capacities of nature" 
in Chapters 4 and 5, but for now, this example is simply meant to give the reader - by 
analogy to the natural sciences - an idea of the underlying intuitions about the relations 
between theories, their models, and the aspects of reality in question. (Remember that where 
the term "model" is used in what follows, mostly we would use "theory", and vice versa.) 
Cartwright's example: (Cartwright, 1989: 149ff.): Consider the following equation 
(which represents a price-demand curve): 
q = ap + u ... Equation (D) 
where q represents the quantity demanded, p the price, a the strength of the tendency of the 
price to influence demand, and u the factor changing the character of the equation from a 
deterministic one into a probabilistic one. Note that this equation plays the role of a 
fundamental law in Cartwright's terms, which is an axiom (or the set of axioms) of a "scientific 
theory" in my terms. 
Now, keep in mind that econometrics fall in a tradition of economics in which it is 
accepted and assumed that economic theory studies the relations between causes and their 
effects, and that, therefore, this equation (Equation (D)) can be taken to represent a causal 
relationship. (I am not implying here that all explanations in the natural sciences are causal, 
but again, the kind of relations at issue here may be seen as analogous to and illustrative of 
certain relations in the natural sciences.) 
Economic data and economic theory (models) have two characteristics (Cartwright, 
1989: 149, 150) that are particularly interesting if the analogy between econometric 
methodology and the methodology of the natural sciences is taken into account: 
• an econometric theory (model) is a system of simultaneous equations, and 
• some - or sometimes, all - of these equations include "random" terms which reflect 
the influences of numerous erratic causes in addition to the few "systematic" ones. 
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What is important to Cartwright's - and our - aims here (Cartwright, 1989: 150), is that, 
given all of the above, Equation (D) assumes a stable tendency of price to influence demand 
and that the strength of that tendency is fixed and measurable, denoted by a in Equation (D). 
The point of any econometric model (theory in our terms) is that its equations represent 
clearly the fact that something remains constant under change (the a of Equation (D)). 
Cartwright (1989: 152) quotes 0. Duncan as follows: " ... if we did not have hope that at least 
some features of our model [theory] would be invariant with respect to some changes in 
circumstances ... [i]f all the model [theory] is good for is to describe a particular set of data 
... then we might as well forego the effort ... ". 
Consider now (Cartwright, 1989: 152) what happens if the amount of television 
advertising is added to Equation (D) as an independent cause that may also influence the 
quantity demanded. Then we get 
q= ap+ {Jr+u ... Equation (D) 
We add r, but assume a stays unaltered. Thus, with or without r, we assume the price 
elasticity to remain unchanged. Cartwright: (1989: 152, 153) writes: "It is important to see how 
peculiar this is. From the point of view of the new equation the old equation expresses a 
relationship that holds in one particular circumstance: r = 0. When r is 0, p and q have a 
familiar distribution: a bi-variate normal. In principle, the distribution of p and q could be 
entirely different when r takes on some different value. But the way the equation is written 
denies that. The method of writing the equation assumes that, however p affects q, that is 
something that stays the same as the situation with respect to r changes, however it does so". 
Thus, what happens in econometric methodology is that parameters (p in Equation (D)) are 
established in one context that are assumed to obtain in entirely different situations. 
In econometrics, Cartwright (1991b: 8) explains, 
[t]he fundamental equations of the model [theory] are supposed to describe 
separate mechanisms that operate independently from each other. Hence, it 
should be possible to manipulate the background structure so as to bring 
about a change in one of these equations without affecting the others - that 
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is, to change one mechanism at a time while leaving [the] others intact. These 
equations are then said to be autonomous with respect to each other. The 
derived equation, which describes the actual behaviour that the system 
undergoes, is not autonomous with respect to these others: change any of 
them and it will change too. It is called a confluent equation. The resulting 
relationship between the basic explanatory equations of the model [theory] 
and the descriptive confluent equations appears to parallel that in physics 
between fundamental laws and their phenomenological consequences. 
This relationship is in model-theoretic terms analogous to the relationship in science between 
theories and their models. 
Let us now turn to the issue at hand - namely to work out a model-theoretic realist 
interpretation of science. 
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CHAPTER TWO: A MODEL-THEORETIC ACCOUNT OF SCIENCE25 
2.1 Introduction 
What is it that philosophers can or should say about science? Should we explain the 
actions of scientists? Should we explain the methodology of science? Should we explain the 
process and progress of science? Should we study the knowledge claims offered by 
scientists and decide which of these are so-called "scientific" knowledge claims? Should we 
study the history of science and its influence on current scientific practice? What - if 
anything - should we say about reality and the links - again, if any - that exist between 
science and reality? 
In his article on philosophy of science in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995) 
David Papineau describes philosophy of science as being divided into what he calls the 
"epistemology of science" and the "metaphysics of science". He claims the former to be 
concerned with questions about the justification and objective nature of scientific knowledge 
and the latter to be occupied with "philosophically puzzling aspects of the reality uncovered 
by science" (ibid. :809). I agree that philosophy of science consists of, among other things, 
an epistemology of science. I would also agree to describe such an epistemology in terms 
of justification for scientific knowledge, but then only if it is understood to imply that a scientific 
epistemology should also - perhaps before anything else - offer an analysis of the nature 
of scientific knowledge, and the process by which we come to such knowledge claims. As far 
as a metaphysics of science is concerned though, I have a few problems with Papineau's 
characterisation. Much rather than any kind of metaphysical musings concerning 
philosophical questions about the "philosophically puzzling" parts of reality that science 
"uncovers", a philosophy of science should offer an ontology of science. If we do assume -
as Papineau obviously does - that science can "uncover" certain aspects of reality a 
philosophy of science should surely focus rather on the structure of such an enterprise than 
that of reality? We are way past the time of so-called "natural philosophy", and should 
acknowledge that now - as has been the case for many centuries actually - philosophy of 
science is about science and not about reality. Of course, if it is assumed that science 
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"uncovers" aspects of reality, we have to say something about reality as it is linked to science, 
but never should we, as philosophers of science, again try to write an ontology or (ontologies) 
of reality. 
But, what then of realism? I shall argue in this thesis that the only kind of realism 
possible is indeed one that focuses more on science than it does on reality. For a workable 
scientific realism the only necessary and sufficient condition that is concerned with the nature 
of reality is, simply, the assumption that there exists such a reality independent of whatever 
happens in science. All the other conditions for such a realism should be concerned with 
science - its nature, its progress, and its justification. For, how can we claim that science 
is about reality if we do not study science and its processes? Perhaps it seems as if this 
question implies an equally strong motive for studying reality. However the assumption of the 
independent existence of reality takes care of that half of the question, simply because, in the 
end, a philosophy of science is about science, and science is about reality. When it comes 
to studying the links between science and reality, the original existential assumption 
concerning reality may be augmented by certain general ("common-sensical")26 ontological 
orientations concerning the nature of reality; for instance its complex and rich nature, as well 
as its similarities and regularities, should be taken into account. But the bottom line remains 
the same since, even then, the reason for these ontological orientations is that the way 
science links itself to reality cannot be motivated or understood without these orientations. 
The underlying reason for the complexity of the science-reality connection is that science and 
reality represent different logical classes and therefore they cannot simply be compared to 
each other directly - especially not in a one-to-one relation of correspondence - without 
committing a chain of serious category mistakes. See Chapter 4 for my discussion of 
Cartwright's views in terms of this issue. In Chapter 5 I shall come back to my own views on 
realism in the light of the model of science developed in this chapter. A discussion of the 
process of science in model-theoretic terms, analysing the development of scientific theories 
from their origin to their applications, forms the foundation of a model-theoretic realism. One 
cannot have the one without the other, therefore I shall begin by analysing science and its 
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enterprises model-theoretically (in the remainder of this chapter), then I shall move on to 
discuss some of the main non-statement analyses of science (Chapter 3), then I shall 
comment on and discuss Cartwright's analysis of science and her specific kind of realist 
oriented problems (Chapter 4), and then, I shall discuss the realist features of science in 
model-theoretic terms (Chapter 5). 
I am advocating a philosophical approach to science which introduces a mediating 
factor (the role of "models") between scientific statements and real objects. In Chapter 5 I 
shall discuss the realist implications of such an account of science. I shall also show that 
such an approach offers the means via which the implications of the fact that there is no 
unique kind of empirical linkage between theories and real systems - but rather a variety of 
many-to-many links between theories, their (conceptual and empirical) models, and systems 
in reality- may be satisfactorily examined and made sense of - still within a realist context. 
A model-theoretic account of science implies an articulation, a kind of "doubling - by 
splitting - up" of the relations between scientific statements and objects in reality, because 
it implies these relations have to be regarded as "filtering" through the models in the case of 
both the formulation of a scientific theory and its application. In this view a conciliation of the 
statement and non-statement view of science is achieved. 
The model-theoretic analysis of the process of science that I propose is done in terms 
of a model of science that offers a rational (conceptual) reconstruction of the "life" of a typical 
scientific enterprise, and is offered against a stratified view of the process of science. This 
stratification is three-fold: it consists of an empirical level, a middle conceptual level, and a 
linguistic level. v The terms of the first level are very particular, those of the second are more 
general, although still specific, while the terms at the final level are at the highest level of 
generality. The relationships between the levels are complex (and often interchangeable), but 
will be presented as a development in time from the first level through the middle level to the 
third level, and then back again. 
The "purely empirical" level I interpret as based on the existence of various systems 
in reality and consists of our interactions with them, while I view the final level as a level of 
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linguistic systems at which a scientific theory is formally formulated and suitably expressed 
in some appropriate language. The middle conceptual level is a very complex one in the 
sense that it has various facets that, in their turn, may be seen in terms of a certain kind of 
hierarchy. It is at this level that models both interpreting scientific theories and making them 
true are constructed, and, also at this level, the issue of adequate reference to real systems 
is examined. I claim the latter relations of adequacy to consist of various scientific 
experimental and observational activities, which may lead to the establishment of a relation 
of isomorphism between (a substructure of) some model of a theory and some "empirical" 
model of some real system and the experimental relations executed in that system. 
In this chapter, I shall concentrate on the nature of scientific theories, their relations 
to models and to (systems in) reality, and the implications thereof for the nature of scientific 
knowledge. The issue of realism will be addressed separately in Chapter 5. I shall start off 
with a discussion of the formulation process of scientific theories, i.e. their "coming-into-
being". Then, in Section 2.4 I shall discuss the matter of applying and interpreting scientific 
theories. Finally, in Section 2.5, I shall conclude this chapter by making a few remarks on the 
nature of scientific progress as it is depicted by a model-theoretic approach to scientific 
theories. The issues discussed in the last two sections of this chapter shall be picked up 
again and worked out finally in terms of their realist implications in Chapter 5. 
2.2 Terminological note 
In this chapter, and also throughout the rest of this thesis, I shall take examples from 
the natural sciences - mostly from physics and astronomy - to support and illustrate my 
arguments. As mentioned in Chapter 1 a model of science such as the one that I shall set out 
in this chapter works very well for the natural sciences, because all three main aspects of 
such a model are simple and clearly portrayed in the natural sciences. As far as the aspects 
of reality studied go, an electron is a far simpler concept than a human being; the models 
employed at the "middle" level of my interpretation of science can often be mathematical in 
the natural sciences, which they cannot necessarily be in other sciences; and finally, the 
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languages can be formalised quite easily in the natural sciences (in first-order logic for 
instance), while other sciences often use full natural language which is tremendously more 
complex. I am convinced though that the model that I am proposing for the philosophical 
interpretation of science is also applicable to the so-called "social sciences", although the 
stage of theory formulation and the interpretative stage of the scientific process will differ from 
that of the natural sciences as far as certain emphases on context dependency and other 
related issues are concemed.28 Apart form referring to certain parallel issues in economics 
and econometrics here and there, the scope of this thesis however does not allow me to go 
into these matters in any more detail. 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to give at least an informal explanation of the 
notions of "theory" and "model" as I shall be using them. Let us choose a first-order predicate 
language, L, in which a deductive theory T is formulated.29 The only condition I set with 
regards to language L, is that it should be appropriate for formulating statements about 
mathematical structures. Let us say that theory T is the (deductively closed) set of all 
formulae which can be deduced from a consistent set (system) of axioms, I:, in formal 
language L. Now, in this language, L, there will be - among other things30 - an infinite, 
countable set of individual variables and a nonempty set of predicate letters. Then, a 
mathematician (or "scientist" for my purposes) may give meaning to these symbols used to 
formulate the sentences in theory T in language L, by constructing a certain mathematical 
structure, call it U, suitable to be described by the language L.31 An interpretation of language 
L will consist of a set over which we consider the individual variables to range, and predicates 
or relations defined on this set as interpretations of the predicate symbols in L. Thus as soon 
as every n-ary predicate symbol in language L is associated with an n-ary relation in structure 
U, we can say that this mathematical structure is an interpretation of the language L, and 
thus, by implication, of any sentence in L.32 Note that of course, for every other definition of 
the domain of the mathematical structure and of the relations defined on it, one is confronted 
with another interpretation of the language. There are thus no "rigid designators" across 
interpretations. A mode/ of any formula such that every free occurrence of variables in it 
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refers to an element in the domain of an interpretation of L by means of a specific valuation, 
will be an interpretation under which that formula is true by the specific valuation defined for 
its (the formula's) variables. 33 Now, a sentence is a formula with no free occurrence of 
variables. Thus the definition of the truth of a formula implies that a sentence will either be 
true under an interpretation by all possible valuations or false under all valuations. Hence for 
sentences we may speak of truth under an interpretation without mentioning valuations. And, 
a set of sentences is true under an interpretation if every sentence of that set is true under 
that interpretation. Thus a model of a theory (being a set of sentences in some formal 
language L) will be an interpretation under which that set of sentences (i.e. the theory) is 
true. 34 
2.3 The formulation of scientific theories 
Now, turning to the epistemic process leading to the formulation of a scientific theory, 
the following. No-one - not even scientists - ever studies reality in all its complexity. The 
way in which we come to knowledge is determined by acts of abstraction and simplification. 
Thus, rather than focussing on the colourful richness of reality, scientists typically will decide 
to focus on a particular aspect of reality. Moreover, intensifying their initial selective actions, 
scientists will also decide to concentrate only on particular features of the real system they 
have picked out. 
At the start of a particular line of research, the first encounters between scientists and 
the relevant system in reality have an interesting feature. Although traditionally viewed as 
happening at the lowest level of scientific activity - "lowest" in the sense of least abstract 
and not least dependent on historical, social, and cultural factors - these encounters are 
already not "objective" in the sense of being neutral to any kind of external influence. This is 
because of the influence various contingent factors have on the actions of scientists and their 
arguments. These factors range from extremely specific to broad combinations of general 
factors influencing scientists at a given time. 
They include personal factors such as the personal interests of scientists involved, their 
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particular research goals, and the social context in which their research is done. Then there 
are also factors that pertain more to the "theory-ladenness" of the choice of experiments, the 
interpretations of data, and so on. These factors include the paradigm or research tradition 
in which the scientists are working, the state of their discipline at the time, the level of 
technology and experimental apparatus available at the time to those particular scientists, 
and also the body of "already established" theories (as the background} against which these 
particular scientists will work. Also included here are factors to which Gerald Holton (1995) 
refers as "themata". These factors are on the one hand, a cross between the specific 
motivation behind the choice of addressing results and problems within one particular 
scientific framework rather than another, and, on the other hand, the scientists' world view 
at the time.35 In this sense, I agree with the constructivists: no scientific activity takes place 
in some kind of objective vacuum. 
The inherent conditioning, or refining, abstractive nature (and potentially idealising 
power) of activities carried out at this level leads ensuing activities to a level more general in 
scope than that of the original encounters with specific aspects of reality. At this level 
scientists create conceptual "models" - which I call "intended models" for obvious reasons 
- of the real system in question. These models are obviously not (yet) formally identifiable 
as interpretations of any sentences of the language in which the final theory will be 
formulated. However, after theory-formulation, at the stage where possible interpretations and 
(empirical) applications of the theory in question are considered, it will become clear that the 
intended "model" of the theory in question is also one of the (possible) mathematical models 
(i.e. interpretations under which the theory in question is true) of the relevant theory. (Thus, 
at the formulation stage of scientific theories, my use of the term "model" is perhaps not 
strictly in the same sense as the one model theorists use.) 
For example, let us consider briefly the formulation of Newton's laws of motion and his 
law of gravitation. Newton wanted i.a. to continue Kepler's research about the movement -
and positioning - of the planets in our solar system. Kepler's laws originated, it seems, 
largely because of his own interest in specifically the movement and positions of the planets 
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in our solar system. His intended model thus may be said to have been supported by data 
concerning only these (and related) planetary features. His research was based on 
observational data regarding the positioning of the planets at different times, much of which 
was the original work of Tycho Brahe. His interpretation of his observational data would have 
been, for instance - and probably among other things - influenced or "laden" by his 
mathematical idealism - e.g. his claim that the planetary orbits should fit exactly into nested 
Platonic solids. Finally, Kepler's research culminated in his formulation of his three laws -
the first two in 1609 and the third in 1618. 
Now Newton could not study all the complexities of our solar system as it manifests itself 
in the manifold of reality. He was also, as mentioned above, interested in examining planetary 
motion in our solar system. Thus he identified the details necessary for his research goal by 
abstracting from this system in reality only those specific features in which he was interested. 
He would have discarded, for instance, the fact that the sun's rays are hot, that Mars seems 
to be reddish in colour, and so on. But, in this way, because these abstractions were so 
closely guided by his intentions - and certainly influenced by both Brahe and Kepler, and 
also Galileo's findings - he would never really have been dealing with the bare data that he 
had extracted from reality. He would, rather, in fact, have been dealing with a conceptualised 
model of our solar system that would in the end lead him to the formalisation of the theory of 
solar systems itself. 
In order to study the dependence of the force of gravity on the distance from the centre 
of the earth, Newton compared the fall of a stone (the alleged apple) on the surface of the 
earth with the motion of the moon. Newton discovered that the " ... forces of terrestrial gravity 
decrease as the inverse square of the distance from the centre of the earth" (Gamov, 1962: 
62). He consequently generalised this result to "all material bodies in the universe" (ibid.) and 
so formulated his universal law of gravitation. 
Scientists thus conceptualise their objectives in the light of the data they gather - and 
may still be gathering - with an eye on their research goals and guided by the specific 
scientific tradition, community, theoretical network or paradigm they are working from. 36 The 
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creative context of this stage of the scientific process offers scientists the chance to test and 
constantly reformulate their conceptual structures and to receive results under the conditions 
set by their goals and the context within which they work. This implies that these (intended) 
models have an idealised nature37 in the sense that they are the results of extremely focussed 
actions which typically disregard factors in the empirical system in question that could muddy 
the waters of their research. 
The progression of generalisation common to this stage of science may perhaps roughly 
be logically reconstructed to range from 
• scientists' initial sensations (possibly mediated by an apparatus) of "real" objects and 
their behaviour in some real system (broadly, of aspects of reality), to 
• the construction of percepts of these sensations, to 
• the construction of concepts of these percepts, to 
• the construction of conceptual models which are structured sets of these concepts, and 
which 
• may then - in certain sciences - culminate in the formulation of mathematical models. 
Finally, these (abstracting) actions culminate38 in the formulation of a general (abstract) 
theory - expressed in some suitable language - in the field of research in which the 
relevant scientists have been working. The nature of this level at which theories are 
formalised is abstract, general, and simple in the sense that the values (meanings) of the 
parameters in the general theories are essentially unconditioned and the meaning of 
theoretical terms (such as "electron" or "mass") is in principle open to valuations or 
interpretations made by scientists interested in applying or implementing the theory. This 
implies naturally that a potentially infinite number of conceptual (or mathematical) models can 
be constructed of one and the same theory. 
The aim of Kepler's research surely was to formulate some kind of law (or laws) 
concerning planetary motion. It is sometimes claimed that Kepler's laws do not constitute a 
scientific theory, however. For instance Dilworth (1994b: 135) claims: 
The main reason usually given for Kepler's laws, taken together, not ranking as a 
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theory is their unequivocally empirical character - i.e. the fact that they are 
'instantiated' in the sense that they refer to the individual planets in the solar 
system and, unlike a theory, are capable of being tested more or less directly. The 
present view [Dilworth's] supports a distinction along these lines, and in fact 
provides an explanation of it, viz., that, unlike Newton's theory, Kepler's laws are 
not integrally related to a model .... 
Well, it is indeed the case that Kepler's laws are very "empirical" and less general in scope 
than Newton's laws of motion and his law of gravity, since the latter do not give any particular 
value or parameter to their theoretical terms. 39 
However, Kepler does generalise from his intended model in the sense that his laws are 
about the motion and position of all the planets - or any planet - (known to him) in our solar 
system, and not particularly about any one specific planet. Moreover, the application of his 
laws to the motion and position of any one planet may be seen to imply the construction of 
a specific conceptual model concentrating only on the particulars concerning that specific 
planet. Although his laws are indeed far less general than Newton's, and also far more like 
the kind of "empirical" theory philosophers in the Popperian tradition advocate, his laws can 
be viewed as part of an "intellectual system" ofthe kind Torretti (1990: 24) supports. Torretti's 
argument comes down to the following: Should it be found (as perhaps from a certain 
perspective it was discovered much later) that a particular planet does not obey Kepler's laws 
it would imply a revision of our scientific thoughts concerning planetary motion. I also take this 
as sufficient motivation to view Kepler's laws as comprising a theory (albeit perhaps a "low-
level" one). 
It is the case that Newton's laws of motion and his law of gravity could in fact finally 
explain Kepler's laws, and thus that Kepler's laws may perhaps not be said to explain the 
positioning of the planets but rather merely to describe their motion. 40 I think that we have at 
least to accept the legacy of the advocates of the deductive-nomological model of explanation 
in so far as we accept that scientific explanation is really some kind of inference, the 
conclusion of which describes the facts to be explained. Generally, Newton's laws explain 
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Kepler's in the sense that a conceptual model of Newton's laws may be given by our solar 
system, and the data giving positions and motions of a particular planet in that solar system 
may be viewed to constitute an empirical model that is isomorphically embedded in the above 
conceptual model. More formally, the application of Newton's universal law of gravity to the 
motion of our solar system's planets around the sun (conceptual model) enables one to 
mathematically derive Kepler's three laws (empirical model). More specifically for instance, 
Newton's law of gravitation explains Kepler's third law in so far as it shows that Kepler's third 
law is based on a force that is exerted towards the centre of the sun and that is inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance between the sun and the planet in question. 
However, it has to be noted that although Newton's laws explain Kepler's they do not, after 
all, explain e.g. gravity - they merely describe it. {I shall briefly discuss the explanation-
description debate again in Cartwright's terms in Chapter 4. This, though, is a very complex 
debate that cannot be fully analysed within the scope of this thesis.) 
Do Newton's laws constitute a theory? Should his laws be viewed as the axioms of this 
theory or as empirical laws in the Popperian way? In the model-theoretic approach to science 
that I advocate, the axioms of a theory describe the conceptual model(s) in which they (the 
laws they represent) are true. Such a model then sets out the calculation of values of certain 
functions and the interpretation of certain theoretical terms in the context of the model. In this 
case, for instance, it could mean that bodies are conceived of as "mass-points" without 
extension. The theory in general sets down the nature of the relations between the terms in 
its conceptual models. Thus on my account, Newton's laws of motion and his law of gravity 
do constitute a theory since they are general enough, or broad enough in scope to offer 
different conceptual models and interpretations of its terms in different contexts of 
application.41 They can be viewed as "empirical" laws only via the interpreting mediation of 
conceptual models and some empirical substructures representing observational data and 
other empirical calculations, which brings us to the next section on the interpretation of 
scientific theories. 
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2.4 The interpretation of scientific theories 
Now, in order for scientists to give "reference" to the multi-interpretable theoretical terms 
and parameters42 of scientific theories, more models - other than the original one leading 
to the formulation of the theory - may be constructed. In other words, because of the 
possibility of all these different models of theory T (in language L), the theory - say in our 
example, Newton's laws - may be (in principle at least) related to any (mathematical and 
thus conceptual) model in which it is true and not only to the intended one. If we take the set 
of axioms, r, to be Newton's three laws of motion and his law of gravitation, expressed 
formally, then they will hold in any planetary system (because of the general nature in which 
they were formulated) and then we can pick any "planet" in such a system and be sure that 
its orbit will be an ellipse and the system's "sun" will be in one focus. E.g. a model in which, 
say, Jupiter is the "sun" and its satellites are the "planets" may now be constructed. 
These models are thus interpretations of the theory43, each of which is also in its tum 
determined by - among other factors - the research intentions and thematic preferences 
of the scientists wishing to apply or study the theory. Note here that the first most obvious 
model of the theory is its original "intended" one. However, since different groups of scientists 
will be applying the theory in question - perhaps for different reasons - at various times, 
this is not necessarily the model that will be chosen as the one via which the theory is to be 
applied or interpreted. The intended model is thus in nature no different from the 
mathematical structures that will be constructed to interpret the theory in such a way that the 
theory will be true in them. These models simply differ as far as the nature of their origins is 
concerned, and features common to both - such as the role of thematic preferences - are 
simply emphasised differently in each case. In this sense for example, the intended models 
have more of an organising and guiding role in the sense of being the first conceptual means 
via which scientists are able to make the first abstractions from reality. The conceptual 
models will give reference and meaning to or "fill in" the content of (some of) the general 
terms (e.g. electron, mass, velocity, temperature) used in the theory44 and specify values for 
the parameters of formulae in the theory in such a way that the theory turns out to be true in 
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these models. The models thus constructed are then obviously mathematical models in the 
Tarskian sense. 45 
Although more specific than the theory, these models are still general in nature in so far 
as they are idealisations in the same way as the intended models are. Nancy Cartwright (for 
instance Cartwright, 1983, 1986, 1989) sees this as problematic as far as the possibility of 
theories offering descriptions of reality is concerned. I disagree, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 4. It is impossible to give clear-cut rules or conditions for the adequacy of our 
conceptions or the real existence of objects in systems in reality, because of the open-ended 
generality of theories in the sense of the different models in which they may be true and 
which is a consequence of the "abstract" character of theories and also because of the open-
endedness of the conceptual models in the sense of their "ideal" nature. The role played by 
the empirical activities of science in establishing the last referential link between some system 
in reality and some model of the theory needs a suspension at the conceptual level of the 
ceteris paribus clauses at play at the linguistic level of science in order to fill in the details 
that, at this level, have been "idealised" and "abstracted" away. More about this in what 
follows, and also in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Here is an example to illustrate the construction of different models interpreting the same 
theory. Newton's laws made it possible to calculate very precisely the motion of the planets 
in our solar system (any solar system for that matter) under the influence of mutual 
gravitational attraction. Up to 1820, scientists interpreting (or applying) Newton's laws of 
motion and his law of gravitation to our solar system had worked in a model of these laws 
(comprising Newton's "theory") which consisted of only seven planets. Then, in 1820, 
calculations carried out within this model started to give "wrong" predictions, and it became 
apparent that the motion of Uranus "did not conform to Newton's grand scheme• (Schwinger, 
1986: 195). The possibility that the motion of Uranus could be affected by the gravitational 
attraction of another planet seemed a good solution to the problem though. So, scientists 
thought of postulating the existence of an eighth planet, and consequently constructed a 
different model of Newton's theory, now with eight planets. In 1845 John Adams calculated 
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the position of this "new'' planet - Neptune - in our solar system, and shortly afterwards 
Urbain Leverrier's calculations confirmed Adams's findings. 
Applications of the same Newtonian "theory" (his three laws of motion plus his law of 
gravity) includes the "discovery" of Pluto in 1930 as the result of theoretical calculations 
based on the universal law of gravity. Also Newton gave the first explanation of the 
"precession of the equinoxes" since the time of the Greeks by applying his law of gravity to 
the motion of the earth. And, a last example, aspects of the motion of the tides of the sea 
could be explained by applying the universal law of gravity to the earth's perihelion and 
aphelion motions (i.e. the movement of the earth far from and close to the sun). Thus new 
information results in different (new) models still constructed to attain the same (previous) 
goal, but also different aims result in different models. 
I take the relations that exist between some theory and the mathematical (conceptual, 
semantic) models that are interpretations of the theory's language and in which the sentences 
of the theory are true, as the first set of relations that determine the possibility of reference 
to some real system. The goal of a formal logician will be to prove that his deduction (theory) 
is valid, i.e. true in all possible worlds allowed by the axioms, i.e. true in all possible models 
(in the conceptual system}, one of which may or may not be in its turn "about• some system 
in reality. Thus, for the formal logician, the question of whether it is possible to construct a 
"second set" of interpretations or models (to retrace the steps of the original scientist -
representing the group of scientists that "formulated" the theory in question - even further 
back to reality), is rather irrelevant. 
Scientists, however, will definitely be interested to know whether one of the conceptual 
models of their theory can have a system in reality as some further interpretation or model, 
because they formulated their theory precisely to enable them to make some sort of claim 
about a certain aspect of some real system. The method of verification of each of these 
(conceptual, mathematical) models (i.e. how well do each of them reflect the system in the 
real world?}, will be decided by the specific nature of the specific (conceptual, mathematical) 
model in question, as well as by the nature of the specific real system in question. It could be 
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that an observation through a telescope is needed, or an observation through a microscope, 
or some sort of calculation, which has less to do with observation, and so on and so on. In 
other words, neither Tarski, nor anyone else, could or can really give a general criterion for 
the truth of the sentences in this last set of interpretations. 
Should some of the elements and relations of one such a conceptual model be 
interpreted to correspond to objects and relations of some system in the "real world" however, 
I claim a further mathematical model may be identified such that its objects and relations 
(representing the relevant empirical data) constitute a mathematical structure which is 
(isomorphic to) a substructure of the relevant conceptual model. If the phenomena in some 
real system and the experimental data concerned with those phenomena are logically 
reconstructed in terms of such a mathematical structure - call it an "empirical" model - the 
relation of empirical adequacy (characterised by the various actions mentioned above) then 
becomes a relation which is an isomorphism between the empirical model and some 
substructure of the relevant (conceptual, semantic) model of the theory in question. 
For example, take a conceptual model of the theory constituted by Newton's laws of 
motion and his law of gravity as the elliptical orbit of some planet - say Pluto - around the 
sun, with the sun in one of its foci. Say 117 individual observations of Pluto on this elliptical 
course are made by scientists working in this model. Then these observations, jointly 
(interpreted as 117 points, at different times, on an ellipse) represent an empirical model of 
the theory.46 
Let us take a brief look also at what happens for instance in econometrics as far as 
empirical models are concerned, before we continue. Mary Morgan (in De Marchi, 1988: 199) 
points out that econometricians have always been occupied with finding "applied counterparts 
to theory that 'worked' with reference to observed data" (ibid.). She (and econometricians in 
general) might however have a slightly different interpretation of the notion of "empirical 
model". For instance she (De Marchi, 1988:200) remarks that the original goals of 
econometricians were to make economic theories more "concrete" and to measure the 
constant parameters of the laws of these theories, and since the "theoretical models" (which 
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can either refer to the theory or a conceptual model of the theory in my terms, since 
economists seem to use these notions sometimes interchangeably) were not measurable, 
finding empirical models that could be subjected to measurement became necessary. In my 
terms empirical models are the means via which the mathematical or statistical data of 
experiments are linked to the more qualitative content of a conceptual model of a theory. So 
perhaps the difference between our notions seems for present purposes negligible enough 
not to spend any more time on it. 
However, although examining the econometric case is illuminating with regards to ours, 
it becomes apparent that Morgan is indeed somehow conflating the notions of conceptual and 
empirical model set out above. She (De Marchi, 1988: 201) sets out three points in the 
process of "finding an empirical model to match the theory involved [and] making the theory 
operational" (ibid.). Briefly they are transforming the "verbal theory" into mathematical form 
and deciding on values for variables, dealing with the ceteris paribus clauses under which the 
theory is taken to hold, and, setting down the specific time frame for each theory. At least the 
first two points seem to be worthy of comment for our purposes. The translation of the 
"verbal" theory into mathematical form is in my terms done either at the linguistic level if 
Morgan means here the mathematical formalisation of sentences in natural language, or at 
the conceptual level, at the time of interpretation, if she means to emphasise the 
determination of values of variables. In either case this formalisation is not necessarily part 
of finding a suitable empirical model, although the specification of time frames as part of the 
specification of parameters, depending on the theory in question, might be. 
A more serious difference is related to her point about the ceteris paribus clauses 
necessary for the theory to hold in the general way that it does. These conditions are already 
"cashed out" when a conceptual model of the theory is constructed in the sense that the 
"initial conditions" needed to make the specific calculations characteristic of actions regarding 
the conceptual model are formulated as part of the said model. The idealised character of 
conceptual models is not so much a result of the ceteris paribus conditions at play at the 
theoretical level as simply a result of the fact that these models are still models of a particular 
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theory. The empirical models in my terms are then even less related to such clauses. Of 
course, even when experiments are carried out, it is the case that certain factors are kept 
stable so as to be able to examine a specific aspect of the real system being studied. These 
factors are however far more specific than the ceteris paribus clauses and are rather a result 
of the specialising way in which science is typically practised. The relations between science 
and reality cannot be anything other than somehow idealised, given the complex nature of 
reality, although the construction of conceptual models of a theory starts the suspension of 
the generalisation implied by scientific theories' ceteris paribus clauses. More on this in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
Thus, my notion of empirical models implies that both the models assigning reference 
to the general terms of the theory and the empirical models representing the (usually 
quantifiable) aspects of verifying the conceptual models of some theory have to be 
"constructed". "Construction" in the first case is more formal and less complex than 
"construction" in the second case. In the second case it implies that data about some system 
in reality is "found" or "discovered" via the necessary experiments co-determined and 
executed in terms set out by the relevant (conceptual) model of the theory. And the results 
of this "construction" may then be represented by some empirical model in which those 
results about the relevant real system are true. Here there is a correlation between Morgan's 
(De Marchi, 1988: 208) remarks concerning the status of empirical models in econometrics 
and the status of empirical models in the natural sciences. She (ibid.) writes " ... the empirical 
models that econometricians [work] with (are] a sort of halfway house, formed to capture the 
correspondence between theory and data ... ". Well, empirical models in my terms also have 
to "bridge" the gap between the conceptual models of a theory and the quantified data 
concerning some system in reality. A last remark concerning Morgan's article: she (De 
Marchi, 1988: 207) remarks that Haalvelmo (1944) stated that " ... in the absence of an 
experimental framework in economics, econometrics must act on both the theory and the 
data, making adjustments on both sides in order to get satisfactory models". In the natural 
sciences this is also true - even despite the presence of an experimental framework (or 
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perhaps because of it?). The hierarchy of 'fools" needed to bring this about is perhaps just 
a little more complex. 
Note thus that the referential relations between the theory and its models are much more 
simple - although also neither rigid nor absolutely fixable - than the relations between 
conceptual models and empirical models of systems in reality. The latter are extremely 
complex and never passive (or absolute), because in this case there are so many more 
variable factors to take into account when considering this more informal and supple relation. 
I quote Sir Allan Cook's (1994: 141) explanation of the link between observation, models and 
theory in physics to show this more clearly: 
Observation is never an isolated activity. The way that we observe depends on 
human capabilities and properties of nature. Observation may affect the objects 
observed and our observational procedures depend upon the state of technology 
and are guided by theory. The results of observation [represented by my empirical 
models] have to be derived by procedures that depend upon some theoretical 
model [one of my conceptual models] as well as upon experimental techniques, ... 
The harder we question nature, [and] the more fundamental the observations we 
make, the more dependent are the results on technique and theory. 
Moreover we as philosophers cannot tell - especially not "before the fact" - which specific 
conceptual construct (which interpretation of some theory) provides the most adequate 
description of some relevant system in reality.47 Only science itself can offer us - at some 
more mature stage of scientific development - an ontology (or ontologies) which can specify 
the contents or detail of the structures reality contains and the particular ways in which they 
behave. 46 Thus, neither the adequacy ("truth") of our conceptions nor the "reality'' of the 
system as described by some theory, is absolute, because both are products of epistemically 
relative interpretations and subject to change. "Adequate" scientific statements may, indeed, 
say of reality that it is the way it is. It is, however, only through the mediation of (conceptual 
and empirical) models that this can be established, and never directly by somehow comparing 
theories to reality. More about this in Chapter 5. 
2.5 The process of science 
2.5.1 Introduction 
36 
Thomas Kuhn's The structure of scientific revolutions (1970) represents a watershed in 
philosophy of science in terms of views concerning the nature of the scientific process, 
culminating in claims about the nature of science's progress, that cannot be ignored in a 
realist analysis of science such as the one offered in this thesis. Although Kuhn's writing 
perhaps never touches directly on the statement/non-statement debate, its use of notions 
such as "paradigm" and "scientific community" invites comment from any model-theoretic 
account of science, while Kuhn's notion concerning "incommensurability" invites comment 
from a realist point of view. In what follows I shall briefly discuss the nature of scientific 
progress in terms of a model-theoretic realist account of science, to show how Kuhn's 
revolutionary periods may thus be interpreted and accommodated. I shall also discuss the 
process of science in terms of the distinctions and common features between the Kuhnian 
notion of "paradigm" and my notion of "conceptual model". I shall mainly concentrate on the 
Kuhn of The structure of scientific revolutions, simply because that, in the end, remains the 
"bible" for Kuhnian philosophy of science. 
2.5.2 The nature of scientific progress 
Is the true nature of science revolutionary? Or is the process of science cumulative? Can 
there be revolutionary periods as well as cumulative periods in the development of science? 
Is the notion of paradigm essential to the idea of revolutionary change in science? Is the 
notion of model essential to the notion of cumulative scientific progress? 
In The structure of scientific revolutions Kuhn (1970:1) advocates a shift of focus in 
historical and philosophical studies of science from studying "finished scientific achievements" 
(ibid.) to concentrating on the "historical record of the research activity itself' (ibid.). He (Kuhn, 
1970:2) is arguing against the conception that the content of science is somehow "uniquely 
exemplified" by observations, scientific theories and laws, and so against a rather na"ive 
interpretation of the notion of "development-by-accumulation" (ibid.). Believers in this view of 
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scientific progress have the task of showing that once current views of nature, such as 
Aristotelian dynamics and phlogistic chemistry, are, as a whole, neither less scientific nor 
more the result of views peculiar to specific scientists, than later theories are. 
One of the most powerful arguments against scientific realism - sometimes referred 
to as the so-called "argument from scientific revolutions" - centres around the seeming 
contradiction implied by the following question: 
• How is it possible, if scientific realism is true, that the history of science abounds with 
examples of theories that have had great predictive success, but that were eventually 
"unmasked" by later science as being "unacceptable" or simply "false"?49 
There are of course various ways in which the argument from scientific revolutions can be 
approached. The one that seems to me to be the most plausible relates to discussions in 
recent philosophy of science by philosophers like Nancy Cartwright, and also the non-
statement advocates such as Patrick Suppes, Bas Van Fraassen, Ronald Giere, and a few 
others. In this context, I approach the problem of the nature of scientific progress by means 
of the conceptual system of models of theories that I have explained in the above. I claim that 
the role of so-called "scientific revolutions" in scientific progress may be interpreted as less 
interruptive and more continuous if the suppleness of this stage in the scientific process (i.e. 
the stage at which models are constructed) is allowed to influence our notions concerning 
scientific knowledge. 
Now, Kuhn wishes to focus rather on the historical acceptance of scientific knowledge 
in a particular time than on any timeless contributions from an earlier science to the present 
one. To do this it seems to be important that any study of a specific scientific practice should 
be conducted from the point of view of the scientists working in that particular community at 
the time and not from the point of view of modem or current science. In this sense it seems 
likely that such a study may offer nothing more than explanations for the "internal coherence" 
of theories and for the reasons why they are deemed to offer the "closest possible fit to 
nature" at a specific time. Kuhn (1970: 4) stresses in this sense that it is indeed the 
"incommensurable ways of seeing the world and of practising science in it" (ibid.) that 
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differentiate between various "schools of science" and not simply methodological failures or 
differences. He (1970: 118) claims that: "At the very least, as a result of discovering oxygen, 
Lavoisier saw nature differently. And in the absence of some recourse to that hypothetical 
fixed nature that he 'saw differently', the principle of economy will urge us to say that after 
discovering oxygen he worked in a different world'. 
Kuhn goes on to claim (1970: 7) that "revolutions" do not simply imply the addition of one 
more "item to a scientist's world'', but rather result in important changes in the scientific 
processional infrastructure. They cause the revision of the evaluative measures concerning 
experimental procedures that are in place at a given time in a given community, change the 
familiar ways in which entities were conceived or conceptualised up to that time, and 
ultimately, result in a shift of the "network of theory'' through which the given community "dealt 
with the world" up to that point in time. 
In what follows, I shall address the following questions related to the above: 
• Is the content of science wholly, and uniquely - or even mainly - given by current 
observations and scientific theories and laws? In this context, what is the role of models 
in the process of science? 
• If science is studied in the way advocated by Kuhn in The structure ... , how exactly 
should the nature and role of "paradigms" be understood? What is the difference - if 
any - between the role played by models in the process of science and that played by 
paradigms? 
• What is the meaning of Kuhn's "different worlds"? 
In his best anti-realist manner, Kuhn (1970: 7) claims that "[s]cientific fact and theory are 
not categorically separable, except perhaps within a single tradition of normal scientific 
practice. That is why the unexpected discovery is not simply factual in its import and why the 
scientist's world is qualitatively transformed as well as quantitatively enriched by fundamental 
novelties of either fact or theory''. 
I disagree with Kuhn about the reason why an unexpected discovery is, as he (ibid.) 
claims "not simply factual in its import". He offers the inseparability of scientific fact and theory 
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as justification for this claim. I would, rather than entwining "real" facts and "scientific" theories 
from the start, instead speak of the layered nature of the process of science and consider 
each layer and its active factors in turn, and only then go on to study the connections and 
relations between layers, and between (some of) these layers and aspects of reality. 
In this way, at least a conceptual distinction between science and reality becomes 
possible, and I see that as a plausible way in which to rescue some form of realism and also 
to escape the overwhelming (epistemological and ontological) relativism implied by the kind 
of constructivist approach Kuhn advocates. I agree with Bhaskar who states in A realist 
theory of science (1978) that the relationship between science and reality seems problematic 
only if one either accepts the social character of science, but denies that its object of study 
is independent of all social activity (the epistemic fallacy), or if one accepts the independence 
of reality, but denies the social nature of science (ontic fallacy). While Kuhn seems to be 
guilty of the first kind of fallacy, it is worthwhile to point out that the ontic fallacy (which seems 
somehow most compatible with the view concerning progress-by-accumulation) is not, 
however, the only other option open to us. 
Acknowledging that reality exists independently of the enterprise of science, need mean 
neither the denial of the social nature of science nor succumbing to views as narrow as those 
focussing only on the "natural", "fixed", or "objective" nature of the object of scientific study. 
None of the above implies that for instance theories explaining and describing light as 
photons (quantum-mechanical entities that exhibit both characteristics of waves and of 
particles) are not scientifically "more advanced" or "better" than Huygens's theory of light, or 
theories based on Fresnel's and Young's theories that claimed light to be transverse wave 
motion. Neither does it imply that I somehow view Planck's, Einstein's, and Feynman's 
theories about light to be out of reach of further scientific activities or criticism. Science 
progresses and scientific knowledge is cumulative in the following way. 
Scientific progress is made at different speeds at the different levels of science. For 
instance, the model of Newton's theory of our solar system which works with seven planets 
can still be said to refer to an aspect of reality. The question of the truth of the theory is 
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model-specific in the sense that it depends on the satisfaction of truth criteria which may differ 
from model to model and are satisfied differently in different models. 50 Thus, in my example, 
Newton's theory may indeed be true in each independent model thereof, by specific 
valuations under specific interpretations. But the theory- taken in its general uninterpreted 
form - could not be said to be true because the model with seven planets referred to reality, 
and then be said to be false, because of the construction of the new, more encompassing 
model dealing with eight planets. Nothing can really, model-theoretically, be said about the 
truth (unqualified) of such an uninterpreted set of sentences. 
Theories change very slowly, conceptual models more quickly, and empirical models 
and the empirical data bases (the accumulation of empirical data via observations and 
experiments) they depict, the quickest. The general theory of relativity was formulated by 
Einstein (and Hilbert) in 1915. For more than 80 years now physicists have been constructing 
literally dozens of different types of models - all models of precisely the same theory - to 
fit the experimental and observational data about the space-time structure of the real 
universe, but also to fit individual or even cultural preferences, such as a passionate belief 
in, or an equally passionate aversion to, the idea of a Big Bang. 
Theory changes usually occur only when the possibility of changing and modifying the 
models of the theory concerned has been exhausted, which confirms the continuity of 
scientific knowledge. Think of the rotation of the orbit of Mercury. Einstein's theory of general 
relativity interprets all gravitational interaction as due to the curvature of space-time. Applying 
Riemann's mathematical theory of curved spaces (of any number of dimensions) to the 
physically real curved space-time - a four-dimensional space-time - and correlating by 
equations the so-called "curvature tensor"51 of the space-time continuum with the distribution 
and motion of masses, all of Newton's law of gravity's results may be derived at the first 
approximation. For example, according to Newton's law of gravity planets move along the 
elliptical orbits with the sun in one focus that Kepler's empirical laws had already determined. 
According to Einstein's theory of general relativity all motions should be considered in the 
four-dimensional world of "events" (x,y,z,icf)52 which is curved if gravitational fields are 
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present. The ''world lines" (Gamov, 1962: 205) of any material body in the four-dimensional 
world (representing the history of the motion of that body) must be geodesics or the "shortest 
lines", and can be calculated on the basis of the general theory of relativity. Exact calculations 
showed that the elliptical orbit of a planet around the sun does not stay stationary as Newton 
predicted. Rather it is "slowly rotating with its major axis turning by a small angle in the course 
of each revolution" (ibid.). This phenomenon is most noticeable in the case of Mercury, which 
is closest to the sun and has the most elongated orbit of all the planets. Thus no model of 
Newton's laws of motion and his law of gravitation could solve the anomaly with regard to 
Mercury's perihelion motion, and so finally a new theory was formulated, some of the models 
of which can indeed explain these discrepancies. Gamov (1962: 205, 206) writes "Einstein 
calculated that the orbit of Mercury must turn by 43 angular seconds per century, and solved 
herewith the old riddle of celestial mechanics. It was calculated by mathematical astronomers 
long before Einstein was born that the major axis of Mercury's orbit must slowly turn around 
because of the perturbations, i.e., gravitational disturbances, of the other planets of the solar 
system. But, there was a discrepancy between the calculations and the observations 
amounting to 43 angular seconds per century which could not possibly be explained [in the 
models of classical mechanics]". 
Now, in this sense, I agree with Kuhn that neither the content of science nor any system 
in reality should be claimed to be "uniquely exemplified" by scientific theories from the 
viewpoint of studies of "finished scientific achievements". And, therefore, one has to accept 
the open-endedness of theories as a permanent feature of the total process of science. The 
terms of an already established theory can be said to be "about" an ongoing potential of 
entities in some system of reality to give reference to some objects and relations in some 
model of that theory. The actualisation of this potential requires human action (in the sense 
of finding or formulating "satisfying" referential relations between systems in reality and some 
models of the theory). 
Moreover, as mentioned before, any successful interpretation of a theory in a model is 
guided by contingent conditions which are context-specifically constructed. The range (or 
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content) of these models thus cannot be established a priori. The formal (or a prion) property 
of scientific progress we as philosophers can say something about is the conceptual process 
of (re)formulating and applying theories in terms of (many different) models constructed to 
interpret the theory and having the ability to link systems in reality (via an embedded empirical 
submode!) to the theory itself. This model-theoretic framework makes possible the 
verisimilitude enterprise of comparing theories as to their truthlikeness (of which more in 
Section 5.5). And, in this framework it is still possible to show that the progress of science is 
indeed accumulative. More on this in Chapter 5. 
2.5.3 Paradigms and models 
In the Postscript to The structure of scientific revolutions (1970), Kuhn admits that at 
least two main and "very different usages" of the term paradigm are possible. I shall in what 
follows briefly discuss these two usages - paradigms as "disciplinary matrices" and as 
"exemplars" - in terms of a model-theoretic account of science. I agree that the Structure's 
notion of paradigm in the sense of the context within which theories are interpreted and 
applied is a valid and unmistakable part of the conceptual processes of science. As explained 
in previous sections of this chapter, my usage of the notion of model identifies models as 
components of these kinds of paradigmatic context. 
Kuhn (1970: 175) claims that the two main senses in which he meant the notion of 
"paradigm" to be interpreted are: 
• as standing for the "entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared 
by the members of a given community"; 
• and as denoting "one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions 
which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules ·as a basis for the 
solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science". 
2.5.3.1. Paradigms as constellations of group commitments 
Kuhn (1970: 182) acknowledges that scientists would rather speak of sharing a theory, 
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or a set of theories, than of sharing a paradigm or a set of paradigms. This led him to 
formulate the term "disciplinary matrix" to denote that which is shared by members of a 
scientific community and that accounts for the success of their communication and their 
agreement about professional judgements. He (ibid.) explains that "disciplinary'' refers to the 
common possession of members of a specific discipline, and that "matrix" refers to the fact 
that what is shared is an ordered system which consists of elements of various kinds, each 
needing further specification. Disciplinary matrices (Kuhn, 1970:184) consist of mainly three 
components: 
• first, symbolic generalisations - either formalised, or expressed in words, like "elements 
combine in constant proportion by weight"; 
• second, what he referred to as the "metaphysical" parts of paradigms and which he 
explained as commitments to beliefs such as "all perceptible phenomena are due to the 
interaction of qualitatively neutral atoms in the void, or, alternatively to matter and force, 
or to fields" and which he described as beliefs in models; and, 
• lastly, values such as predictive power, simplicity, consistency, plausibility - and he 
stressed that the application of values may be considerably affected by individual factors 
such as personality and biography. 
In my exposition of the conceptual process of science, the need for a disciplinary matrix -
something which is common to a certain group of scientists - is obvious. Whether in the 
sense of offering the theoretical background against which scientists gather data from 
systems in reality, or in the sense of forming research objectives and directing 
conceptualisations of real systems, or in guiding interpretations of theories in their application 
or implementation, a context somehow common to all scientists of a certain research group 
is indeed indicated. 
Note though, that Kuhn (1970: 184) sees it as the function of models to provide the 
relevant community with preferred or permissible analogies and metaphors, and so to help 
to determine what will be accepted as an explanation and puzzle-solving solution, as well as 
to determine as yet unsolved puzzles and their relative importance to the group. In my terms, 
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although models help to do this, all of these are functions of the matrix, rather than of 
individual models. Models are rather the result than the cause of these things and are thus 
not to be identified with the matrix itself. In my view, models have a specialised role in the 
sense that they are specific interpretations of given theories in which these theories are 
true. 53 So, the formulation of models has to be preceded by factors such as determining the 
nature of these models, whether they will offer an explanation for whatever problem is being 
studied, and so on. The disciplinary matrix should in my terms be seen as offering the 
background against which actions at all three levels of the scientific process take place. 
2.5.3.2 Paradigms as shared examples 
Traditionally it is thought that scientific knowledge is embedded in theory and rules. A 
student cannot learn to solve problems before she has learned the theory and the rules for 
applying it. And then, after having solved many problems, such a student will find it less and 
less difficult to solve more and more complicated problems. Kuhn (1970: 188) claims that " ... 
at the start and for some time after, doing problems is learning consequential things about 
nature. In the absence of such exemplars, the laws and theories [the student] has previously 
learned would have little empirical content". He further goes on to say (Kuhn, 1970: 190) that 
scientists solve puzzles by modelling them on previous solutions. He wants to emphasise that 
what he refers to as "consequential knowledge of nature" is acquired while learning the 
similarity relationship and is afterwards embodied in a particular way of viewing nature -
rather than by laws and rules. He (Kuhn, 1970: 191) claims the verbal statements of laws 
taken by themselves to be "virtually impotent"54 and stressed that what actually results from 
the use of exemplars is something like Polanyi's "tacit knowledge" which is learned by doing 
science rather than by acquiring rules for doing it. Kuhn (1970: 194) argues that claiming that 
rules and the ability to apply them are acquired from exemplars implies that there are, already 
at that stage, alternatives in the following sense. We might, he (ibid.) continues, "have 
disobeyed a rule or misapplied a criterion, or experimented with some other way of seeing. 
[And those) are just the sorts of thing we cannot do." I would qualify this remark by adding 
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that those are things scientists cannot do until after they have started making observations 
and thus taking part in the scientific process. Then they start abstracting data from real 
systems, constructing conceptual models, and maybe in the end, formulating theories, always 
directed by factors like research and personal goals and working from within a specific 
disciplinary matrix. 
The only way in which we can have scientific contact with the world (that is, with systems 
in reality) is through actions involving selection, abstraction, and generalisation, which are 
always executed within some theoretical framework or disciplinary matrix, and are always 
teleological in character in the sense that these abstractions are made in order to theorise 
eventually about a specific aspect of some real system relevant for certain context-specific 
reasons. So in this sense there are indeed no absolute rules and laws guiding us towards the 
expression of our knowledge, because of the way our encounters with reality are structured. 
And, in this sense, it is indeed only by constructing various models of reality that we learn 
"consequential things about nature". 
Thus, the way in which models function in a model-theoretic interpretation of the process 
of science has some of the features that Kuhn ascribed to this second use of the notion of 
"paradigm". Models can be seen as the basis for solving "puzzles" in the sense that they are 
actually constructed in the first place, when they form part of the process towards theory-
formulation, to do just that. Also, when considering the implementation or application of 
theories, already established models of theories may lead scientists to new interpretations 
of these theories, or to amending the existing models in order to offer "better" explanations 
for the problem the theory is addressing. To claim however - as Kuhn does - that models 
replace explicit rules as basis for puzzle-solving is maybe taking matters a bit far. It is indeed 
not possible to find absolute laws or rules dictating the construction of models (whether 
during the process towards theory-formulation, or afterwards, when the theory is applied), 
simply because these constructions are so context- and theory-specific. But, the fact that 
models operate as a link between theories and systems in reality, and that they have an 
essential interpreting role to fulfil in the process of science, is at least a significant feature of 
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scientific practice, if not a rule or a law. 
As far as Kuhn's claim that models offer scientists a specific way of viewing nature is 
concerned, that is indeed the case in a model-theoretic interpretation of the scientific process 
too (although the broader motivation for a specific world view is taken to be offered by a 
specific disciplinary matrix). Both in the process of theory-formulation and during the 
application of theories, models are constructed and employed in accordance with a certain 
view of reality, and afterwards, these models exist in a sense as an affirmation of these views. 
See Chapter 5. 
2.5.4 Conclusion 
The problem with Kuhnian revolutions is that they imply more than an epistemological 
shift, they require an ontological shift that necessitates discontinuity. Kuhn's "different" or 
"incommensurable" worlds address both the problematic issue of the invariance of (the order 
of) nature and that of the neutrality of science (or of the language of science). And that is at 
least one of the reasons why incommensurability has proved to be such an arresting notion 
- it concerns the status of both of the two poles of scientific realism. 
Kuhn (1970: 111) states that "[e]xamining the record of past research from the vantage 
of contemporary historiography, the historian of science may be tempted to claim that when 
paradigms change, the world itself changes with them", although he qualified that later (in the 
Postscript) by saying that it is not '1he world" that changes with a change of paradigm, but 
rather it is that scientists afterwards work in a "different world". He (Kuhn, 1970: 121) wishes 
to argue against the Cartesian belief that "what changes with a paradigm is only the 
scientist's interpretation of observations that themselves are fixed once and for all by the 
nature of the environment and of the perceptual apparatus" (ibid.). In this sense of course, 
Priestley and Lavoisier both saw oxygen, and Aristotle and Galileo both saw pendulums, 
although in each instance, they differed in their interpretation of what they had seen.55 
Now, since The structure ... Kuhn has often referred to the process by which later 
meanings are produced from earlier ones as a "process of language learning". By 1990 he 
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had however found this metaphor too inclusive and had started concentrating56 instead on 
the meanings of restricted classes of terms. These terms are taxonomic or kind terms, like 
"dog", "coW', "gold". They have two characteristic properties: 
• They are identified as kind terms by virtue of lexical features such as taking the 
indefinite article. 57 
• They are subject to what Kuhn refers to as the "no-overlap" principle - no two terms of 
this kind may "overlap in their referents unless they are related as species to genus" 
(Kuhn in Tauber, 1997: 233). For example, no dogs are also cows, a bangle is not a 
ring, and so on. Encountering a cow that is also a dog, would mean, in terms of this rule, 
that part of a taxonomy will have to be redesigned, and not that it is simply the set of 
category terms that has to be broadened or enriched. 
To be able to describe reality at all, it seems obvious that in these terms, then, some kind of 
lexical taxonomy should already be in place. Moreover for communication to be possible, 
shared taxonomic lexicons have to be in place, because if different communities have 
taxonomies that differ in a certain local area, then situations may occur where statements 
made in the one will not be expressible in the other. Kuhn (ibid.) claims that the only way to 
bridge such a gap would be to breach the rule of no-overlap, and so incommensurability 
becomes a kind of untranslatability. It would be possible, though, for members of one 
community to learn the taxonomy employed by members of the other, but that would not 
mean that they would be able to translate terms from one taxonomy to the other, and, 
moreover the cost of bilingualism is that the particular community in which discourse is 
occurring at the time, has to be kept in mind throughout, to escape re-instating the original 
threat to communication. In the scientific context, Kuhn (in Tauber, 1997) makes it clear that 
periods of revolution will, in terms of the above, then be episodes which require local 
taxonomic change. All this is to say that there are times in the development of science when 
fundamental change in taxonomic categories is involved (for example, think of the Copernican 
and Ptolemaic taxonomies). 
The interesting thing, in this context, about a model-theoretic interpretation of the 
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process of science is that it can support changes of this kind, without subscribing to a 
discontinuous view of scientific progress. It seems obvious that there are "degrees" of 
incommensurability in the above sense - surely the "gap" between the Aristotelian view of 
science and the Einsteinian one is bigger than that between the Newtonian and the 
Einsteinian. In other words, it seems as if the nature of episodes of progress depends very 
much on the specific paradigms or disciplinary matrices involved. And, it is this aspect of the 
scientific process that may become a lot clearer if the mediation of models between theories 
and aspects of reality as a kind of magnification of scientific change is acknowledged, 
because the "decelerating" influence models have on this entire process helps to highlight 
the different factors of change and their different nuances in different situations. Kuhn's 
emphasis on the directing role that paradigms play in science's processes is thus affirmed 
in a model-theoretic account of science, although in such an account the (extremely) slow 
pace of change of paradigms (in terms of disciplinary matrices) does not necessitate Kuhnian 
incommensurability.58 Given the overarching nature of disciplinary matrices, a change in 
disciplinary matrix might indeed be a revolutionary event, but the continuity models ascribe 
to science's processes is usually sufficient to render these events less interruptive than they 
are perhaps portrayed in Kuhnian terms. 
The best way in which to interpret incommensurability in model-theoretic terms is 
perhaps then to acknowledge the - very gradual and slow - change of disciplinary matrix 
in the total process of science, but under the following conditions. The incommensurability 
should be understood to be about change in methodology, interpretation of observations, and 
general application of scientific knowledge. In other words, incommensurability may be more 
characteristic of model change than it is of change in disciplinary matrix. One may without 
real difficulty acknowledge that it would be difficult for Niels Bohr to work within the 
Einsteinian deterministic disciplinary matrix and get the same results as easily as he did, 
working in the context of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. However, 
Bohr and Einstein (Sachs, 1988) often had discussions about their different approaches. It 
might be that the more steadfast nature of disciplinary matrices that accounts for their slow 
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change rate renders the conditions, detail of methodology, and implications of results of 
separate models less incommunicable as some believers in naive interpretations of 
incommensurability seem to claim. 
Kuhn wants however to stress that, more than merely interpretational and 
methodological change, revolutions also result in change of disciplinary matrix, the theoretical 
and meta-theoretical background against which the scientists are working, and everything 
that goes with that. In model-theoretic terms, however, revolutions take place only in cases 
of disciplinary matrix change, and not in cases of model change. The phenomenon of 
incommensurability should thus not necessarily be linked to revolutionary changes. It is 
possible to have two different models of the same theory within the same disciplinary matrix, 
while different meta-theoretical orientations do not prohibit scientists from understanding each 
other. 
It seems - especially in later writings - as if Kuhn's objective with arguing about the 
variable sensory experience of scientists differently placed in history and differently placed 
with respect to alternative paradigms that form the "different worlds" in which they practice 
science, is still to somehow recover the "one world". These kinds of "different" worlds, 
however, have to do with science and ~s practice. It does not directly have anything to do with 
Nature, the "one" world, or however one decides to refer to it. It is, as Kuhn (1970: 121) puts 
it, "the nature of the environment" and the "perceptual apparatus" that "fix" observations. It 
should be noted though that interpretations of observations can never be fixed - they can 
be refined, amended, sharpened, and changed in whatever way, at any minute in any number 
of ways for any number of reasons. Secondly, the "nature of the environment" and the 
"perceptual apparatus" that shape interpretations of observations, are part of the disciplinary 
matrix within which the observations are made as well as the specific "view of the world" it 
offers. 
Reality and our observations of certain of Nature's features are two different things. 
Nature and its features - such as gravitation - are independent of scientists and their 
actions, while observations of aspects of reality are not. It is important to distinguish between 
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Nature and science; the one given, the other constructed. The always present danger of 
blurring the conceptual boundaries between Nature and science sometimes ends in a 
conflation of Nature and science, caused, ~ seems, by science's directedness towards reality. 
And this somehow implies, it seems - in a social constructivist kind of way - that science 
will have some kind of transforming influence on reality. That is the problem: science may 
change our conceptions of reality (think of the role of background information in shaping 
these images). However, the features of Nature that we call gravitation have always been 
related to the features we call motion, position, mass, and acceleration and will always do so. 
The fact that Newton formulated a very workable, successful version of these relations does 
not change this in any way. Newton's formulation enabled - and still in limited domains 
enables - us to understand and employ the phenomenon of gravity and its manifestations, 
but our understanding will not change the working of these features - except in our models 
of it, in the "artificial environments" Cartwright likes to speak of. 
This is no great disaster though, except if one takes this to mean that scientists have no 
knowledge about Nature. But it does not mean this, because "having knowledge of Nature" 
means exactly that abstractions are made from what is presented to our faculties of 
knowledge (however one wants to fill that in) and manipulating these abstractions 
conceptually and rationally. Science is the product of scientists' efforts to give a rational 
account of empirical observations and their implications.59 Thus, the way some real system 
is will not itself be influenced by theory-change. Kuhn himself stated (in Tauber, 1997:243) 
that it is groups and their practices that constitute "worlds" (interpreted as the products of 
paradigms or disciplinary matrices) and that science is one of these "practices-in-the-world". 
Therefore change in the disciplinary matrix from which scientists work may be triggered 
or influenced by theory-change, although this kind of change takes place even more slowly 
than theory-change itself. Think, for instance of Newton's method and how it differs from 
Cartesian mechanics, especially as far as the use of mathematics is concerned.60 Descartes 
had tried to derive basic physical laws from metaphysical principles, while Newton insisted 
on basing his theorising on a careful examination of reality. 61 Finally, this kind of change may 
51 
- and often does - lead to a change in the way in which scientists view reality, simply 
because different aspects of the system in reality they are studying are emphasised because 
of the change in purpose and method indicated by the matrix change. 
The old debate between scientists aiming to "save the appearances" by "superimposing" 
mathematical relations on phenomena, and those who find explaining exactly why the 
phenomena are "there" more important, seems somehow to be lurking behind a lot of the 
issues raised both in this chapter and in Chapter 5. Einstein spoke in this sense of 
"principled" and "constructive" theories, and considered his General Theory of Relativity as 
a principled theory in so far as it met the requirement of visualisability only after formulation. 
Quantum mechanics' development, however, was preceded by visual or pictorial 
interpretations, although the requirement of visualisability was rejected later on in formalising 
a number of basic quantum mechanical equations. Visualisation plays an interesting role in 
the search for atomic structure. The atomic model described by Rutherford in 1911 was 
closely analogous to the solar system. Some of Maxwell's theories of a more classical nature 
however gave rise to objections against this model. Bohr tried to eliminate these in 1913 by 
combining classical and non-classical approaches. Sommerfeld later elaborated Bohr's model 
and the analogy with the solar system was retained in the Bohr-Sommerfeld model. 62 
But, by the 1920's Pauli and Heisenberg were rejecting this pictorial atomic structure. 
Pauli remarked (Sarlemijn & Sparnaay, 1989: 7) that scientists should not try to shackle (the 
structure of) atoms with their preconceived opinions, but should rather adjust their concepts 
"in line with experience". In a famous paper, written in 1925, Heisenberg stressed that his 
basis for theoretical quantum mechanics is founded only on "the relationships between 
quantities which are in principle observable" (ibid.: 8). The Copenhagen interpretation of 
quantum mechanics supports the same approach: it is sufficient for the formalism adequately 
to establish the connection between the experimental results - no visualisation or physical 
interpretation of formal calculations are needed. A bit later, however, Heisenberg adopted a 
different attitude and began to search for physical interpretations that would "fit in" with matrix 
mechanics. This shows how the way chosen to solve a problem - which is in the first place 
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detennined by the relevant disciplinary matrix - may influence scientists' methods and goals 
- whether to strive towards "saving the appearances", or to have as objective to be able to 
show the connection between scientific conceptualisations and aspects of reality only after 
theory formulation has been initiated or even completed. 
Scientific method should thus ideally provide a model-dependent model-modifiable 
strategy, because such a strategy offers - within a realist context - the possibility of 
modifying or amending our existing theories in the light of further research. The continuous 
nature of science is also confinned, since the methodological principles of a strategy like this 
will themselves depend on the theoretical picture provided by currently accepted theories. 
Both our new theories and the methodology by which we develop and apply them depend 
upon previously acquired theoretical knowledge. And this fact about the cumulation of 
scientific knowledge - as well as science's various relations to reality - can best be 
supported and explained by a model-theoretic - realist - conception of scientific knowledge. 
To clarify the distinctions and similarities between a model-theoretic account of scientific 
theories and the various non-statement approaches to this issue, in the next chapter some 
of the main non-statement approaches will be briefly discussed. 
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CHAPTER THREE: VARIATIONS ON THE NON-STATEMENT VIEW OF SCIENCE63 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, the Introduction, I have discussed the differences between the statement 
and the non-statement approaches. The advocates of the statement approach depict 
scientific theories as axiomatised deductively closed sets of sentences within some 
appropriate syntactic system, and discuss the "empirical interpretations" of these theories in 
terms of some set of correspondence rules or bridge principles. The defenders of the non-
statement approach, on the other hand, do not view the formal formulation of scientific 
theories in some appropriate language as the most useful characterisation of "theories•. 
Rather, they depict these "theories" in terms of sets of mathematical structures that are the 
models of the theory in question. They do not, however, escape the usual realist questions 
in this way, the problem is simply pondered in a different context with the help of a set of 
more workable - in the sense of adaptability to different situations - tools. 
In what follows I shall discuss a few of the main non-statement programmes offered by 
current philosophy of science. I focus on the non-statement approach to science since its 
defenders' acknowledgement of the role of mathematical models in science's processes is 
of paramount importance to my model-theoretic view of science. Although I have the notion 
of a scientific theory as a deductively closed set of sentences in common with the defenders 
of the statement approach to science, the rest of their (absolutist) views do not feature in my 
approach at all, and therefore I shall not discuss their approach in any more detail. 
3.2 Patrick Suppes's set-theoretic approach to science 
Suppes offers one of the first viable alternatives to the "received (statement) view'' of 
scientific theories and so brings about a radical turn in philosophy of science. Other than the 
structuralists who stress the use of formal semantics and meta science to appeal to the 
structural aspects of theories, Suppes finds the axioms of set-theory sufficient, and claims 
mathematics, rather than meta-mathematics to be the language of science.64 
Since to define a class of set-theoretic structures of which a theory is true (relative to 
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these structures) it is irrelevant to know really what the theory is about, he seems to be not 
overly interested in the problem of identifying or limiting the intended applications of scientific 
theories in the classic "statement" sense. I try to emphasise as often as possible that there 
are at least two kinds of truth relation to be examined when asking questions about the "truth 
of a theory". As I have pointed out in Chapter 2, the first kind of truth relation that theories 
typically enter into is purely formal in the sense of Tarskian satisfiability, and here, obviously, 
it is the case that the content of theories is not necessarily a deciding factor. The second kind 
of truth relation (between models of theories and empirical models depicting the behaviour 
of phenomena in real systems) is also formal in this sense, but also far more complicated, 
given that these relations are the relations determining empirical adequacy and all that it 
implies. And, obviously, in the second case, that "about which" theories are, becomes 
extremely relevant. 
According to Suppes (1967: 57) the problem with the statement approach's co-ordinating 
correspondence rules is that they do not in the sense of modern logic offer an adequate 
semantics for the axiomatic calculus of the theory. Wojcicki (in Humphreys, 1994: 127) 
explains that " ... if for the logical positivists the right way to define an empirical theory Twas 
to define a set of axioms from which all the other sentences valid in T are logically derivable, 
Suppes suggests that to define T is to define a set-theoretical predicate that denotes all the 
set-theoretical structures [semantical models) of which T is true in the Tarski sense". Suppes 
does not so much emphasise the non-statement approach versus the statement approach 
though. He rather stresses the advantages of analysing empirical theories within a set-
theoretical framework rather than a meta-mathematical one65 , and (Suppes, 1954: 244) 
writes: 
... Why axiomatise?, I may briefly say that axiomatisation is one constructive way 
of obtaining the sort of intellectual clarity and precision for which philosophers are 
always striving with respect to the foundations of the various sciences. 
Unfortunately a good many philosophers seem to labour under the misimpression 
that to axiomatise a scientific discipline ... one needs to formulate the discipline in 
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some well-defined artificial language .... this kind of linguistic viewpoint is, in my 
opinion, seriously in error, and the predominance of this attitude has perhaps been 
one of the major reasons for the lack of substantial positive results in the 
philosophy of science .... Luckily we can pursue a programme of axiomatisation 
without constructing any formal languages. The viewpoint I am advocating is that 
the basic methods appropriate for axiomatic studies in the empirical sciences are 
not metamathematical (and thus syntactical and semantical) but set-theoretical. To 
axiomatise the theory of a particular branch of empirical science in the sense I am 
advocating is to give a definition of a set-theoretical notion, such as that of a 
system of classical particle mechanics (see McKinsey, Sugar, and Suppes (1953)), 
or that of a system of rigid body mechanics (see Adams (1959)), or that of a 
system of Mendelian genetics (see Rubin (1954)). 
The class of structures (systems) under consideration is thus described by giving one 
"generic" structure, with parameters, which can be specified to deliver all the systems in the 
class. Suppes (in Morgenbesser, 1967: 60) acknowledges this when he points out that one 
of the simplest ways in which to provide an extrinsic characterisation of a theory is to define 
the intended class of models of the theory; and then asking if the theory can be axiomatised, 
merely comes down to asking if a set of axioms can be stated such that the models of these 
axioms are precisely the models in the defined class. He (in Morgenbesser, 1967: 61, 62) 
remarks however that" ... the problem of intrinsic axiomatisation of a scientific theory is more 
complicated and considerably more subtle ... . Fortunately, it is precisely by explicit 
consideration of the class of models of the theory that the problem can be put into proper 
perspective and formulated in a fashion that makes possible consideration of its exact 
solution." 
And, in model-theoretic terms, even more positively, such consideration of the class of 
models of a given theory shows the continuous character of science (see Chapter 2). The 
underdetermination of theories by models and their underdetermination by data are more 
problematic from a non-statement point of view perhaps, precisely because from such a point 
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of view the issue of underdetermination seems untouchable (and so insoluble), given the non-
statement aversion to theories as linguistic entities, so that the notion of a theory as some 
kind of overarching organising notion does not really exist for defenders of this view. In a 
model-theoretic approach underdetermination is more "natural" and even somehow forms 
part of scientific progress.00 I shall elaborate on the meaning of underdetermination in model-
theoretic realist terms in Chapter 5. 
Suppes addresses the philosophically problematic relations between empirical systems 
and theories (i.e. my "second set" of interpretational relations) in terms of a hierarchy of 
models that focuses on the complex nature of the experimental process.67 He (Suppes, 
1954:243) already points out very early on in his work that progress in foundational studies 
of philosophy of science requires distinction between theory and experiment, since the 
reconstruction of the experimental stage of science is rather more problematic in comparison 
to the theoretical stage which may be axiomatised "quite easily'' with the help of set-theoretic 
predicates. He (Suppes, 1954:246) wants to provide philosophy of science with" ... a kind of 
algebra of experimentally realisable operations and relations" and emphasises that 
discussion of the empirical interpretations of the primitive notions for certain defined notions 
of some empirical theory imply interpretations of quantitative notions, which necessitates 
some systematic theory of measurement. 68 He is not interested in the classic notion of 
absolute objective truth, nor is he interested in the kind of framework offered by the 
instrumentalists, rather he wants to speak about truth in terms of modern statistical decision 
theory. 
Thus, one of the most important issues in Suppes's philosophy of science is the 
emphasis he puts on the "experimental stage" of science.69 Empirical interpretations of the 
primitive notions for certain defined notions of some empirical theory are interpretations of 
quant~ative notions, which necessitates some systematic theory of measurement, as already 
mentioned . 
. .. the point of a theory of measurement is to lay bare the structure of a collection 
of empirical relations which may be used to measure the characteristics of 
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empirical phenomena corresponding to the concept. Why a collection of relations? 
From an abstract standpoint a set of empirical data consists of a collection of 
relations between specified objects. For example, data on the relative weights of 
a set of physical objects are easily represented by an ordering relation on the set; 
additional data, and a fortiori an additional relation, are needed to yield a 
satisfactory quantitative measurement of the masses of objects" (Scott & Suppes, 
1958: 113). 
Thus, as far as the co-ordinating principles or bridge principles of the statement approach are 
concerned, Suppes stresses (in Morgenbesser, 1967:62) that the practice of testing scientific 
theories is a much more complicated issue than is implied by the usual comment about these 
issues.70 I agree with this, but I do not see the philosophical need for turning almost 
exclusively to the statistical methodology to examine these relations that Suppes (in 
Morgenbesser, 1967, and also Suppes, 1969, Suppes, 1989, and Suppes, 1993) insists on.71 
I think that for the purposes of philosophy of science, it is sufficient - and a more 
philosophically challenging prospect, I might add - to look to the various model-theoretic 
relations involved, and to be able to point out all of (or as many as possible of) the factors 
involved in these connections. 72 
Suppes and Dana Scott in their artide Foundational aspects of theories of measurement 
(1958) ground the foundational analysis of measurement in general model theory. Suppes 
(in Morgenbesser, 1967:58) points out that the essential characteristic of a theory of 
measurement is that it can study (in a precise way) the transformation or development of 
"qualitative observations" into the "quantitative assertions" characteristic of the more 
theoretical stages of the scientific process. He approaches this problem in terms of 
representation theorems, mainly because he views the models of the theory and the models 
of the data (see below) to be of different logical types: "Given an axiomatised theory of 
measurement of some empirical quantity such as mass, distance, or force, the mathematical 
task is to prove a representation theorem for models of the theory which establishes, roughly 
speaking, that any empirical model is isomorphic to some numerical model of the theory. The 
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existence of this isomorphism between models justifies the application of numbers to things . 
. . . What we can do is to show that the structure of a set of phenomena under certain empirical 
operations is the same as the structure of some set of numbers under arithmetical operations 
and relations" (Suppes in Morgenbesser, 1967:58). 73 Although I would read "conceptual 
model" for his "empirical model" and "empirical model" for his "numerical model", this is 
essentially my view of the "verification" of the models of scientific theories too. In my 
approach it is however not necessary to use a separate language - from the one talking 
about the content of a theory's conceptual models - to talk about the empirical models of 
theories - although of course it can be done, and then Suppes's use of representation 
theorems will become applicable too. 74 
Suppes (1954: 245) sets out the various stages of formulating a set-theoretic predicate 
for (or axiomatising) a particular branch of empirical science as follows: 
• In the beginning some kind of statement of what other theories are assumed (e.g. in 
axiomatising rigid body mechanics, one would assume the standard branches of 
mathematics and particle mechanics) is needed. 
• Then the "primitive" notions of the theory are listed, and their set-theoretic nature (in 
particle mechanics, notions like "set of particles", the "interval of elapsed time", the 
"position function'', the "mass function", and so on) is indicated. 
• The set-theoretic definition can then be completed by listing the axioms which have to 
be satisfied, because one will then be able to examine the deductive consequences of 
the definition. Obviously one of the main tasks here is to rationally reconstruct within set 
theory the standard theorems of the branch being studied. One will also then be able to 
ask some of the questions of modem mathematics that have obvious implications for the 
structure of empirical theories, such as questions concerning the formulation of 
representation theorems75 which may be linked for instance to studies directed towards 
the problem of reduction between theories76• 
Then finally, one will be in a position to give an empirical interpretation of the axiomatised 
theory, which will have to take the complexity of the entire experimental enterprise into 
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account. 
Suppes thus articulates a more complex stratified view of the relations between 
models of theories and systems in reality, than I do in this thesis. However, I too go to great 
lengths to point out the elaborate sophistication of the manoeuvres needed to find the 
possible links between particular systems in reality and certain models of a theory being 
examined at a given time. He (Suppes, 1989: 25) wants to show that the study of the relations 
between (empirical) theories and their data demands a study in terms of a hierarchy of 
models of different logical type77• He (Suppes, 1960: 297) stresses the clarifying role of the 
set-theoretical notion of model in experimental design and the analysis of data: "The 
maddeningly diverse and complex experience which constitutes an experiment is not the 
entity which is directly compared with <i model of a theory. Drastic assumptions of all sorts 
are made in reducing the experimental experience ... to a simple entity ready for comparison 
with a model of the theory'' (ibid.). 
Suppes sees the empirical relation between a conceptual model (of a given theory or 
class of systems) and a system in reality as a highly articulated, composite relation, with an 
articulation which depends upon the experimental or observational situation in question78• I 
am in complete agreement with this view, but for my (philosophical) purposes I collapse this 
complex relationship to a much simpler relation, indicated by "empirical adequacy'' (in my 
terms). This simple relation results in fitting the empirical data - however elaborately 
extracted from the physical system, and subsequently formulated conceptually, i.e. 
mathematically - into the relevant conceptual model of the theory in question (i.e. the 
relevant conceptualisation of the empirical data in question forms a substructure of the 
conceptual model in question). A simple example: Observations over time deliver 113 
different spatial positions (x1, y1), (x2, y2), .. ., (x113, y113) for the planet Neptune in the x-y-plane 
(of the planets in our solar system) of a coordinate system centred on the sun. These are the 
data. All 113 points lie on the (near-) ellipse with its uncountably many points which is the 
conceptual model of the orbit of Neptune (which in its turn is part of the conceptual model of 
the solar system, in which the - Newtonian or Einsteinian - theory of our solar system is 
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true). What is suppressed or collapsed here is the process of distilling the data (x,, y,), (x2, 
y.j), ... , (x113, y113), which is a process which involves theories, models, and practices relating 
to telescopes, the human eye and visual system, light, movement of the earth, clocks, and 
so on, and so on. 
Suppes (1989: 27-29) argues that the fundamental theory and descriptions of apparatus 
are two extremes of hierarchy - in between are the models of the theory, the models of the 
experiment, and the models of the data. He (in Morgenbesser, 1967: 62) emphasises over 
and over again that to be able to "connect• experimental data to a relevant theory, the data 
have to be put through a "conceptual grinder", which refers to this conceptual hierarchy he 
sets out from the "raw" observations to the final "fundamental" scientific theory. The theory 
of the experiment is the definition of all the possible realisations of the theory that is the first 
"step down from the abstract level" (Suppes, 1989: 28) of the fundamental theory. A possible 
realisation of the theory of the experiment is a model of the theory if the experimental 
conditions are satisfied. Models of the experiment represent experimental data in canonical 
form, but when is a possible realisation of the data a model of the data? Suppes (1989: 29) 
remarks again that an answer to this kind of question requires a "detailed statistical theory 
of goodness of fit", since models of the data should incorporate "all the information about the 
experiment which can be used in statistical tests of the adequacy of the theory" (Suppes, 
1989: 31), which means that he (Suppes, 1989: 32) restricts the models of the data to those 
aspects of experiments which have a parametric analogue in the theory.79 In these terms, I 
would express Suppes's model of the scientific development of a theory (Suppes, 1989: 31) 
as follows: 
Fundamental theory 
Models of the fundamental theory 
Theory of the experiment 
Models of the experiment 
Models of data 
Experimental design 
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Ceteris paribus conditions 
Suppes (1989: 32) characterises the ceteris paribus conditions at the bottom of the table as 
"every intuitive consideration of experimental design that involves no formal statistics", which 
I presume refers to the context in which the concrete as-yet-untranslated-into-data ''first" 
observational activities are carried out. Note that in a model-theoretic account of theories the 
ceteris paribus conditions are at play in the formulation of the theory and not at the level of 
dealing with data. He seems to think, as Cartwright does, that the closer to reality we get, the 
more of these clauses we need, while I claim that only by a suspension of these clauses can 
we move to the more specific levels of the scientific process. Thus although I do not deny the 
idealised character of our conceptual models or even of the images of real systems our 
empirical models present, I claim that these "idealisations" are not so much a result of ceteris 
paribus clauses as simply of the nature of scientific actions. (More about this in Chapter 4.) 
A last point to note is that he (Suppes, 1989: 32) makes it clear that in analysing the 
relations between theories and experiments, difficulties encountered at any of the levels from 
the level of models of the theory to Suppes's last identified level of ceteris paribus conditions 
reflect problems or weaknesses in the relevant experiment, and not in the relevant 
"fundamental" theory. I agree, although it seems obvious that errors may also occur in the 
formal construction of the models of the theory, and also, that problems encountered in 
creating these constructions may indeed point to problems in the structure of the fundamental 
theory"". 
Suppes (1989: 34) concludes: "One of the besetting sins of philosophy of science is to 
overly simplify the structure of science .... What I have attempted to argue is that a whole 
hierarchy of models stands between the model of the basic theory and the complete 
experimental experience. Moreover, for each level of the hierarchy, there is a theory in its 
own right. Theory at one level is given empirical meaning by making formal connections with 
theory at a lower level." I am in complete agreement thus far, but again, my version of a 
model-theoretic view of the structure of theories can fully accommodate this kind of hierarchy. 
There is a principle of transitivity at work here - accommodated by a model-theoretic 
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account of theories - that does the same philosophical work as Suppes's intricate comments 
on measurement theory and the role of representation theorems. 
Take Newton's laws of motion and his law of gravity applied to our solar system again. 
Such a model (i.e. a model of our solar system) will be described by an uncountable set of 
sentences which, i.a., describes every position at any time of every planet in question on an 
elliptical curve. I claim there exists a transitive connection between experimental data and 
some model of the theory, since the data offer "pieces" of the model by means of some 
"experimental theory" in the sense that the theory of the experiment "translates" observations 
into data (or models of data). which can be then possibly linked with (i.e. embedded into) 
some model of the theory. If a scientist is looking at a planet through a telescope, the theory 
of the telescope translates those observations into data, and these data give the position of 
say Mercury at a given point in time. But this is exactly what the empirical models of Newton's 
theory offer (in this context). since a conceptual model of the solar system offers here the 
positions of all the planets at specific times. The data thus do depict certain relations valid in 
models of the theory. 
3.3 The structuralist programme 
Stegmuller ((1976). (1979)) places the structuralist programme in the "non-statement" 
tradition, because its main methodological principle is to view "theories" as structures, or sets 
of structures (in the standard set-theoretic sense), in the place of sets of statements. Sneed 
(in Balzer, Moulines, Sneed, 1987: 86) writes" ... our point of view is not that of a philosopher 
who is puzzled by questions like how it is possible to obtain knowledge about 'the 
phenomena'. Our attitude is much more descriptive, and if we look at what is 'given' for an 
empirical theory we take the point of view of that very theory - in contrast to the 'absolute' 
point of view of the philosopher". This refers to the fact that the structuralists are more 
concerned with making apparent the logical form or structure of empirical theories than with 
their actual content. That is why their aim is to create "logical reconstructions" of empirical 
theories, rather than worry about the "usual philosophic issues to do with science and reality'' 
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(Sneed, 1983: 350)81 • Also, Sneed (1971) and Stegmuller (1976) claim this approach can 
best handle Kuhn's condition for membership of a particular scientific community in terms of 
"holding" a certain theory, ;;ilthough a community's beliefs about the subject matter of that 
theory is not fixed over time. 
Structuralists typically depict a scientific theory as a " ... conceptual structure that can 
generate a variety of empirical claims about a loosely specified, but not completely 
unspecified, range of application:i' (Sneed, 1976:120). This view is closely related to what 
I hold too, except for the fact that a scientific theory to me still is a linguistic expression - and 
an essential component of science - that may be interpreted by a set of (conceptual) 
structures (i.e. models in which the theory's sentences are true). I also take these models 
(and not the theory itself) to be the "generators" of "a variety of empirical claims" about a 
certain range of applications of the theory. 
The structuralist programme dates from the early sixties and is essentially a 
development of Patrick Suppes's view. The programme originally started (Sneed, 1983:350) 
as an atti:mpt to describe more precisely the empirical claims of theories with considerable 
mathematical apparatus. Since the early seventies Wolfgang Stegmuller, with his colleague 
Joseph Sneed, assisted by Wolfgang Balzer, Ulises Moulines and others, started refining this 
approach. The structuralist approach is a meta-theoretical approach to scientific (empirical) 
theories that essentially focuses on the nature of scientific theories, interrelations between 
theories (especially reduction, equivalence, and approximation), and theory progress or 
evolution. During the last two decades in various disciplines formal reconstructions of 
empirical theories into structuralist form have been carried out by the supporters of the 
programme, such as physics (Sneed, 1973), psychology (Suppes, 1969, 1989), and 
neuropsychology (Suppes, 1989). 
Before I briefly discuss the main tenets of their programme, a comment on their view of 
the role of language, given their "non statement" approach. In An architectonic for science 
(Balzer, Moulines, Sneed, 1987: 17) it is claimed that" ... we [Balzer, Moulines, and Sneed] 
believe ... that in the study of the structure and development of empirical science language 
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has not a big role to play. This belief is mirrored in our concept(s) of an empirical theory which 
will not contain a language as an explicit part. It would ... be a serious misunderstanding to 
say that therefore we have dispensed with language altogether .... What is left open in our 
account is the way in which sentences are formed out of basic symbols, variables, and other 
logical symbols. But such formation rules do not play any role in empirical science ... ". They 
(ibid.) go on to point out that a species of structures totally describes the "non-logical" 
vocabulary of a given theory (i.e. its individual constants, predicate constants, function 
constants and their arities). 
I agree that the last point may be true, but I have a problem with the first remark claiming 
that the formation rules of sentences (of theories) do not form part of empirical science and 
that this is justification enough for the structuralists to leave it out of their analysis of empirical 
theories. Of course these rules (like the rules of mathematics) do not form part of empirical 
science itself. However, (again like mathematics) they provide the means to formulate and 
communicate the conceptual structures, and they do form part of a philosophical analysis of 
science, since part of such an analysis would be to examine the structure and meaning of 
scientific theories as linguistic expressions. 82 Retaining the notion of theories as linguistic 
expressions is the only way I can see in which to formulate the class of models of a theory 
in "one" formal expression. Even the structuralists have to employ language to describe the 
classes of structures they have in mind, albeit the mixture of natural language and 
mathematical symbolism usually employed by scientists and mathematicians, and of which 
a formal logical language is a (meta-) mathematically amenable stylisation.83 Also, the 
linguistic expression of a theory offers different ways of "controlling" the multiplicity of models 
of one theory in the sense that amending the axioms of a given theory can logically 
strengthen the theory such that it "shrinks" the class of possible models (via boundary or 
initial conditions), or the theory can "shift" to a different class of models, such as happened 
when Einstein added the "cosmological constant" to his equations (theory!). 
Joseph Sneed, in giving an exposition of what he sees as the subject matter and nature 
of philosophy of science (Sneed, 1976: 121), explains that the structuralist claim is that" ... 
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everything interesting a scientist of science might want to say about the products of science 
can be said within [a] conceptual [structural] framework. More precisely, it can be said within 
an ontology of scientific theories ... with sufficiently ingenious relations among these entities". 
He remarks (Sneed, 1976: 116) that philosophy of science in general is about setting out a 
"clear, coherent conceptual framework" in which the various sciences can formulate their 
empirical claims. However, he (ibid.) continues that the "science of science" he is thinking 
about should be a social science, since its main subject matter are the communities within 
which these empirical claims are formulated. The coming-into-being, development, and going-
out-of-existence of these communities as well as of their products (empirical scientific 
theories) should, it seems then, all form part of this subject matter.84 
The basic elements of theory identification as set out by the structuralist programme may 
be summarised as follows (note that structuralists claim that all these components can be 
precisely explained in purely structural - i.e. set-theoretical - terms). "Theories" are taken 
to consist of (classes of) models in the Tarskian sense of formal semantics, i.e. a model of 
a theory T is a possible realisation in which all the sentences (or at least a set of given 
axioms) of that theory are satisfied.85 The identity of a "theory'' is first and foremost given by 
a class of models, which we may call M (following Stegmuller and his colleagues).00 The 
models are determined by a given set of axioms (the "tautologies" of the theory), but the 
structuralists claim these axioms to be secondary to the determination of the identity of a 
theory, since any set of axioms may be chosen just as long as it is satisfied by the same set 
of models, M. 
The structuralists try to "fif' models to theories, since they do not acknowledge the theory 
as a linguistic entity to start off with. A defender of a model-theoretic account of science 
works towards the formulation of a theory as a linguistic expression, and then, in applying the 
theory, starts off with the theory as a linguistic entity and tries to construct models in which 
that particular theory will be true. 
However, although it is true that in the structuralist view the specific set of axioms in 
question does not really play a primary role in the identification of the theory, distinguishing 
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between two different kinds of axiom does. In the literature, these two types of axiom are 
usually referred to (Moulines in Schurz & Dom, 1991 :317) as framework conditions87 , which 
are mainly the accepted body of theories, or background knowledge, or paradigm within 
which scientists work, and "proper" axioms which are taken to be substantial empirical laws. 
In the example of Newtonian mechanics, Newton's Second Law is a "proper" axiom, while the 
(implicit) condition of the differentiability of the position function would be a framework 
condition. The framework conditions define the basic notions about the structure of each of 
the fundamental notions of the theory, i.e. the "base set" (Balzer, Moulines, Sneed, 1987: 5) 
of the theory; while the "proper" axioms state the law-like relations between these basic 
notions, i.e. ''what conditions have to be satisfied for a possible candidate to really be a 
structure of this kind?". The latter are the "fundamental laws" (Balzer, Mou lines, Sneed, 1987: 
19) that "connect" all the terms of a theory in one "big formula". 
Structures determined only by framework conditions are called potential models, the 
class of which may be denoted by Mp, or Mp(D, while structures fulfilling both the framework 
conditions and proper axioms of a given theory, are called actual models, the class of which 
may be denoted by the familiar M, or M(D. Obviously M(D is a subset of Mp(D - so that 
Ms= M0 Methodologically speaking, clear distinction between these two classes of models is 
necessary in any logical reconstruction of a theory88 . Thus the set-theoretic predicates 
determining the set Mp(D are defined by statements about the set-theoretic properties of the 
base set of the theory, and typifications and characterisations of basic relations. The 
determination of M(D. on the other hand, relies on the specification of the laws (axioms) 
identified in the theory as well89. 
Also part of the determination of the identity of a theory is a distinction between the 
theoretical and the non-theoretical terms of the same theory, the interrelationships 
("constraints") between models of the same theory, as well as the intertheoretical links 
between models of different theories (concerning different sets of potential models). 
Advocates of the structuralist programme take <Mp,M> = K (Moulines in Schurz & Dorn, 
1991 :319, and Balzer, Moulines, Sneed, 1987:36ff.) to be the (conceptual) "theory-core" of 
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a particular theory. The core K plus the class of intended applications, call it /, form the 
simplest set-theoretic structure that may serve as a logical reconstruction of an empirical 
theory. K and I are called theory elements. K is a purely formal mathematical structure and 
it says "something" or is "about" the class of intended applications. More complex theories 
are "builf' of theory-elements that are linked or related in certain ways. In summary, the notion 
of a theory core is expanded to include the following elements (Balzer, Moulines, Sneed, 
1987: 37): 
• conceptual framework conditions, 
• empirical laws , i.e. the "proper axioms", 
• "constraints" describing connections or relations between different applications of a 
particular theory, and 
• intertheoretical links (such as the relations of reduction, approximation, and equivalence) 
describing links between a particular application of the theory in question and other 
different theories represented by different theory elements. 
• Also part of the theory core is the class of partial potential models Mpp that consists of 
a subset of Mp, the class of potential models, that can be interpreted independently of 
the theory in question. Partial potential models are thus characterised in terms of a 
theory-relevant theoretic/nontheoretic distinction among the components of the class of 
potential models. More about partial potential models a little later in this section. 
• An empirical claim - also part of the theory core - is associated with a particular 
theory element in terms of the part of the content of that theory element which forms the 
class of partial potential models that is "compatible" with the laws, constraints, and 
intertheoretic links associated with the particular theory element in question. This claim 
is simply the claim that the particular intended application of the theory in question is in 
K, i.e. in <Mp,M>. 
An obvious motivation (that both realists and anti-realists would agree on I should think) for 
empirical theory construction surely is the (successful) application, in one way or the other, 
of that (empirical) theory. That is why claiming that we know what an empirical theory looks 
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like if we know its core, is not completely correct. We also need to have some information on 
the nature of its intended applications. Structurally speaking, then, if we take I as the set of 
intended applications of a given empirical theory identified by a specific given K, we have to 
know the nature of the elements of I, as well as the extension90 of I. Note again that cores of 
theories and the applications of theories together - i.e. Mp, M, and I - are the "material" out 
of which empirical claims may be formulated. 
Now, the elements of I are taken - by the structuralists - to be not "simply the 'real 
things', independent of any conceptualisation, to which the theory is supposed to apply'' 
(Moulines in Schurz & Dom, 1991: 319)91 , but rather systems, which are nothing else but 
structures, that present us with ways of " ... conceptually carving up reality in pieces and 
putting these pieces in certain relationships" (Moulines in Schurz & Dom, 1991: 320). Thus, 
we can take a system, s, to be a structure of the form <A1, ... , Am, R1, ... , Rn>. The important 
issue here is to determine the relationship between the class of potential models, Mp, and a 
particular intended application, s. Obviously, for a system s to be an intended application of 
a theory, it has to be an element of the set of potential models, Mp, in the core of that theory, 
and thus a necessary condition for the determination of a set I of intended applications of a 
theory given by K = <Mp, M>, becomes I,;; Mp 92• Sneed (in Humphreys, 1994: 196) helpfully 
points out that I should be seen as the "totality" of potential data the theory in question is 
supposed to account for. 
All right, but exactly what does this subclass (I) look like? How big is it? To be able to 
understand the structuralist answer to this question, let us think a bit about the nature of the 
relations between I and the class M of actual models in K. We cannot simply assume that I 
= M, since it is entirely possible that any empirical theory might have applications that are 
unwanted93, for whatever reason. The implicit result of multiple models of empirical theories 
entailed by the depiction of theories in terms of classes of models94 lies in the problem of 
identifying "empirically uninteresting" models (or potential models) so that they may be 
discarded (as soon as possible). As this is a problem defenders of the statement approach 
also face, it is especially interesting to see how the structuralists face up to it. Balzer, 
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Moulines, and Sneed (1987: 23) offer an explication of the application of a theory to a certain 
(intended) range of phenomena in terms of Mp and M. They first point out that this issue is 
related to a distinction between conceptualising a certain range of phenomena and making 
an empirical assertion about them. For my analysis of the scientific process this is also 
important, since my analysis is done in terms of a conceptualising stage (leading up to the 
formulation of the theory in question) and an applicative or interpreting stage (following the 
formulation of the theory). 
So we do not want M to be a subset of I, since there will probably always be elements 
in M that we do not want in J. Moulines (in Schurz & Dom, 1991: 321, 322) sets out three 
possible ways to describe the nature of the relations between M and J: 
• (i) JcM 
• (ii) I ¢ M, bull n M , Cl> 
• (iii) I n M = Cl>. 
Case (i) is the ideal case, where the relevant theory is a complete success, capturing all the 
intended applications. Case (ii) presents us with a partially successful theory, and, of course, 
the bigger the intersection between I and M, the more successful the theory will be. Case (iii) 
presents us with a theory that has no intended applications among its actual models, which, 
of course is a completely meaningless theory.95 
Moulines (in Schurz & Dorn, 1991:321,322) points out that in terms of the 
methodological evaluation of empirical theories it is evident that the intersection between I 
and M needs to be defined or specified as precisely as possible, although the structuralists 
stress that there is no purely semantic answer to the question concerning this intersection.96 
Any kind of approach to this issue has to be preceded by what they term "pragmatic-
diachronic considerations" (Moulines in Schurz & Dorn, 1991:321), because of the fact that 
for every given theory core, K, there has to exist a scientific community that will use the 
theory identified by the core in "real life". Because I is dependent on the scientific community 
within which the theory under consideration has been constructed or will be applied, the 
structuralists refer to the class of intended applications as a "genidentical" (Moulines in 
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Schurz & Dom, 1991:322) entity.97 The relationship between the scientific community and the 
pair K, the core (identity) of the theory in question, is philosophically important, because 
intended applications are taken - by the structuralists but not by me - to be part of and 
internal to the theory concept itself, and not somehow external to the theory. Balzer, 
Moulines, and Sneed (1987:38) claim that without this class it will be impossible to know the 
empirical content of the theory. They (ibid.: 38) put the structuralist case as follows: 
We consider [the class of intended applications] to be a part of the identity of a 
theory because without it we would have no way to know whether we are dealing 
with an empirical theory at all. Take the case of an advanced scientific theory, 
where quite a few abstract terms expressed in mathematical language appear, and 
let us ask whether by just considering the theory's formalism we would be able to 
tell which part of the world the theory describes, or for what purposes the theory 
is useful. ... we cannot tell. For, even by assuming that the formalism is adequate 
for describing some par! of the world, we should be able in general to go over to 
quite different phenomena described by the same formal means. This is indicated 
by a well-known theorem of logic, namely, that structures isomorphic to models of 
a theory are again models of that same theory .... Thus, in order to know what a 
theory is about, we have to include an informal description of its intended 
application, as a part of the identity of the theory in question.98 
The relationship between the set of intended applications and a given scientific community 
can vary in the sense that the same community may use completely incompatible cores. On 
the other hand, different communities may use the same core class and then the relationship 
between intended applications and cores will be completely different. This is possible 
because we can define (from the intended nature of these applications) the domain of 
intended applications of a certain core K;, associated with a specific scientific community, as 
a particular subclass of the class of potential models, Mp. for which the scientific community 
in question wishes (intends) to show (either by observation, experiments, or calculation) that 
it is also a subclass of the class of actual models, M, of the theory in question. "Strictly 
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speaking [of course], I may not be characterised as a class in the precise sense of set theory 
since it is not determined by purely extensional means .... The domain I remains always 
within Mp. but its precise limits within MP change as the skills, knowledge and interest of [the 
scientific community] as a whole change" (Mou lines in Schurz & Dorn, 1991: 324). 
This has however already been pointed out earlier by Suppes, and as I have pointed out 
above, not even the original formulators of some scientific theory can know in advance what 
will happen to their theory - i.e. in which models it will be interpreted. In my terms, this is a 
matter to be determined via the empirical models of the theory about the construction of 
which nothing can be said beforehand. The only thing that can be said about a scientific 
theory's "identity" is the remarks I made about the role of the "intended models" in the 
developmental stage of theories. This is no problem though, since given the nature of 
scientific knowledge, the nature of these applications simply has to be open-ended in this 
way. 00 
A common criticism against the structuralist programme - which can perhaps i.a. be 
seen as a product of or reaction to the post-Kuhnian philosophical atmosphere in the late 
sixties, which was the time in which the structuralist ideas found a wider audience - is that 
the defenders of the programme view empirical theories in purely mathematical terms. 
Moulin es (in Schurz & Dom, 1991: 314, 315) gives a very apt answer to comments of this 
kind, which, I think, should be taken very seriously. He (ibid.) writes: 
If I say that I am going to speak about a set of pigs, then, of course, I am going to 
speak about 'something mathematical', since a set of pigs is not a pig (an empirical 
object) but a set (clearly, a mathematical object). This does not mean that I am 
saying there are no pigs in the world or that the pigs themselves are mathematical 
entities. Similarly, when structuralists say that an empirical theory is to be 
conceived of as a particular kind of structure consisting of sets of structures, then, 
in a trivial sense, they are saying that an empirical theory is a mathematical entity, 
since, in general, structures consisting of sets of structures obviously are 
mathematical entities. This, however, does not at all imply that empirical theories 
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are being put on the same footing as purely mathematical theories, nor that they 
only deal with mathematical objects, nor that 'there is no reference to reality'. 
In a sense, I agree and add that thus elements of sets may be viewed - rather 
unproblematically - as mathematical representations of real (empirical) objects. However, 
in this text, Moulines (in Schurz & Dorn, 1991: 315) goes on to make the claim that 
structuralists in general seem to view as their "link" with reality, but, that, I claim, is really 
much more negative since it goes against the very spirit of their model-theoretic approach. 
First, the claim: "At least part of the models that constitute an empirical theory according to 
structuralism consists, at least in part, of sets of empirical objects. This one can read on the 
first pages of any introductory exposition of structuralism" (ibid.). Well, I have never been able 
to see how a real object can be an element of a mathematical entity. He should have said "at 
least some of the elements of the models that constitute an empirical theory ... represent, at 
least partly, certain empirical objects". 
I believe that the failure of the structuralist programme's defenders to regard the 
relationship between a model (or a set of models) of a theory and some real system quite in 
the sense of a model-theoretic interpretative relation, may result in uncertainty concerning 
their realist sympathies. That such an interpretative relationship exists is denied by Moulines's 
(ibid.) claim that at least some of the sets of models of a theory are (consist of) empirical 
objects. He (Moulines in Schurz & Dorn, 1991: 317) continues to say that "[i]f the theory is to 
be called 'empirical', at least some of the [domains] of at least some of its models will be such 
things as sets of physical bodies, or space time points, or persons, or states of mind, or 
wares, or written texts, or any other sort of empirically detectable entity which nobody would 
call a 'purely mathematical entity'. That's the way 'reference to reality' comes in[to] 
structuralism. As simple as that". Well, if everything was this easy, should not somebody 
perhaps consider telling those philosophers who persist (stubbornly it seems, in the face of 
the structuralist solution to their problems) in worrying about the problems of scientific 
realism? 
Balzer, Moulines and Sneed (1987: 23) offer the following explication of the application 
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of a scientific theory to a certain (intended) 100 range of phenomena in terms of the set of 
potential models and the set of actual models of the theory. They write: 
When confronted with some given 'data' or 'phenomena' we might want to use a 
theory T to 'understand' them, to 'explain' them, to 'predict' them - in short we 
might want to apply T to these data. To do this, the first thing we try is to 
conceptualise the domain I of data in terms of T, i.e. [we] ... use the concepts 
appearing in potential models of T to refer to I. We create a potential model of T 
for/. This is the more 'conceptual' aspect of the application of a theory. The next 
step is to make an assertion about I in terms of T - an assertion with empirically 
testable consequences. We then assert that I satisfies the fundamental laws of T, 
which, of course, only make sense if I has already been conceptualised in terms 
of T. In other words, we make the empirical assertion that the potential model 
considered is also an actual model of T. This empirical assertion can be either true 
or false. If it turns out to be true, we can say that we applied T to I successfully. 
More specifically, Sneed (1976) and his colleagues (Balzer, Moulines & Sneed, 1987) 
describe the set of (intended) applications of an empirical theory in terms of some set of 
partial potential models (i.e. theory-independent subsets of the set of potential models), and 
an empirical claim associated with the core of the theory in question. Such an empirical claim 
states that the set of partial potential models that satisfies the conditions set by the laws, 
constraints, and intertheoretic links of the theory in question, is indeed in K, the theory's core. 
If one recalls that the class of partial potential models represents subsets of the class of 
potential models, the above explication in terms of intended applications remains the same 
in general. This finer distinction of the class of potential models focuses on those theoretical 
terms that are specified by other theories and not by the theory in question. This implies that 
the part of a theory that may have relations to reality cannot be determined only by the theory 
itself. Sneed (in Balzer, Moulines, Sneed, 1987: 86) remarks that the class of partial potential 
models represents what is "given" for a particular theory in terms of surrounding theories. 
Why is this distinction between so-called "T-theoretical" and non-theoretical terms 
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necessary? Let us first look again at the way in which the defenders of the structuralist 
programme see theories connected to their empirical claims. The structuralists' answer to 
these questions become very complex and extremely technical since they formulate these 
answers in terms of constraints, inter-theoretic relations, and partial potential models. Most 
simply put, as noted above, cores of theories and the applications of theories together form 
the "bricks" out of which empirical claims may be formulated. 
Theories consist of these basic "theory-elements"'°' which have the ability to construct 
various "theory-nets" (which are basically more complex theories than the original one in 
question) from the relevant theory's original elements. A theory-net consists of a 
"specialisation" of the basic theory element. This specialisation corresponds to an empirical 
claim about the range of intended applications offered by the theory element in question. 
Thus the net as a whole corresponds to a non-basic empirical claim about the whole range 
of intended applications the theory has to offer. The problematic part of this analysis of 
theories lies in the overlaps between applications in various theory elements. These theory 
elements are linked by the interrelationships between models of the same theory (referred 
to as "constraints" in the structuralist programme). And, it is these problems that may be 
solved - or so the structuralists seem to think - by distinguishing between theoretical and 
non-theoretical terms. In this sense the definition of the core of a theory is expounded 
(Sneed, 1976: 123) as follows: 
K = <Mp, Mpp, M, C>, where 
• MP is the set of potential models of the theory, as in the above, but with the 
understanding that these models are models of the entire conceptual content of the 
theory, including theoretical components; 
• Mpp, the set of partial potential models, is the set of all models obtained by excluding the 
theoretical components from the conceptual body of the theory in question 102; 
• Mis still the set of actual models, since it depicts the set of possible models of the "full 
conceptual apparatus" of the theory that satisfy certain laws formulated in terms of 
theoretical components; 
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• C is the set of constraints on Mp, and captures the notion that different applications of 
the same theory-element are interdependent 103 in the sense that values of a function in 
one application of the theory may not be used without taking account of the values of 
that function in other applications - thus, constraints single out certain admissible 
combinations of potential models 104; and 
• inter-theoretical links are depicted as follows: T-nontheoretical terms may be also or only 
determined by means of other theories which do not presuppose T at all, so that the 
problem of communicating information from these theories to theory T becomes 
problematic - Balzer, Moulines, and Sneed's answer (1987: 58) is - not too 
surprisingly - to link this with the interpretation of the set of partial potential models in 
the following way: "The information [from theories different from T that we want to 
transfer to T] consists of data which are obtained in the course of some determination 
of a term which is non-theoretical in T. Clearly such transfer contributes to the 
interpretation of Mp,,(.T). It is part of the determination of the meaning of the terms 
occurring in T's partial potential models, and therefore it is an essential component of 
T itself .... [This leads to the introduction of] ... intertheoretical links which represent the 
transfer of data from theories T' to theory T."105 
Sneed (1976: 124) 106 claims that a theory-element core is used to make empirical claims in 
the sense that a subset of Mpp, call it A(K) (ibid.), is selected such that theoretical elements 
can be added to each of its members in such a way that it yields a subset of the set of actual 
models M (this means that each member of the subset of Mpp will satisfy the theoretical laws 
of the theory). 107 The empirical claim that the particular theory element is thus making, is that 
descriptions of phenomena that actually occur is indeed a part of the theory core. In other 
words, if we have a theory-element E = <K, I>, where K is the elaborated theory core above, 
and I remains the set of intended applications, then the claim that Eis making is that I is an 
element of the subset A(K) of Mpp. That means that the theory-element core K narrows down 
the set Mpp to the subset A(K), thus restricting the possible models of the theory (containing 
only non-theoretical components) such that the result is I. This "narrowing down" is done via 
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constraints and intertheoretical links 108• Balzer, Moulines, and Sneed (1987: 87) point out that 
the assumption that the intended applications of T have the structure of its partial potential 
models is the "most economical and most natural" assumption to make. Thus we should 
assume that /(T) " Mpp (T). There will, of course, still be unwanted applications, even if we 
take Mpp as the set of all possible applications of the theory, but these gentlemen (1987: 87) 
claim it is enough that "[w]e can say something precise [after all], namely that an intended 
application is a partial potential model, but we cannot be precise about eveiy feature of 
intended applications". 109 
In model-theoretic terms - as I shall discuss in Section 5.5 - the notions of inter-
theoretical links and constraints are mostly addressed in terms of underdetermination via the 
various models of a particular theory. The "narrowing down" of the set of applications of a 
theory is best done by amending the axioms of the theory itself, although the various relations 
possible between theories and models of the same theory as well as models of other, 
possibly related, theories also may be applied in this sense. As far as the last remark above 
is concerned, also in a model-theoretic account of science is it not possible to depict all the 
possible (intended) applications of a specific theory, as has already been pointed out often. 
3.4 The semantic approaches of Beth, Van Fraassen and Suppe 
Bas Van Fraassen developed a semantic approach to philosophy of science by building 
on the work of Evert Beth 110, in which physical systems are depicted in terms of their possible 
states. This position was further developed by Frederick Suppe 111 • The foundational claim of 
this approach is that any scientific (physical) theory is taken - by scientists themselves -
to have many alternative linguistic formulations. (Think of the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian 
formulations of classical particle mechanics.) Theories thus cannot be identified with their 
linguistic formulations. Suppe (1973:130) claims that it is rather the case that" ... scientific 
theories are extra-linguistic entities which are referred to and described by their various 
linguistic formulations ... [thus] theories are to be constructed as abstract structures which 
serve as models for the sets of interpreted sentences [that] constitute their linguistic 
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formulations (i.e. that they are meta-mathematical models of their linguistic formulations}, 
where the same structure (theory) may be the model for a number of different, and possibly 
inequivalent, sets of sentences or linguistic formulations of the theory". 112 Here, then, is a 
more radical approach than either that of Suppes or the structuralist programme in the sense 
that the theory is identified, as it were, with the notion of model. A theory is a model to the 
defenders of this approach, they do not merely talk about discarding the linguistic features 
of theories in logical reconstructions, they claim a theory to be "extra-linguistic". 
Beth 113 developed what is referred to as a "state-spaces" view (related to the older phase 
and configuration space view of mechanics and that of Von Neumann (1955) for quantum 
mechanics) in three articles (1948/49), (1949), and (1961). Van Fraassen (1970:327), 
following Beth, believes that the meaning structure of a certain part of natural language 
becomes suitable for a technical role in some scientific language if it has a representation in 
terms of a model, in the sense of a mathematical structure. Then the scientific language can 
be formally reconstructed as an artificial language whose semantics is determined with 
reference to this mathematical structure or model. Such a language Van Fraassen (1967) 
calls a "partial or semi-interpreted language". 114 Note that the "meaning structure" of a part 
of natural language that may be represented by some mathematical model may here then be 
described in some appropriate formal language. In a model-theoretic approach the semantic 
content of the linguistic expression of the theory in some appropriate formal language is 
determined by the initial conceptual model, but also, the linguistic theoretical expression is 
then interpreted by other conceptual models during the application stages of the theory115, 
which implies nothing more than that the "meaning structure" of the linguistic expression is 
then represented yet again by other (or the same) mathematical structures. However, this is 
not what Van Fraassen and Beth really claim. To them the model is the mechanism that may 
determine the semantics of the formal language in which the theory may be formulated, as 
are my initial conceptual models. However the theory itself remains a non-linguistic entity, 
since nowhere do they mention the possible interpretation of the theory in terms of other 
mathematical structures in the model-theoretic sense.116 
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Now, in Beth's approach, the notions of a "physical system" of a theory and the various 
"states" in which this system can be at given times, are foundational. These notions are 
however easier to understand if some of Suppe's notions are introduced first. The specific 
class of phenomena that the (linguistic) formulation of a theory is meant to characterise, is 
called the intended scope of the theory. Theories do not characterise these phenomena in 
their complexity, though. Suppe (1973: 131) gives as illustration the fact that classical particle 
mechanics characterises mechanical phenomena as if they depend only on the abstracted 
position and momentum parameters, while actually various other "unselected" parameters 
usually also influence the phenomena. Thus a theory's characterisation describes what the 
relevant phenomena would have been like had the abstracted parameters - those the 
theory's formulation focuses on for whatever reason - been the only parameters influencing 
them. This is essentially what happens both in my original intended models and in the later 
conceptual models of a given scientific theory. More about this a little later in this section. 
In this sense, theories may be said to characterise physical systems, because they are 
about the behaviour of certain abstract systems in the sense that this behaviour is dependent 
only on the parameters selected by the theory. Physical systems are relational systems 
whose domains consist of states, and relations and laws ranging over these states.117 Van 
Fraassen (1970: 330) states that the function of a law in Beth's approach is to describe the 
behaviour of the physical system with which the theory is occupied at the time in terms of its 
possible states, its normal evolution through time, and its behaviour in interaction with other 
factors. 118 These laws thus indicate which states are physically possible for the various 
physical systems; and they also determine which combinations of states are so-called theory 
induced physical systems (notion explained below) and which are not. "Thus the relations of 
the theory determine all and only those sequences which are the behaviours of physical 
systems in the class of theory induced physical systems" (Suppe, 1973: 133). 
The selected parameters abstracted from the phenomena can wholly describe the 
behaviour of physical systems, and so they are called the defining parameters of the physical 
system. The values of these parameters are physical quantities which may be determinate 
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or statistical (Suppe, 1973: 131). A set of simultaneous values for the parameters of a 
physical system is a possible state of the system. Note that any physical system is at any 
time in exactly one of its possible states, although that state may change over time. The 
behaviour of a physical system is given in terms of these state changes. In this way, the 
behaviour of a system is the system's history and each physical system has a unique 
sequence of states (in the deterministic case) or a set of possible sequences of states with 
associated probabilities (in the statistical case) that it assumes over time. Each physical 
system is characterised fully by a specification of the possible states it can assume and the 
sequences of states it assumes over time. 
The class of causally possible physical systems for a theory is the class of physical 
systems which correspond in the following way to causally possible phenomena P, within the 
theory's intended scope: any P in the theory's intended scope corresponds to a (causally) 
possible system P' such that P' is what any causally possible phenomenon P would have 
been were the idealised conditions imposed by the theory met and the phenomenon P 
influenced only by the selected parameters. Obviously then, one of the tasks of a theory is 
to describe the class of causally possible physical systems for the associated theory. This is 
done by the theory describing a class of physical systems known as the theory induced class 
of physical systems, such that this class is identical to the class of causally possible physical 
systems. 
A theory then is empirically true if the theory induced class of physical systems and the 
class of causally possible physical systems for the theory are indeed identical. Testing of 
theories involves determining whether this identity in fact exists between these two types of 
classes of systems and is usually done in statistical terms. 
As far as the semantic content of the theory formulation 119 is concerned, Van Fraassen 
(1970:328) writes that the "set of states of some physical system are represented by 
elements of a certain mathematical space, called the state-space."120 Apart from the state-
space, these theories use a certain set of parameters - referred to in the above - to 
characterise the particular physical system. This yields the theory's set of elementary 
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statements about the system in question. These are initial and boundary conditions which are 
part of the relations determining empirical adequacy in my terms. These statements are such 
(ibid.) that each elementary statement U formulates a proposition to the effect that a certain 
physical magnitude m has a certain value r at a certain time t. 121 The truth of such a 
proposition U always depends on (or is relative to) the particular state of the system at that 
time - in some states m will have the valuer and in some states it will not have that value.122 
A "satisfaction function" determines whether the system's actual state is represented by 
an element of the mathematical structure consisting of all the relevant state-spaces of the 
theory or not: "The mapping h [of the theory] (the satisfaction function) ... connects the state-
spaces with the elementary statements, and hence, the mathematical model provided by the 
theory with empirical measurement results. 123 ••. The exact relation between ... [elementary 
statement U] and the outcome of an actual experiment is the subject of an auxiliary theory 
of measurement, of which the notion of 'correspondence rule' gives only the shallowest 
characterisation" (Van Fraassen, 1970:329).124 A description of a set of state-spaces plus the 
satisfaction function are thus offered in the place of the statement approach's axioms or 
postulates concerning the "primitive" symbols of the scientific language. 125 I agree, although 
I offer the entire model-theoretic stratified process of science in the place of these postulates. 
Now if a physical system is in the class of theory induced systems, then the domain of 
the physical system will be a subset of the domain of the theory and the sequence of states 
of that system will be one determined by the theory's relations (laws). These physical systems 
are meant to be replicas of the actual systems in reality, and so by describing the physical 
systems the theory " ... indirectly gives a counterfactual characterisation of the actual 
phenomena" (Suppe, 1973: 131). Also, it may happen that theories give an idealisation of 
some physical system - Suppe's (1973: 131) illustration again is from classical particle 
mechanics. These kinds of systems are "isolated systems with dimensionless point masses 
interacting in a vacuum". Such idealised physical systems are still abstract replicas of 
phenomena, but with the additional feature that certain idealised conditions (such as being 
isolated systems of dimensionless point masses) are imposed on these systems which actual 
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phenomena can never actually meet. Thus (Suppe, 1973: 139) "[o]nly some of the 
propositions which are true of the theory will be true of a particular physical system in the 
ciass of theory-induced systems, but every proposition true of a physical system in that class 
will be true of the theory". If a theory is empirically true, the semantic relations holding 
between propositions in the theory-formulation language and the class of causally possible 
physical systems for the theory will be exactly the same as those holding for the theory-
formulation language and the class of theory-induced physical systems. Moreover, every 
proposition in the theory-formulation language which is true of a causally possible physical 
system will be true of the theory. 
A few remarks on this semantic approach to scientific theories in terms of a model-
theoretic account of these matters. In model-theoretic terms the intended scope of a theory 
is indeed the "class of phenomena" the (formulation of) the theory is meant to characterise. 
It is simply the case that within the latter kind of account we usually speak of real systems 
rather than phenomena or classes of phenomena. Also, in the latter approach, a theory can 
do no more (as Nancy Cartwright so delights in pointing out) than characterise the real 
system it means to describe as it would have been had the abstracted parameters of the 
theory been the only ones influencing the system in question. (I shall discuss this "idealised" 
or "open-ended" feature of scientific theories more deeply in Chapters 4 and 5.) 
Each possible state of a physical system - in Suppe's terms - might be viewed as a 
conceptual model in model-theoretic terms, seeing that a possible state of a system is given 
in terms of a simultaneous set of values for the parameters of the theory in question. The 
theory-induced physical systems would then perhaps best be viewed in terms of the empirical 
models of a model-theoretic account. The reason for this is that the class of causally possible 
systems turns out to be systems in which the idealised conditions set by the theory have been 
realised, influenced only by the selected parameters of the theory, and that a theory is said 
to be empirically true in Suppe's terms if this class of systems is identical to the class of 
theory-induced physical systems. The relation of empirical adequacy between conceptual and 
empirical models of some theory in model-theoretic terms is then very close to this relation 
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of identity between causally possible physical systems and theory-induced physical systems. 
This becomes even clearer if we take into account that the "satisfaction function" of Suppe's 
semantic framework determines whether the actual state - i.e. the causally possible state 
- of a physical system is represented by the mathematical structure representing the theory-
induced physical systems. 
3.5 Ronald Giere's naturalistic approach to science 
Giere (1985:75) agrees with Van Fraassen that the logical positivists' (statement view) 
pre-occupation with the linguistic structure of scientific theories obscures the important role 
models in which those theories are true, have to play in the scientific process. He, however, 
does not waste much time in pursuing any of the semantic categories of reference and 
meaning in the way Van Fraassen does (via his notion of elementary statements yielding 
semi-interpreted languages). He (Giere, 1985:77) states clearly that he" ... will simply ignore 
such issues .... the theory of science need not wait on the development of adequate general 
theories of meaning and reference to proceed. We need not know in detail how general terms 
such as mass come to be associated with terms in an abstract mathematical structure. We 
know that it can be done because it is done". This is close to what I have been implying all 
along. I have stressed that, because of the complex and changeable nature of these issues, 
questions concerning experimental design, measurement theories, and criteria determining 
the "fit" of some model to a system in reality, are best left to science itself to answer. I do 
however think philosophy of science has something to say about these issues, at least as far 
as showing their place in the structure of science as a whole (i.e. in the relations between the 
possible empirical and conceptual models of some theory), and their implications for the 
structure of scientific theories in particular (i.e. their possible reference to real systems). 
Giere sees himself as a supporter of the non-statement view of theories, preferring 
Beth's state-space approach to Suppes's set-theoretic one. He states (Giere, 1994: 277) that 
he interprets the model-theoretic approach to imply that " ... theories include two sorts of 
linguistic entities. Some are predicates, which may have an elaborate internal structure, as, 
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for example, the predicates 'pendulum' or 'two-body Newtonian gravitational system'. Others 
are statements of the form 'X is P' in which X refers to a real world system and P to one of 
the predicates, as in the statement, 'The earth-moon system is a two-body Newtonian 
gravitational system'". These remarks might be viewed in terms of a model-theoretic 
approach's relations in its conceptual models - as the "predicates" Giere refers to, and such 
an approach's empirical models - Giere's "statements" concerning the "real world". li;i 
general, the structure of a theory consists, according to Giere (1994:277), of a 'family' of 
models or predicates, where the linguistic structure corresponding to a predicate is a 
definition instead of an axiomatic system (as in the traditional statement approach). 
Giere addresses these issues in terms of "theoretical models" (the models (or set of 
models) created by defining a certain real system), and "theoretical hypotheses" which are 
statements picking out similarities between theoretical models and some system in reality. 126 
He (Giere, 1983:271) makes it clear from the start that theoretical models (as definitions of 
systems in reality) have no empirical content. They may, however, be used to make claims 
about reality via the theoretical hypotheses that identify elements of some theoretical model 
with elements of real systems and then claim that the real system exhibits the structure of the 
model in question. Giere (1984:11) acknowledges the idealised nature of models127 by stating 
(Giere, 1985:79) that a theoretical model is not "a faithful replica in all detail" of the object 
modelled. He (Giere, 1984:12) goes on to explain that theoretical models also come in 
various degrees of specificity, but points out that no such thing as a maximally specific model 
exists. This kind of model is always relative in the sense that it is a model of a designated 
type; thus a model is always an idealisation of reality. Giere (1984: 12) also refers to the 
underdetermination of a theory by its models: "There are many ways of filling in a highly non-
specific model to achieve a highly specific version of that model. The relationship between 
non-specific and specific models, therefore, should not be confused with the relationship 
between general and particular, as in the relationship between general laws and particular 
instances" (ibid.).128 
He (Giere, 1983:272) stresses though that a theory is not simply a general model. He 
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(ibid.) blames scientists for thinking that theories have empirical content and accuses them 
of using the term "theory'' to refer to a "more or less" generalised theoretical hypothesis 
asserting that "one or more specified kinds of system fit a given type of model". He (Giere, 
1985:78) accuses the logical positivists of conflating two separate functions of a theory, 
namely to offer general interpretations of theoretical terms such as "mass"; and to provide the 
means of identifying particular instances of these terms. The two "functions" of theories that 
Giere refers to might be respectively viewed in model-theoretic terms as the ''work" 
conceptual models and empirical models do. 
Giere, it seems however, wants actually to study "how we as human beings use abstract 
models in describing particular objects in the real world" - which reminds somewhat of 
livartofski's approach 129. He does this not by means of that favourite realist notion of 
approximate truth, nor in terms of Van Fraassen's (1980:9, 45ff.) notion of approximation in 
the sense of one model of a class of models fitting the real system, but rather by means of 
a particular notion of "similarity". Giere (1985:80) claims that theoretical hypotheses assert 
that "[t]he designated real system is similar to the proposed model in specified respects and 
to specified degrees' .130 He adds that the precision associated with any hypothesis is always 
less than or at most equal to the precision of the measurement techniques employed at the 
time. 131 Giere (1983:269) thus finds the rationality of science in the testing of "highly specified 
theoretical models against empirical data" .132 
Giere (1983: 272) remarks that theoretical hypotheses can also vary from having a very 
simple form to being a very complex type of claim, and that (Giere, 1984: 13) they reflect the 
level of specificity of the corresponding theoretical model. The simplest form of a theoretical 
hypothesis is a claim that a particular identifiable real system fits a given model. In my 
approach this would correspond to the claim that the empirical model obtained from the real 
system sits isomorphically embedded in a given conceptual model, making the latter 
empirically adequate for the real system (relative to the procedures delivering the empirical 
model). However, claiming for instance that our solar system is a Newtonian particle system 
(with a suitable set of initial conditions) involves the whole mechanical theory of the 
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Newtonian system. He (Giere, 1984: 13) notes that theoretical hypotheses can thus be more 
or less general in the sense of including more or fewer real systems of various kinds. 
"Consider, for example, Newton's theory of celestial mechanics, Mendel's theory of 
inheritance, or the plate tectonic theory of the earth. On this account ... the difference 
between a 'hypothesis' and a 'theory' may be largely honorific" (Giere, 1984: 13). Well, in 
model-theoretic terms this is not the case. The difference in scope between these kinds of 
theoretical hypotheses rather refers to the kinds of structures it relates to each other. The 
"truth" relations between a conceptual model and its theory will necessarily be more general 
in scope than those between an empirical model of a theory and one of its conceptual 
models. It is also worth noting that theories then rather than theoretical hypotheses contain 
all the different possible histories of some real system that could result from different, but 
physically possible, initial conditions. 
3.6 W6jcicki's empiricist semantics of science 
Wojcicki (in Humphreys, 1994: 125) argues that the coordination of set-theoretic 
definitions of theories such that the statements of scientific theories can be related to 
empirical hypotheses {i.e. theoretical hypotheses "decided" by observation) is an extra-
theoretical issue. Philosophers of science should therefore not attempt to address this issue 
within their analyses of the structure of science by notions such as the structuralist notion of 
"intended applications". W6jcicki thus replaces "observability" with "empirical decidability''. I 
agree in the sense that philosophy of science is concerned with matters of empirical 
decidability, rather than with observations themselves, and also wish to point again to the 
overlap with and elaboration of Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism here. 133 
When turning to the nature of empirical interpretations, W6jcicki (in Humphreys, 
1994:131) also refers to the underdetermination of theories by data: "[n]o scientific theory is 
just true about the empirical systems to which it applies .... Empirical systems are, to appeal 
to a Peircean metaphor, 'nebular'. They are never fully separable from their environments; 
moreover they consist of objects whose properties are not uniquely determined and may not 
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be exactly such as is required by the theory. Thereby, if a theory applies to any such system 
it applies to it in an 'approximate' way". However, as a result of Wojcicki's model-theoretic 
sentiments, he (Wojcicki in Humphreys, 1994:132) stresses - much in accordance with my 
own approach 134 - that it is not so much the issue of approximation and its determination that 
is important, or the related fact that " ... scientific theories dramatically fail to be totally true of 
the states of affairs to which they refer" that should drive one's notion of truth. Rather, he 
views the implications of a model-theoretic approach to imply that theories are "partially'' or 
"relatively'' true, in the sense of being true "in certain selected respects". And it is such an 
approach, he - rightly - claims (ibid.) that can indeed account for the ways in which 
scientific theories refer to real phenomena. 
He (Wojcicki in Humphreys, 1994:133) sets out his approach as follows: "An application 
of an empirical theory T, by itself or combined with some auxiliary hypotheses, to an empirical 
phenomenon n in order to solve a specific problem Q concerning n may require the 
formation of a theoretical mode/1 35 (one may prefer to say mathematical model) of the 
phenomenon ... ". This implies defining an abstract system M meant to satisfy the following 
conditions: M is a realisation of T, and M is a faithful representation of n under all the 
respects that are relevant to Q. 
Thus, if A is the solution to Q, then A is factually true, i.e. true of n if and only if A is true 
of M. A theoretical model of n is a model of an aspect mo of the phenomenon n - each 
other problem connected to n may lead to the formulation of a new model M '. 136 This notion 
of a theoretical model is very close to my notion of an intended model. The "truth" of the 
solution depends on the accuracy and reliability of the steps resulting in the solution offered 
by theoretical model M, and is a matter of statistical analysis of all the steps of the 
procedure. 137 In order for the model's equations to have a unique solution, Wojcicki requires 
that the values of the parameters of the equations should either be established experimentally 
or be deduced from the available experimental data with the help of hypotheses we consider 
to be confirmed, i.e. the laws of the theory. This points towards an assumption of the same 
kind of hierarchy of models as Suppes's.138 
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I should mention that Wojcicki (in Humphreys, 1994:138) however does not view 
theoretical models as "the right candidates for the role of intended applications in the Adams-
Sneed sense". According to him the problem lies in their identity as realisations of the 
theories which are intended to refer to certain empirical systems. 139 He (ibid.) allows that, 
even though theoretical models are not empirical systems, they can be viewed as some 
idealised representations of these systems. Why then does he not allow for the kind of 
transitive reference or interpretation relation I argue exists, with the theoretical models 
mediating between their theories and empirical systems? If (theoretical) models may both be 
realisations of theories and representations of empirical systems, why can they not serve as 
a semantic link between theories and empirical systems? His acknowledgement (in 
Humphreys, 1994: 138) of the fact that a structuralist intended application may indeed be a 
structure which may turn out to be a realisation of the theory in question, simply makes his 
comments on this issue more puzzling. He (Wojcicki, 1979: 158), however, views the notion 
of "semantic model" as synonymous to that of "realisation", so that it does seem as if the 
problem here is distinguishing between the use of the various terms in certain contexts, 
especially given that he continues to state that "[c]learly, the same system may happen to be 
a model for an instance of an empirical phenomenon [my intended and his theoretical model] 
and at the same time a model for a set of laws [my conceptual model interpreting the theory 
and his semantic model] which describe the behaviour of that phenomenon• (Wojcicki, 
1979:158). 
The problem might lie in the fact that Suppes and a few others want to distinguish 
between the "theoretical" model and a "semantical" one in a fundamental way, and perhaps 
Wojcicki simply does not point out clearly enough that someone like Suppes does not assume 
the two roles that a mathematical model can play in the process of science in the way we do. 
In this sense, Suppes (1960:291) claims the set-theoretical model - Wojcicki's semantic 
models and my conceptual models - to be more fundamental than the "physical" one - in 
W6jcicki's terms, the theoretical one, and my intended model. I fail to see why the same kind 
of mathematical model might not be seen as playing both roles at different times of the 
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scientific process.140 
Suppes seems to reduce this interplay to interplay between the semantic model and the 
theory, which is acceptable as long as one accepts that this "semantic" model may 
sometimes play the role of Wojcicki's "theoretical" model. Thus, neither is Wojcicki nor am I 
introducing theoretical models as a separate class of formal models opposed to semantic 
models - we rather emphasise that the important thing is the stage at which one is creating 
a model: either "as a method for finding a new theory [theoretical model) or as a test of a 
given theory [semantic model]" (Wojcicki in Humphreys, 1994: 146).141 
Wojcicki (1979:158 - 160) also points out that the semantic use of the term model is 
often confused with the use of the term as a set of mathematical equations describing some 
kind of regularity in the behaviour of a particular phenomenon. I agree with him that this 
should be avoided and that the latter use should rather be changed such that it is taken that 
the meaning of "model" in that sense is "theory''. Wojcicki (1979: 160) remarks that "[i]t seems 
more reasonable then, when speaking about mathematical models, to speak about 
mathematical entities the equations define [and] which serve as abstract representations of 
the phenomena examined rather than about the equations themselves". This seems to imply 
that the sets of equations should be referred to as the "theory".142 
3. 7 Conclusion 
The different relations between theories, models, and systems in reality offered by the 
various non-statement approaches to the scientific process all offer - among other things 
- variations on the theme of scientific realism. The model-theoretic tools these views are 
equipped with seem to offer a very good chance of, on the one hand showing that there are, 
indeed, such relations, and on the other hand, to define the nature of these relations more 
precisely than before. A model-theoretic rather than a non-statement (or semantic) approach 
promises the most at this point since it not only "speaks about" the relations of the models 
(of some theory) to reality (or rather physical systems in reality), but also about the relations 
between these models and the theory itself. In this way a truly model-and-theoretic realism 
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can be achieved. The non-statement elimination of the theories as linguistic expressions 
actually do away with half of the realism issue. That is the main point of difference between 
my approach and the non-statement approaches to science discussed in the above. 
There are however among these approaches and mine also quite a few common 
aspects concerning especially the final "empirical" links between models (of some theory) and 
real systems. Adams (1959) was the first person whom I know of who, in terms that may be 
interpreted in a realist way, described an empirical theory in terms of (i.e. as consisting of) 
two classes of structures: a class consisting of all the theory's "realisations", and a class 
consisting of all the intended applications of the theory in question. The latter class is merely 
a class of empirical structures (i.e. physical - or "real" - systems) of which the theory is 
(expected to be) true. As I see it, the problem is not only then to show that the theory is true 
of these empirical structures, but also to describe the relations - if any - between the 
"realisations" of the theory and these more physical structures making the theory true. 
Now, as I have said often in the above, these are the two most difficult questions a 
realist, model-theoretically speaking, has to face. However, these questions can only be 
answered on the basis of - and analogous to, in a certain sense - the (formal) relations 
between a theory and its conceptual models (which I take to be Adams's "realisations"). In 
model-theoretic terms the answer to both the above "difficult" questions lies in the claim that 
a(n empirical) theory is true of Adams's empirical structures, because it is true (formally) in 
its conceptual model(s) within which we find the particular empirical structure(s) in question 
to be (isomorphically) embedded. 
Most of the non-statement advocates discussed above offer notions concerning the last 
empirical model-theoretic link between theories and real systems - i.e. notions concerning 
the idea of empirical submodels embedded isomorphically into some conceptual model(s) of 
a given scientific theory - that are at least reminiscent of those of a model-theoretic 
approach: 
• Suppes's hierarchy of theories and models expresses in far more detail the more simple 
model-theoretic relation of isomorphic embedding at this last "empirical stage" of theory 
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development. 
• Without a distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical terms, structuralists simply 
say that a particular intended application is an element of Mp. If such a distinction is 
made, they say that a particular intended application belongs to the class of partial 
potential models, Mpp, which is formally derivable from IV/,. Sneed and his colleagues 
link these classes of models (whether Mp or Mpp - whichever one is applicable) with 
an empirical claim associated with the core of the theory in question. Such an empirical 
claim states that the set of (partial) potential models that satisfies the conditions set by 
the laws, constraints, and intertheoretic links of the theory in question, is indeed in K, 
the theory's core. The role of these empirical claims would, in my terms, be fulfilled by 
the isomorphic relations between the conceptual model(s) and empirical submodel(s) 
of a given theory, which - at least partly- are determined by the empirical expressions 
giving the empirical data in question. 
• In terms of Beth's state-space approach the link to reality is given via some satisfaction 
function between some (mathematical) state-space describing some physical system, 
and a set of elementary statements concerned with physical measurements. This means 
that the actual state of a physical system at a certain time may be given by defining 
some state-space representing the possible states of that system and some satisfaction 
function, which holds if the actual state of the system (described by some elementary 
statement) is an element in the domain of the relevant state-space. Suppe claims a 
theory to be empirically true if the semantic relations holding between the propositions 
in the theory-formulation language and the class of causally possible physical systems 
are those that hold in the case of theory-induced physical systems as well. If a physical 
system is in the class of theory-induced systems, the domain of the physical system will 
be a subset of the domain of the theory, and the sequence of states of that physical 
system will be determined by the theory's laws.143 The relations determining the 
isomorphic embeddings of empirical models into conceptual models of a given theory 
are fairly close to Beth's "satisfaction" function. Also Suppe's definition of empirical truth 
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makes a lot of sense translated into model-theoretic terms - i.e. "empirical submodels" 
for "causally possible physical systems'', and "conceptual models" for "theory-induced 
physical systems". 
• Van Fraassen announces a theory empirically adequate if some model of the theory is 
such that (real) structures describable in experimental and measurement reports are 
isomorphic to an empirical substructure of the relevant model of the theory. This is 
obviously the approach closest to mine. Van Fraassen's empiricism and non-statement 
sympathies however keep his views still sufficiently "non" -if not "anti" - realistic for me 
not to subscribe to them unconditionally. 
• Giere (1991: 29) views theories as being represented by a family of theoretical models 
and a set consisting of these theoretical hypotheses that "pick out things ... that may fit 
one or another of the models in the family" (ibid.). Evaluating the truth of such 
hypotheses is a matter of statistical methodology (Giere, 1991), since he claims 
(1985:80) a real system to "have the same structure as a model" if the system is similar 
to the model to specified degrees and in specified respects. 144 This is yet another -
albeit perhaps a weaker one - version of the model-theoretic isomorphic embedding 
between empirical submodels and conceptual models of scientific theories. 
• Wojcicki (in Humphreys, 1994) speaks of factual truth if the solution offered by some 
theory is true of the phenomena the theory wants to explain, as well as true in a model 
of the theory. This model should be a realisation of the theory and should represent the 
phenomena in question in all relevant respects - which essentially is a shortened 
version of Adams's original approach. The strong agreement between Wojcicki's and 
my approaches is illustrated by the following remark. He (Wojcicki in Humphreys, 
1994: 137) writes: ''The fact that formation of a theoretical model presupposes formation 
of a model of the data as well as the fact that formation of a model of the data can be 
controlled by the requirement of consistency of the model with the corresponding theory 
are of key significance for proper understanding of the interplay between the data and 
the theories, and thus for proper accounting for both the corrigibility of the data and the 
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falsifiability of the theoretical claims". 
On the whole Suppes's approach seems to me to hold the most promise as far as solving 
problems concerned with possible relations between theoretical entities, empirical data, and 
phenomena go. Obviously Van Fraassen's notion of empirical adequacy determined by 
certain relations of isomorphism is very close to my own ideas on these issues. In my terms, 
however, proving the existence of relations of isomorphic embedding between empirical 
models and conceptual models (which incorporate Suppes's hierarchy of models between, 
at the highest level, theories of experiments, and the notion of experimental design, closest 
to reality) offers a way - the possibility of which Van Fraassen denies - in which to refer to 
the contingent and complex relations between real systems and theories via their 
mathematical models in a precise way. 145 
From this brief summary it is obvious that the reasons why I am not fully satisfied with 
the non-statement approach to the nature of scientific theories and their links with reality do 
not lie in their use of the term "model" nor in their interpretation of it. The problem is rather 
that in a model-theoretic account of science the general terms of the theory are a prerequisite 
for linking these theories to (systems in) reality. No realism concerning real entities that is still 
a scientific realism can work without the organising role of the general linguistic terms of the 
theory. 
In this sense an interesting change of direction is offered by Nancy Cartwright's 
approach to the theories of physics. She is not a non-statement defender, but neither does 
she really fit into the statement framework. She does retain a (syntactic) notion of a theory, 
in the sense that she often refers to sets of field equations as theories, but it is not always 
clear what her views are on the notion of theories as deductively closed sets of sentences. 
Her continued claims concerning the "falsity" of the fundamental laws contained in scientific 
theories seem to indicate that, like the advocates of the non-statement approach, she views 
the role that theories (as linguistic entities) play in the processes of science redundant. Thus, 
like mine, her account of science has statement and non-statement characteristics and also 
she addresses the issue of realism in various ways throughout her account. That is why the 
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whole of the next chapter is devoted to discuss - against the background of my model-
theoretic account of science - the main points of her approach. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: NANCY CARTWRIGHT AND THE LYING LAWS OF PHYSICS146 
4.1 Introduction 
Nancy Cartwright is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on the role 
of models in the process of science. Although some of her work comes very close to the 
model-theoretic interpretation of science that I am offering, there are also serious differences 
in our approaches. At the end of this chapter I shall claim that my interpretation can 
incorporate hers, eliminating some of the more serious problems I think still exist in her work, 
and - especially in Chapter 5, but already in some of the later sections of this chapter - I 
shall show how a model-theoretic account of scientific knowledge has more to offer current 
realism than either of her simulacrum or causal accounts of science. 
Cartwright's main claim is that scientific theories (or rather, the "fundamental laws" which 
are part of the theories' content) have very little or nothing to say about reality. She argues 
for this with the aid of two arguments: 
• an instrumentalist, anti-fundamentalist, and, mostly, anti-realist, strategy arguing against 
a "theory-driven" interpretation of the function of models in (philosophy of) science, and 
• a metaphysical argument offering a hierarchy of causalities, dealing at the highest level 
with the capacities of real things - representing a "patchwork of laws" - based on a 
notion of reality as not necessarily being ordered and structured, even possibly being 
"disunified". 
4.2 Phenomenological and fundamental laws 
Nancy Cartwright claims in How the Jaws of physics lie (1983) that considering the truth 
of the (fundamental) laws of physics will force anyone to admit that almost all of these laws 
are strictly false, i.e. "lie", because they are valid only under certain circumstances or given 
certain conditions that do not strictly hold in reality. However, it is interesting to note that the 
implication ["Conditions" - "Law''] is (logically) true even if the "conditions" (the antecedent 
of the implication) are not satisfied. Therefore "inapplicable" would be more appropriate than 
"lying'', which seems to imply "false" in Cartwright's context. 
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Her distinction between phenomenological and fundamental laws is centred around the 
distinction between the particular (concrete) and the general. She claims this distinction to 
be in the Aristotelian sense of emphasising the richness and vitality of the particular, although 
it is interesting that she chooses not to refer to the fact that Aristotle saw the richness of the 
particular only becoming fully realised in the "universal" (or general). My approach is therefore 
perhaps more "Aristotelian" than hers, because my model-theoretic interpretation of the 
process of science will be meaningless without the role it ascribes to general statements (i.e. 
scientific theories), while Cartwright is always trying to get away from the need to assign too 
meaningful a role to this kind of statement. She quotes (Cartwright, 1983: 9) Boltzmann's 
equation and the general equation of continuity used by Maxwell in his explanation of the 
motion in a radiometer as examples of fundamental laws and describes these laws as 
"general, abstract equations; ... not about any particular happenings in any particular 
circumstances."147 I do not think that this description of fundamental laws is debatable. What 
is debatable, however, is whether this necessarily leads to the conclusion that fundamental 
laws have no links with aspects of the real world. 
Phenomenological laws are complex descriptions of actual situations in very specific 
terms - ''what can be confirmed through tests and comparisons with observations are 
phenomenological laws - comparatively detailed descriptions of concrete situations, which 
because of their richness in detail, do not have great generality (sometimes called 'low-level' 
generalisations)" (Cartwright, 1983: 129). Cartwright (1983: 129) claims that it is 
phenomenological laws that fulfil the "traditional role" of laws in the sense that they describe 
empirical regularities - which fundamental laws - because they are too general and much 
too simple - cannot do, since they cannot account for the actually observed variety in the 
behaviour of objects in reality. Fundamental laws do not have anything to say about 
"regularities" (constant conjunctions of events in Humean terms), because describing regular 
behaviour requires more and more complicated descriptions of the situation. The descriptive 
phenomenological laws thus have less and less generality and they can never be stated 
without exceptions, while fundamental laws "by contrast, are simple, general, and without 
96 
exception" (Cartwright, 1983: 157). 
Gartwright (1983: 55ff.) quotes the universal law of gravitation, Schrodinger's equation, 
and Maxwell's equations as further examples of fundamental laws, and gives (ibid.: 2) Airy's 
law of Faraday's magneto-optical effect as an example of a phenomenological law, because 
Airy's law does not explain Faraday's law (in the way that the more theoretical treatment of 
it in terms of electron theory by Lorentz does), but rather describes the actual changes in 
Faraday's dense borosilicate glass as magnetic fields rotate the plane of polarisation of light 
(while Lorentz's formulation of the Faraday effect appeals to the electron theory, and so has 
an underlying explanatory content to it, that Airy's law does not have). Other examples of 
phenomenological laws she discusses (Cartwright, 1983: 55ff.) are the performance 
characteristics of lasers as specified by their manufacturers, and the phenomenology of 
fundamental particle interaction, including things like scattering cross-sections. She choses 
these examples, because, as Alan Chalmers (1987: 83) points out, "[m]easurements of the 
rotation of the plane of polarisation are related to the strength of the magnetic field that 
causes it in the way specified by Airy's formula, lasers do perform [mostly!] in the way 
specified in the manufacturer's instruction manual, and, for example, scattering cross-
sections of interacting proton beams at some specified energy are reproducible whenever 
such beams are made to interact".148 It seems then that Cartwright claims fundamental laws 
to be explanatory of the content of phenomenological laws, and phenomenological laws to 
be descriptive of aspects of reality. Explanation and description are thus done at different 
levels of the scientific process. This is a very important point, and is also accommodated in 
my model-theoretic account of science, but it is not a point that necessarily scores any marks 
for any kind of anti-realism. I shall show that, on the contrary, it is rather a supportive point 
in a model-theoretic realist account of science. 
It is claims like the following about fundamental laws that do not seem to be entirely 
correct from a model-theoretic perspective - " ... fundamental laws ... do not hold for the most 
part, or even approximately for the most part, and conversely, those laws which are more or 
less true much of the time are not fundamental" (1989: 174). The unease that such claims 
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cause is not necessarily the result of what she says about the nature of these laws 149, but 
rather that they seem to imply that she still believes in some absolute notion of truth. She 
stresses that fundamental laws can - possibly and at most - explain the content of 
phenomenological laws by organising or classifying them, and that fundamental laws 
therefore do not describe the behaviour of real objects in the world. However, as Rueger and 
Sharp (1996: 95) point out, fundamental laws are in this context still useful to her even though 
they are not "true descriptions" of real objects or their behaviour, precisely because they 
"organise and classify our knowledge in an elegant and efficient manner" (Cartwright, 1983: 
100). She creates the impression in How the laws of physics lie (1983) though, that she might 
view the fact that fundamental laws only serve to organise and summarise real phenomena 
as a particular weakness of these kinds of law, because she puts so much emphasis on the 
fact that "the cost of explanatory power is descriptive adequacy" (Cartwright, 1983: 3), which 
seems to imply that the final cost of explanatory power is the loss of the truth of fundamental 
laws. 
In my version of the scientific process, however, that is not a problem, and, I might add, 
neither should it be in hers, because we both accept and acknowledge from the outset that 
truth is a very local and limited notion, albeit in a more complex way than is ordinarily thought. 
In other words, the fact that she (ibid. :5) denies that "explanation is a guide to truth", surely 
is only problematic if one thinks of truth as a universal notion. She does, in a sense, make 
amends in Nature's capacities and their measurement (1989), as well as specifically stressing 
pretty clearly in her article entitled Fables and models (1986), the fact that questions of truth 
are not necessarily questions of universality.150 
Cartwright is arguing against the notion that fundamental laws give true descriptions of 
real phenomena. And thus, she is also arguing against my notion of scientific progress, 
because although we both acknowledge the use of the notion of models to mediate between 
the concrete and the abstract, she still thinks that accepting some kind of realism with regard 
to fundamental laws means accepting an absolute notion of truth, when, paradoxically 
enough - as I have mentioned above - she herself still seems to believe in this notion in 
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any case. Why else does she say that fundamental laws lie? If she takes seriously the 
possibility of contextualising the '1ruth" of these kinds of laws with the help of abstract models, 
why then does she still argue for the falsity of fundamental laws as if it is not possible for her 
to be satisfied with a "localised" version of truth? She argues against assumptions of the 
absolute truth of fundamental laws by stressing the concrete character of phenomenological 
laws. However, she cannot acknowledge the semantical links between theories and models 
that I claim exist, because she apparently thinks that would somehow imply that she believes 
theories to be absolutely true, and as they are not, she would rather discard them completely 
as part of the meaningful (and descriptive) side of the scientific process, and simply 
acknowledge (a la Duhem) their organising role, than try to find (like I am) some kind of 
reason for them lo be part of the chain of factors or concepts that in the end make science 
mean (and explain) something to people living in the real world. (More on these issues a little 
later on in this section.) 
Returning to Cartwright's interpretation of "phenomenological", she does not use it in 
terms of its usual interpretation as referring to the "observable" (Cartwright, 1983; Cartwright, 
1986), but rather points to the fact that this kind of law describes actual behaviour of real 
objects. She believes that, regardless of whether an object is observable or not, if we can 
manipulate it (intervene in its behaviour a la Hacking (see his lnteNening and representing 
(1983)), we can formulate (true) low-level generalisations which accurately describe the 
(causal) relations into which it enters. Phenomenological laws describe particular events 
while whatever fundamental laws have to say is always about various situations in reality in 
one sweep. So, then - because fundamental laws can supposedly do no more than explain 
the content of phenomenological laws (in accordance with the covering law model of 
explanation, about which Cartwright has quite a lot to say), and good explanations are 
supposed to be simple (abstract) and general - it seems that fundamental laws can indeed 
never directly be about any particular aspect of reality. However, ii is important to understand 
that Cartwright, by referring to phenomenological laws as low-level generalisations, means 
to say that they too, have an abstract nature in the sense of being idealised descriptions of 
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objects in reality. Moreover, as Chalmers (1993: 199) also points out, quite in accordance 
with the fact that phenomenological laws too, are generalisations that involve conditions, and 
even the much discussed ceteris paribus conditions, these laws themselves sometimes fail 
to adequately describe the behaviour of real objects. (Think, in this regard, most simply of 
Cartwright's example of the instructor's manual of lasers - surely lasers can malfunction?) 
But how then does Cartwright conceive of relating fundamental with phenomenological 
laws and either (or both) of these sets with real objects? It seems that the "content" of 
fundamental laws is filled in by various abstract models. 151 In Cartwright's scheme of things 152, 
these models mediate between theories and fundamental laws on the one hand, and 
phenomenological laws and reality on the other. According to the model-theoretic 
interpretation of the process of science that I am offering, models mediate between theories 
(linguistic systems) and systems in reality. Phenomenological laws, in my terms, would simply 
be part of the content (or properties) of the models interpreting scientific theories, and they 
would be expressible as sentences true in the model(s) under consideration, as well as 
possibly true in some empirical substructure(s) of these models, and so, true of some real 
system. 153 
Schematically, Cartwright's account will look something like this: 
SETS OF FUNDAMENTAL LAWS 
THEORIES 
MODELS 
Ceteris paribus conditions active 
Ceteris paribus conditions active 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL LAWS 
REALITY 
My scheme of things would rather be: 
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AXIOMS 
FUNDAMENTAL LAWS 
THEORIES 
Ceteris paribus conditions active 
CONCEPTUAL MODELS 
EMPIRICAL SUBSTRUCTURES 
SYSTEMS IN REALITY 
Cartwright explains in How the laws ... (1983: 4), that the "route from theory to reality is from 
theory to model, and then from model to phenomenological law'', and goes on to claim that 
"phenomenological laws are indeed true of objects in reality - or might be; but the 
fundamental laws are true only of objects in the model". In other words, she does not see the 
same kind of referential relation between models and systems in reality that I see. The 
reason, I think, is that she worries too much about the ideal character of the models and the 
role of the ceteris paribus clauses needed to interpret phenomenological laws. 154 Also, it is 
difficult to see how a vel}' specific link with reality can be given by a law, even if it is a 
phenomenological one. For example, if Newton's laws are fundamental, Kepler's are 
phenomenological (and deducible from Newton's), but the direct observations (done in both 
cases) are specific activities (looking in a particular precise direction) carried out at a specific 
time (specific to the second). Statements describing these kinds of activity surely are not 
laws, but can rather be expressed in terms of some empirical model which would be a subset 
of the model of the theory under consideration and which interprets experimental data and 
empirical activities leading to the formulation of these data. 
Cartwright is not a complete anti-realist, as her interpretation of phenomenological laws 
clearly shows 155, it simply seems to be the case that she cannot see how to escape the 
antirealist implications of the abstract nature of fundamental laws. This anti-realism has its 
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origin in her interpretation of the "explanatory" role fundamental laws play in the practice of 
science (physics). It seems as if Cartwright is implying - in the sense of the validity of 
fundamental laws being dependent on abstract, idealised situations - that fundamental laws 
must hold regardless of the individual arrangements of things possible in each separate 
situation in reality that they (these laws) are "about"; while phenomenological laws potentially 
describe the actual situations to which they are applied. Here again it seems as if she still 
holds on to some belief in truth per se (" ... fundamental laws hold regardless of ... individual 
arrangements ... "). although her entire crusade is supposedly focussed on showing the local 
character of truth. Perhaps this should be taken as a warning of the danger involved in 
attempting to exclude the role of fundamental laws from the model-theoretic process, since 
it makes for certain invalid - surely unintended? - conclusions. The problem is that 
Cartwright does not acknowledge that the sense in which fundamental laws hold "regardless 
of individual arrangements" is merely in terms of their abstract nature. This should not be 
linked to thinking that therefore they are universally true. Nor should it be thought that 
because they are too general to describe real systems, they are false. Questions of truth can 
only be addressed in terms of the conceptual models and empirical models of scientific 
theories. 156 
In my account of the scientific process, as remarked above, I show how meaningless 
any talk about the truth (or validity) of fundamental laws per se is and I argue that these 
issues can be meaningfully addressed only in terms of the infrastructure of the models 
interpreting these laws. But, if then in Cartwright's terms, the main distinction between 
fundamental and phenomenological laws is taken to be the fact that fundamental laws hold 
by themselves - albeit only in certain "unreal" situations - while phenomenological laws can 
only hold on account of some (non-necessary) arrangement of circumstances, what does that 
imply for scientific explanation, prediction and the description of real objects? 
Phenomenological laws describe actual events, because although they are usually 
mathematically formulated in physics, no fundamental explanation of the mathematical 
formulae nor of the mechanisms underlying these formulae are assumed in these laws. 157 The 
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problems related to scientific explanation in the context of the "leap" from fundamental and 
even phenomenological laws into more messy "worldly" situations are emphasised differently 
in a model-theoretic approach. Within such a model of science - as I have pointed out 
before - it is usually taken that scientific theories explain the content of their models, and 
through these models, some aspects of reality and the behaviour of certain phenomena may 
be described and predicted. A theory does not always necessarily explain every detail of the 
system in reality it is focusing on. Newton's mechanics does not explain the phenomenon of 
gravity. It rather explains the influence of gravity on certain events and in that sense, it 
describes gravity rather than explains it. The old (deductive-nomological) symmetry between 
explanation and description should be "stretched" such that it covers all three strata of a 
model-theoretic model of science. If this is not done the fact that the descriptions of gravity 
in the above sense may enable someone applying Newton's mechanics to make certain 
predictions concerning the results of the exertion of the forces of gravity, without explaining 
gravity itself, cannot be grasped, and then it might seem that explanatory power indeed 
diminishes descriptive power, as Cartwright so often claims. 
Thus, in model-theoretic terms scientific theories are said to explain in the basic sense 
of theories explaining the content of their models by establishing deductive links between the 
sentences expressing what is true in some model. Thus in a model-theoretic account of 
science a theory and its conceptual models "explain" in the strict logical sense that a 
predicted phenomenon can be logically deducted from the theory and the model(s) in 
question. Newton's three laws of motion and his law of gravity plus the model of our solar 
system - in terms of current scientific knowledge - explain why we see Mars tonight at 
eight o'clock in a particular position. In these terms, a preceding theory (e.g. Newton's laws 
of motion and gravitation) may describe models which (under certain conditions, within a 
certain interpretation, approximately) are also models of a later "higher order" theory (say the 
general theory of relativity), and then the latter may be said to explain the former. 158 The 
better explanatory power of later theories with respect to the content of their models is then 
the result of at least the higher level of accuracy of the theory. For instance, as Penrose 
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(1997: 57) points out, Einstein's general theory of relativity can be said to be accurate to 
about one part in 1014, which is about ten million times as accurate as Newton's mechanics, 
which may roughly be taken to be accurate to about one part in 107. Improved accuracy is 
one embodiment of that continuity and progress in science with which some form of realism 
sits comfortably. 
The referential relations between model terms and objects and relations in some real 
system are (indeed, as Cartwright claims) more descriptive than explanatory. However, this 
need not result in anything as negative as Cartwright's claims of high explanatory power of 
fundamental laws diminishing their "truth making" power. If the whole interpretative chain -
i.e. from terms of some theory, to terms in some conceptual model(s) of the theory, to terms 
in some empirical substructure of the conceptual model in question, to some real system -
is taken into account, the fact that models seemingly describe and theories explain only the 
content of their conceptual models does not necessarily have any anti-realist consequences. 
Usually it is even the case that theories contain some basic notion that they merely describe, 
even if they do explain the rest of the content of their models - e.g. Newton's mechanics 
does not explain the notion of "gravity" itself, but merely describes its behaviour. The 
distinguishability and interconnectedness of the three stages roughly outlined by this 
"interpretative chain" - as set out in chapter 2 - show however that description (a feature 
mainly of models) and explanation (a feature mainly of theories or fundamental laws) are 
inseparable, perhaps even just as much as explanation and prediction have traditionally been 
taken to be. Just as nothing can really be said about a theory's truth or reference without 
linking the theory to a specific interpretation of the relevant language given by some model 
of the theory, explaining something means at some ("deep") level describing certain aspects 
of that thing. Definitions have to terminate at undefined terms, and the deduction of sentences 
of the theory has to start at unproven axioms. 
Cartwright has a valid point in emphasising the role of phenomenological laws against 
the overwhelming philosophical attention that fundamental laws have been getting - and in 
certain cases to a certain extent, still get - but my account differs from hers, because I 
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introduce the role of models from a different angle than she does. My approach, although 
making much of the role of fundamental laws in the scientific process, is enough in the 
semantic (non-statement) tradition to find her anti-realism towards fundamental laws too 
limiting. Unfortunately, she has few kind words to say to supporters of the semantical 
approach to scientific theories: "On the semantic view, theories are just collections of models; 
this view offers then a modem Japanese-style automated version of the covering-law account 
that does away even with the midwife [of deduction]" (Cartwright, Shomar, & Suarez, 1995: 
139). I agree that the non-statement elimination of the theory as a linguistic expression is 
misguided, and that is why in my approach I stress the role of theory as much as I do the role 
of models. Theories (or fundamental laws) do indeed, in a certain sense, aim to "state the 
facts in a more general way so as to make claims about a variety of different circumstances" 
(Cartwright, 1983: 103). But, I see them as a crucial link in the chain of scientific progress, 
and I stress that it is mainly thanks to their general nature in the above sense, that they are 
a link in the first place. 
Laymon (1989: 355) formulates one of the challenges Cartwright directs at supporters 
of the explanatory priority of fundamental laws as follows: 
• they have to specify how actual scientific practice can be viewed as supportive of the 
truth of fundamental laws. 
He (ibid.) points out that the first thing to do, in order to meet this challenge, is to concede 
that the generic-specific account of explanation is not descriptive and then to give it the 
following normative reading: "[t]he goal of science should be to seek fundamental laws which 
are true, and can be used in the sound derivation of phenomenological laws" (Laymon, 1989: 
355). He describes (1989: 355, 356) the realist with regard to fundamental laws as someone 
who believes that scientific practice can be appealed to in confirmational considerations and, 
in particular, that attempts to derive phenomenological laws (and data) play a role in these 
kinds of considerations. 
Cartwright needs this challenge answered, because she wants to claim that fundamental 
laws explain in the sense of organising the content of phenomenological laws, but do not 
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describe anything real, while phenomenological laws describe real phenomena, but do not 
really explain them. 159 
Realists (in Laymon's terms) explain the practice of looking for increasingly more 
accurate and less idealised initial or boundary conditions in terms of the fact that idealisations 
are characteristically false and that they therefore have a distorting influence on derivations 
of predictions in such a way that, even if the fundamental laws are true, they will be able to 
produce only distorted or false predictions. In this sense, Laymon (1989: 359) claims, realists 
see the aim of science as the construction of more accurate models because they believe 
that our theories, if true, will produce more and more accurate predictions when applied to 
these more and more accurate models. He (Laymon, 1989: 359) gives the example of Baily's 
connection of coefficients rendered superfluous and corrected by Stokes's development of 
a Newtonian theory of viscous fluids to illustrate his point. Cartwright (1983) gives a few 
examples in quantum physics to illustrate this realist tendency about approximation among 
"fundamentalists" - most notably Messiah's hydrogen atom (Cartwright, 1983: 137-138), and 
Louisell's treatment of the gas laser (Cartwright, 1983: 146 - 148). 
Well, is giving idealised (perhaps "approximately true") descriptions (or explanations) of 
real systems not at least one of the things that science "really" is about? The trick is perhaps 
to distinguish between "distorting" idealisation and counterfactual idealisation. Think again 
of Suppe's distinction between counterfactual and ideal truth. Models provide us with 
counterfactual truths in the sense that they realise certain selected parameters of the theory 
in specific contexts where certain other influences are held stable. However the physical 
systems thus described are causally possible, while the kind of distortion to which Laymon 
and especially Cartwright seem to be referring, is Suppe's notion of "pure abstractions" that 
is not part of the empirical truth of models. (See Chapter 3 for a discussion of Suppe's notion 
of empirical truth.) 
In the light of these examples Laymon (1989: 359, 360) formulates the following 
confirmation principle: 
• a set of fundamental laws receives confirmation if the use of more realistic specifications 
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of initial or boundary conditions in fact leads to more accurate predictions. 
He concludes from that that sets of fundamental laws (i.e. "acceptable" theories) are 
"monotonic towards the truth" (Laymon, 1989: 360) in the sense that more accurate and less 
idealised initial conditions lead to more accurate predictions. This implies that, from theory 
T being monotonic in certain situations, we conclude that T is, in principle, monotonic, that 
is in other words, that T is such that if T is true, then it is possible, in principle, to make 
sufficient corrections to its initial conditions so that it will yield better predictions. Laymon 
(1989: 360, 361) claims that this monotonicity approach offers a way in which to show how 
fundamental laws can be confirmed or disconfirmed in the face of distorting idealisations, 
although he concedes (1989: 357) that a fundamental realist asks too much if she wants to 
be able to claim that it is possible to derive phenomenological laws and also, more generally, 
empirical data from some true fundamental law, or a set of fundamental laws. (He (1989: 
361,362) cites the Michelson-Morley example and a few others to illustrate this.) 
The model-theoretic interpretation of science that I offer accommodates both the 
possibility of this kind of development (in the sense of constituting models to interpret the 
fundamental laws) as well as fundamental laws being monotonic towards the truth - think 
of the events leading to the discovery of Neptune. It was possible to amend the model of the 
solar system with which scientists had been working up to the discovery of Neptune, without 
implying that the older model was necessarily "false" (in the sense of not referring to anything 
in reality anymore - if it ever did at all). This is also related to the fact that I take the problem 
of underdetermination to be twofold: theories (and intended models) are underdetermined by 
data - the old Duhem-Quine problem; and models are underdetermined by theories - the 
set of sentences of a particular language which are true in a particular model of a theory is 
bigger than the set of sentences comprising the theory. This implies that if a theory is 
underdetermined by data, a model of that theory is a fortiori underdetermined by those data. 
See Chapter 5 for a discussion of underdetermination in model-theoretic terms. 
Laymon (1989: 363) accuses Cartwright of ignoring the "confirmational value" of this sort 
of improvability of idealisation and approximation which is an actual fact of real scientific 
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practice, although he acknowledges that he needs inductive evidence for his claim that this 
kind of improvability leads to stating that, if a set of fundamental laws is true, then it is 
possible, in principle, to make sufficient corrections to its initial statements (conditions) so that 
it will yield better predictions. He discusses (1989: 366 - 368) in this context, the example 
Cartwright (1983: 107ff.) gives of Bethe's derivation of the Lamb-shift (in the excited state) 
by correcting the Weisskopf-Wigner method of treating exponential decay, and also Agarwal's 
derivation of the Lamb-shift in the ground state. Laymon concludes (1989: 367) that all that 
can be said in the light of these examples is that some combination of approximations and 
idealisations entail the Lamb-shift - whether or not quantum mechanics entails the Lamb-
shift depends on the approximations and idealisations scientists decide to use, and on 
nothing more. In other words, Cartwright's anti-realist argument in this regard is based on two 
factors: 
• the choice of approximations and idealisations is limited by the initial and boundary 
conditions which have to be added to fundamental laws (via their conceptual models), 
but not dictated by them; and 
• different choices lead to different incompatible results. 
As shall be pointed out in Chapter 5, my treatment of the underdetermination problem shows 
that these factors need not have any anti-realist implications at all. For instance, the fact that 
initial and boundary conditions limit the choice of models, but cannot dictate scientists' 
choices - the first factor above - is completely accommodated within the framework for 
interpreting the progress of science that I am offering, and actually contributes to the 
continuous character of science. 
These factors lead Cartwright however to conclude (Cartwright, 1983: 107) that the 
empirical content of the phenomenological laws is not contained in the fundamental laws 
which supposedly explain them, in other words, she concludes that the fundamental laws 
simply organise scientific knowledge by explaining phenomenological laws but cannot really 
describe - or say anything else for that matter about - the real objects in the real world. The 
main reasons for Cartwright's antirealism about fundamental laws can be summarised as 
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follows: 
• She believes that the fundamental laws of science (physics) do not describe the 
behaviour of the objects in their domain, rather they "provide mathematical frameworks 
into which, by various devices some phenomena of the world can be fitted" (Chalmers, 
1987: 84). In other words, to give a fundamental theoretical account of an object is to 
"fit" that object into the mathematical framework of the theory (for examples see 
Chalmers, 1987: 84, 85) - which means that the laws explain idealised versions of the 
behaviour of real phenomena by some underlying (usually mathematical) mechanism. 
• She takes the underdetermination of theory by data as proof for the anti-realist nature 
of fundamental laws (she offers the example of radiative damping as an example, see 
Chalmers's discussion of this example in Chalmers, 1987: 86). She claims to 
successfully address the underdetermination problem however by showing the real 
nature of capacities in her later works. (I "solve" the "problem" of underdetermination by 
simply incorporating it into the structure of the scientific process.) 
• She emphasises the logical gap between fundamental theoretical descriptions and 
adequate phenomenological descriptions of real situations by pointing to the 
imprecisions in mathematical expressions of theoretical descriptions (she offers the 
quantum mechanical treatment of the Lamb-shift as supporting evidence for this claim 
- see a discussion of this example in Chalmers, 1987: 86) - instead of stressing the 
interpretable nature of these kinds of expressions and examining the possibility of them 
having "links" with reality via models. 
Chalmers (1987: 87) writes: "Cartwright takes on an anti-realist stance with regard to 
fundamental laws, then, because the situations described by them are too simple and artificial 
to correspond to real world situations [no description of real objects], because adequate 
descriptions of the latter cannot in general be logically deduced from fundamental laws in 
conjunction with initial conditions [against the covering-law model), and because physicists 
frequently employ fundamental laws in diverse ways to offer different descriptions of the one 
real world situation [underdetermination of theory by data]". 
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Laymon (1989: 367) counters that one simply has to accept that judgements of "relative 
realism" are often made before the accuracy of predictions are compared. He claims that for 
instance, with regard to Bethe's derivation of the Lamb-shift, "Bethe's realisation that the 
mathematical debris [-] generated when the time approximation was applied before the sum 
approximation [-) could be interpreted as the Lamb-shift, may have served as a good reason 
to grant his calculation the status of being more realistic than the original Weisskopf-Wigner 
calculations" (Laymon, 1989: 368). In other words experimentation can - and is actually-
used to test the relative realism of idealisations. Which is essentially what I am claiming too. 
The idealised nature of models necessitates a variety of different empirical (mostly 
experimental) ways to select different interpretations (models) of one theory, namely those 
models which are able to accommodate the empirical models generated by the data. This, 
however, goes against Laymen's own confirmation principle (Laymon, 1989: 359, 360 and 
above) because these examples offer no illustration of the use of the previously determined 
relative realism of idealisations to test fundamental theories. 
4.3 The role of models in science and Cartwright's "simulacrum" account of science 
Traditionally, according to the statement approach, in philosophy of science a theory is 
taken as consisting of two parts: 
• internal principles (the "core" or basic content of the theory expressed in some 
theoretical language), and 
• bridge principles (links or procedures "giving meaning" to the theoretical terms in the 
theory's language by relating these terms to phenomena in the "external world"). 
A problem that has been worrying Cartwright - and which occupies any philosopher 
concerned with dealing with the intricacies of realism, maybe especially those working from 
a model-theoretic point of view - is, very simply put, that the presence or necessity of these 
"bridge principles" of an indirect and complex nature, however they are interpreted (in terms 
of models, mathematical functions, both, or something entirely different), implies somehow 
that the theory160 itself has very little to say about the real phenomena the bridge principles 
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are supposed to link it to. 
First on her mind in How the laws of physics lie (1983, chapter 8), is to make clear 
whether having as few as possible bridge principles, should hold a promise of high 
explanatory power. I suppose the reasoning behind this claim is that the fewer bridge 
principles a theory needs the less "fundamental" - in the sense of falsity - its fundamental 
laws. She (1983: 143) claims that, if members of some research community want to be able 
to work together, some way has to be found in which to limit the kinds of models that can be 
used to describe real phenomena, because, given the complex and rich nature of these 
objects (the phenomena that have to be described) a variety of models might describe the 
same phenomena. She (Cartwright, 1983: 144) writes: 
If there were endlessly many possible ways for a particular research community 
to hook up phenomena with intellectual constructions, model building would be 
entirely chaotic, and there would be no consensus of shared problems on which 
to work. The limitation on bridge principles provides a consensus within which to 
formulate theoretical explanations and allows for relatively few free parameters in 
the construction of models ... It is precisely the existence of relatively few bridge 
principles that makes possible the construction, evaluation, and elimination of 
models. This fact appears also to have highly anti-realist side effects ... it strongly 
increases the likelihood that there will be literally incompatible models that all fit 
the facts so far as the bridge principles can discriminate ... 161 The great 
explanatory power of quantum mechanics comes from its ability to deploy a small 
number of well-understood Hamiltonians to cover a broad range of cases, and not 
from its ability to match each situation one-to-one with a new mathematical 
representation. 
The anti-realist implication of this is, I agree with her (Cartwright, 1983:145), not to be argued 
against by some belief in only a very small number of basic interactions in nature, but rather, 
I claim, by a belief in the very nature of the link between models of a theory and some aspect 
of reality. I do not think though that these links are determined solely by traditional bridge 
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principles, because the notion of bridge principles too has too much of a universal air about 
it. I am more comfortable with the more "natural" limitation on models provided by the aims, 
background information, equipment, and training of the specific scientific community in 
question, as well as the satisfaction functions operating between theories and their models 
that set out the specific boundaries of the content of models in the first place. I am not entirely 
convinced though, that Cartwright would completely agree with that, given her anti-realist 
interpretation of the question of underdetermination, as well as her repeated efforts to show 
that terms in a theory have nothing to say about any aspect of reality, but can only explain 
the idealised behaviour of objects in models of the theory, thus effectively still severing the 
realist link. 
She (1983:147 -150) does however distinguish two senses of the notion of the "realistic" 
nature of a model: 
• The first sense has to do with the relation between a model and reality (some aspect of 
reality, I would say). In this sense, a model is realistic if it gives an accurate description 
("picture") of the aspect of reality ("situation") being modelled. In other words it will have 
to describe the structure and actual behaviour of the real system. 
• The second sense has to do with the relation between the model and "the mathematics" 
(in her terms (1983: 150)), which is the relation between the model and the theory in my 
terms. According to her a fundamental theory determines criteria for what counts as 
explanations, and, in these terms - relative to those criteria - a model will be realistic 
if it explains the mathematical representation - i.e. if it realises the theory. 162 
She (Cartwright, 1983: 151ff., chapter 8) offers her "simulacrum account of explanation" in 
the place of the covering law model of explanation. According to her (Cartwright, 1983: 151) 
the covering law model requires the way in which phenomena are modelled to be realistic in 
both senses because it views a phenomenon to be explained if it has been derived from 
some fundamental law. Cartwright, however, primarily wants to show that - and how -
fundamental laws logically summarise and classify (as mentioned before, in Duhem's 
tradition) groups of phenomenological (experimental) laws without aiming to explain them. 
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She (ibid.: 152) writes: "I have been arguing ... that the vast majority of successful treatments 
[of phenomena] in physics are not realistic. They are not realistic in the first sense of picturing 
phenomena in an accurate way; and even in the second sense, too much realism may be a 
stop to explanatory power, since the use of 'phenomenological' [still abstract] terms rather 
than more detailed 'causal' constructions may allow us more readily to deploy known 
solutions with understood characteristics and thereby to extend the scope of our theory 
[althqugh this will not necessarily lead to a better understanding of the actual aspect of reality 
the fundamental laws are 'about']". 
Cartwright's problem with fundamental laws is that they are laws about distinct 
(separate) aspects of objects in reality and their behaviour - or, in her most recent terms, 
about distinct causes and their separate effects - while, in the real world, these things 
actually occur only in combination with other aspects of these or even other objects. And, 
moreover, these combinations change quite often and occur very seldom according to some 
regular kind of pattern, because of the variety of factors involved. Cartwright's problem is that 
"[e]ven if these regularities did hold ceteris paribus - or, other things being equal - that 
would have no bearing on the far more common case where other things are not equal" 
(Cartwright, 1989: 177). Again, this interpretation of the nature of fundamental laws is not 
really what is at issue here, the problem or challenge really is to find a kind of view that can 
accommodate these fundamental features of scientific theories and still offer a realist 
interpretation of the scientific process. A model-theoretic approach such as the one that I am 
offering holds this promise without even having to specify whether one sees objects and 
activities in reality in terms of causes and their separate effects (as Cartwright seems to be 
doing nowadays) or not, since both accounts can be accommodated. 
Now, if giving a fundamental theoretical account of a certain object means fitting it into 
the mathematical framework of the theory under discussion, and, if this is what fundamental 
laws ultimately do, as Cartwright claims - "To explain a phenomenon is to find a model that 
fits it into the basic framework of the theory and that thus allows us to derive analogues for 
the messy and complicated phenomenological laws that are true of it" (Cartwright, 1983: 152) 
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- the obvious question to me is why this should result in false fundamental laws? The 
answer lies in Cartwright's notion of models and their role in the scientific process. 
She (ibid.) points out that models help us to "see" the relevant phenomenon through the 
mathematical framework of the theory, but stresses that different problems will have different 
emphases on different aspects of that framework. This, to me, implies that different models 
can - and should - only be evaluijted according to the different aims guiding their 
construction. And that is, in my view, why she calls her account of explanation a "simulacrum" 
account.163 She (ibid.) writes: 
This is just what I have been urging that models in physics are like ... A model is 
a work of fiction. Some properties ascribed to objects in the model will be genuine 
properties of the objects modelled, but others will be merely properties of 
convenience ... Not all properties of convenience will be real ones. There are the 
obvious idealisations of physics - infinite potentials, zero time correlations, 
perfectly rigid rods, and frictionless planes. But it would be a mistake to think 
entirely in terms of idealisations - of properties which we conceive as limiting 
cases, to which we can approach closer and closer in reality. For some properties 
are not even approached in reality. They are pure fictions. I would want to argue 
that the probability distributions of classical statistical mechanics are an example 
... It is better, I think, to see these distributions as fictions, fictions that have a 
powerful organising role in any case and that will not mislead us too much even 
should we take them to be real in the simple cases. 164 
However, "[b)eing explanatory in this sense, that is, being useful in many different contexts, 
requires the theory to neglect the special differences between the contexts ... Therefore, the 
theory cannot be true of any of these real situations; it can give a correct description only of 
the behaviour of objects in highly idealised contexts or models. The model contains the 
distortions and idealisations that are necessary to make a theory bear on a real situation. 
Real objects and their behaviour are too varied, too complex, too messy to be treated 
faithfully by theories of great generality; that's why we need models to mediate between 
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theory and phenomenon" (Rueger & Sharp, 1996: 95). The important thing that both Rueger 
and Sharp, and also Cartwright, seem to overlook is that scientists never examine any real 
system in all its messiness. That simply is not - and has never been - the aim of science. 
It is however part of the task of philosophy of science to show how such abstract and general 
theories may be said to be (or not to be) about aspects of this complex reality, and yes, that 
is where studies of the internal structure of models of theories and the various relations into 
which they enter come in. The mediation of models between theory and reality is however 
misunderstood if it is taken to offer the means by which science can indeed be said to say 
something about some real object in all its varied complexity. 
And, it seems that (for Cartwright) it is because of the simulacrum nature of models that 
bridging relations can only hold ceteris paribus. This shows the structural error in her account 
as far as ceteris paribus conditions are concerned. The view that portrays these conditions 
as some kind of ingenious device cunningly designed by naive realists or staunch 
fundamentalists to "save theories from point-to-point testing" (Rueger & Sharp, 1996: 103) 165 
is completely misguided. First, however, as far as bridge principles are concerned - they do 
not hold ceteris paribus. There is no absolute set of rules describing these kinds of 
correspondence relation. Rather these rules hold with respect to a certain model within whose 
boundaries the theory is true. The best that can be said about "bridge principles" in my terms 
is that perhaps one can speak of a set of bridging "procedures" or "links" that extracts data 
from the relevant real system relative to a specific empirical context, and then injects these 
data, as an empirical model into the model under consideration. 
The theory holds ceteris paribus yes, but not in Cartwright's sense of the word. In my 
terms, to say that a theory "holds" means, per definition, that it holds (is "true") in a particular 
one of its models. To say now that it holds "ceteris paribus" adds nothing to simply saying that 
it is true. Moreover, there is nothing else about which it can be stipulated that it stays the 
same - everything is given in the model. Ceteris paribus clauses seem in Cartwright's terms 
to play a more and more important role the further away one moves from fundamental laws. 
In model-theoretic terms, however, they are necessary only at the level of scientific theories 
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or linguistic systems, and become less and less active the closer to reality one moves. I claim 
- see also Chapter 2 - that they are suspended in their generality as soon as the theory 
in question is interpreted in specific models, rather than activated. The idealised nature of 
conceptual - and even empirical models - is not the result of specific ceteris paribus 
clauses, but indeed simply true to the nature of science. No real system can ever be 
examined, represented, explained, or described in its full complexity. That is simply not 
science's function. 
Following Duhem (Duhem, 1914: 7), Cartwright (1983: 96) considers the notion of 
scientific explanation in terms of description in the sense that explaining a set of phenomena 
means giving a physical theory of them, "a physical theory in Duhem's sense, one that 
summarises ... and logically classifies them" (Cartwright, 1983: 96). Rueger and Sharp (1996: 
95) refer to the problem she has with the covering law account of explanation as the 
"unsoundness argument" and set it out as follows: "If ... phenomenological laws could be 
soundly derived from more fundamental laws as the traditional [covering law] view would 
have it, then any successful comparison of the phenomenological consequences of the theory 
with the observations would count unproblematically as inductive support for the theory. 
Confirmation would flow upwards from the phenomenological level to the fundamental level. 
This flow, however, is staunched ... because phenomenological laws typically cannot be 
soundly deduced from more fundamental theories. To derive the former we usually need 
assumptions [ceteris paribus clauses] which are either false (distorted representations of the 
situation of application) or which contradict the fundamental laws themselves. Inductive 
support cannot, therefore, be transmitted." 
Claiming that phenomenological laws cannot "typically'' be deduced from fundamental 
ones, is perhaps jumping the gun a bit. Is it not the case that Kepler's laws can be deduced 
from Newton's in a very sound way? Moreover the ceteris paribus clauses and other 
additional assumptions needed to validate the fundamental laws are suspended when models 
are constructed of some theory - as remarked above - and thus these clauses become 
more and more concretely realised as they set the boundaries for the truth of the theory, i.e. 
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the clauses themselves (e.g. "no other forces act differentially on components of the system") 
become realised, i.e. true in the relevant models. Thus it is rather unclear how they can be 
understood to "contradict" the fundamental laws themselves (which are also true in these 
models).166 These ceteris paribus conditions or clauses will usually be incorporated into the 
formulation of the law explicitly (as when stating that Hooke's law holds as long as the elastic 
limit has not been exceeded), or else implicitly and tacitly by common understanding. 
So, it seems that to Cartwright, in order to fit some phenomenon into the mathematical 
framework of some theory, a model of that phenomenon ''which re-describes it in terms which 
are amendable to mathematical theoretical treatment" (Chalmers, 1993: 200) has to be 
constructed. "Before we can apply the abstract concepts of basic theory - assign a quantum 
field, a tensor, a Hamiltonian, ... or write down a force function - we must first produce a 
model of the situation in terms the theory can handle" (Cartwright, 1994b: 282). I do agree 
with this, but not with Cartwright's conclusion that models are thus (in her terms) merely 
devices used to fit phenomena into the theoretical frameworks of theories which in their turn 
classify and organise groups of phenomena. - " ... the point of the kind of models I'm 
interested in is to bring the phenomenon under the equations of the theory" (Cartwright, 1983: 
157). This is not the only role models have. They do have this function, but it is by virtue of 
this very function that they offer ways to link the theory with aspects of reality. 
Cartwright (1983: 160) wants to focus on what "actually happens in concrete situations, 
whether these situations involve theoretical entities or not, and how these differ from what 
would happen if even the best of our fundamental laws played out their consequences 
rigorously". Moreover, she stresses (1994b: 292) that Hacking's point in Representing and 
intervening (Hacking, 1983) is not merely that theoretical entities exist if we can use or 
manipulate them or intervene in their behaviour, but far more important, that " ... it must be the 
case that we understand their behaviour very well if we are able to get them to do what we 
want11• 
She (1994b: 292) concludes then from this that such an understanding should be taken 
as enough evidence for " ... the truth of some very concrete, context-constrained claims, the 
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claims we use to describe their [the theoretical entities' under discussion] behaviour and 
control them". The important fact here remains that (ibid.) " ... in all these cases of precise 
control, we build our circumstances to fit our models ... [in other words] that does not show 
that it must be possible to tailor our models to fit every circumstance .... some circumstances 
resemble the models we have; other do not. And it is just the point of scientific activity to build 
models that get in, under cover of the laws in question, all and only those circumstances that 
the laws govern [try to describe]". She already says as much in How the laws of physics lie 
(1983: 157), where she clearly states yet again that she is arguing, not that the generality and 
exceptionlessness of fundamental laws are proof of their being laws of nature, but precisely 
the opposite, namely that these features are not real, that is, fundamental theories simply 
appear to have these characteristics. This is the result of an over-focussing on what she calls 
the "second stage of theory entry", in the sense that the fundamental laws may be true of the 
objects in the model (but not of objects in reality), "but that is because the models are 
constructed that way ... when we present a model of a phenomenon, we prepare the 
description of the phenomenon in just the right way to make a law apply to it" (ibid.). 
I suppose we do, in a sense, try to "make" the circumstances resemble the models we 
have, at the stage when the intended model is being constructed, insofar as the aims of the 
scientists concerned, the available mathematics, and so on, will define the nature of the 
models at that level. Also, perhaps at the stage of the scientific process where empirical 
adequacy is tested these kinds of considerations will have some role to play. In a sense, 
one's view on this will depend on the role one takes background information to play in the 
process of science - are scientists trying to find a "match" between some model and an 
aspect of reality, or an aspect of reality-as-they-interpret-it according to their established body 
of knowledge, future research aims, and training? More about this a bit later on in this 
chapter. A last remark on saving the phenomena: the construction of models means precisely 
the preparation of the conceptual description of a certain object in reality to "make" some law 
apply. However, no a priori rules exist - as pointed out above in terms of bridge principles 
- that govern the construction of models, and therefore, obviously scientists cannot 
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guarantee that these deliberate actions will indeed end in descriptions of real phenomena. 
I am not sure though whether philosophy of science should demand such guarantees. I think 
that being able to describe in general the way in which theories are linked to aspects of 
reality, and so to set out the way in which (the process of) science should be interpreted, 
should be enough. The guarantees at issue here are at the level where relations between 
aspects of reality and models are evaluated, and that is solely an empirical issue, and thus 
falls in the domain of science itself. 
This also has to do, as Cartwright (1983: 158) points out, with the anti-realist implications 
of her account, because different - possibly incompatible - models are used for different 
purposes, and so there is no one-to-one matching between models and the real situations 
being studied. And, obviously then, that is why she cannot see how the laws governing the 
models could be presumed to apply to real situations. According to Rueger and Sharp (1996: 
107) fundamental theories cannot receive confirmation from successful predictions, based 
on models of theories, precisely because these models themselves are no mirror-images of 
reality but rather distort reality - because of their ideal (or context-dependent or) aim-
orientated emphasis-sensitive nature. Then one may well ask how, if there is no one-to-one 
mapping between a situation studied and a model, and a fundamental theory is true only in 
a model, can it be claimed that a scientific theory has something - or anything for that matter 
- to say about reality? Of course, this makes sense, but I am claiming that these issues can 
be viewed and set out a little differently: 
• It is true that there is no guarantee that some theory will be applicable to a specific 
aspect of reality before that theory has been interpreted and this interpretation (model) 
linked empirically to some system in reality. 
• But, what does it mean to "place a phenomenon in the mathematical framework of a 
theory"? Does that not already imply that the model was constructed - apart from giving 
a true interpretation of the theory - also with some kind of real phenomenon in mind? 
Yes, indeed. 
In other words, the model-theoretic view of science implies that scientific theories can - and 
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do - say something about reality (because of the way the reality-model-theory link is 
interpreted), but acknowledges that it is not possible beforehand to determine or claim that 
a certain theory will definitely be applicable to a certain aspect of reality and to no other. The 
reasons for this are very important since they explain the "vagueness" of any kind of 
description of "bridge procedures" between theories, models, and real systems. The first 
reason lies in the "freedom" involved in the construction of models in the sense of model 
construction being influenced, among other things, by the scientific community's aims with 
the theory under discussion. Entangled with this reason, the second reason lies in the specific 
nature of the real system that the theory in the end - via its conceptual and empirical models 
- may be said to be "about". 
Cartwright does see this, in a way, since she (Cartwright, 1994c: 293) acknowledges 
that the link between (an aspect of) reality and some model is "a matter for hard scientific 
investigation, not a priori metaphysics". And goes on (ibid.) to explain that "(t]hat is the reason 
I am so concerned with the successes and failures of basic science in treating large varieties 
of situations differing as much as possible from our experimental arrangements". This is a 
valid point, but only worrying if one believes that science is mirroring total Nature by 
discovering its ultimate laws. Otherwise, this simply is a feature of the way science is being 
done. 
So, although models are the source of the "distortions" and idealisations that prohibit 
theories (and their fundamental laws) to say anything directly about any real situation, model-
theorists like me cannot see the scientific process continuing without them. But, that simply 
brings us back to Cartwright's claim that laws that explain are not necessarily true. Rueger 
and Sharp again (1996: 96): "There is thus a trade-off between a theory's explanatory power 
and its (potential) truth: the more efficient a theory is in explaining or organising a large 
variety of different phenomena, the less can it be true or state the facts". As Cartwright (1983: 
72, 73) herself has been stressing since How the Jaws of physics lie (1983), 
(i]f we state the fundamental laws as laws about what happens when only a single 
cause is at work, then we can suppose the law to provide a true description. The 
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problem arises when we try to take the law and use it to explain the very different 
things which happen when several causes are at work. This is the point of 'The 
truth doesn't explain much'. There is no difficulty in writing down laws which we 
suppose to be true: 'If there are no charges, no nuclear forces, ... then the force 
between two masses of size m and m'separated by distance ris Gmm1r2 '.We 
count this law true -what it says will happen, does happen - or at least happens 
to within a good approximation. But this law does not explain much. It is irrelevant 
to cases where there are electric and nuclear forces at work. 
Well, yes, of course, if one believes in an absolute notion of truth, and if one believes 
that this absolute truth in science is about specific individual situations in their uniqueness. 
That is the whole point! It is, I believe however, possible to speak only of theories being true-
in-some-model and not of theories being true qua nothing else, i.e. absolutely or "universally" 
true. Cartwright (1g86) does point out the fact that "truth" does not mean "universal", but 
almost everywhere else she continues to contradict herself. I think the reason for these 
ambiguities may lie in her interpretation of ceteris paribus clauses or conditions. She views 
these clauses as playing an important role in the explanatory power of the fundamental laws, 
in the sense that they determine what kinds of explanation are permissible because they lay 
down or record, in a sense, the nature of the abstractions from real situations made by the 
theory and its fundamental laws. It seems then that in this sense the conditions laid down by 
these clauses also determine the nature of the models of the theory in question in their 
function as part of the concretising mechanisms of science, such that they "adapt" contexts 
to "fit" the laws explaining the behaviour of the objects found within that particular context. 
In model-theoretic terms the role - if any - of ceteris paribus clauses is somewhat 
different - as I have already pointed out. First, they are only of importance - if at all - as 
part of the linguistic expression of some theory. Cartwright's reconstruction of Newton's 
gravitational law (see above quote) - i.e. "If there are no .. ." is simply wrong. The law states 
rather that "The gravitational force between two masses ... " without exception. The law is still 
absolutely and totally relevant when there are (also) other forces present! What she implies 
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with her reconstruction of the law is simply not the case. The gravitational force is still there 
in cases where electric and nuclear forces are at work. We take the (vector) sum of all the 
forces on a particular body to see how ii will behave. I might also remark here that thus, a 
remark such as Rueger and Sharp's (1996: 96) conclusion concerning Cartwright's thoughts 
on this issue: "Because the complexity of the behaviour of real objects is produced by the 
interaction of hopelessly many (causal) factors, varying from context to context, a simple, 
highly explanatory theory which inevitably ignores most of these factors has (almost a priori) 
no chance of ever providing a true description of a [real] situation", is equally wrong. We do 
have theories and models about how different causal factors combine when acting on the 
same system in reality. A simple example is given by the vector addition of speeds, 
accelerations, and forces. The only kind of reconstruction of Newton's gravitational law that 
mentions other forces and factors should then simply be something like this: "Even if there 
are electric charges, nuclear forces, the sun shining on them, rain falling on them, ... , then 
still, everywhere, under all possible circumstances; the gravitational force between two 
Ceteris paribus clauses, where necessary, form part of (a complete formulation of) the 
law and are not even really extraneous conditions. A scientific theory makes statements 
concerning the nature and behaviour of a certain phenomenon, or a group of phenomena, 
in some real system(s). These statements are "sweeping" precisely because they have to 
cover al/ phenomena, in whatever context they may occur, that may exhibit the features of 
the ones described in the theory, and not only specific ones. In that sense, the formulation 
and application of any fundamental law is never ceteris paribus. Rather than saying "if all 
possible influencing factors not explicitly mentioned are absent or neutralised, then ... ", a 
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fundamental law will typically say "even if all possible other factors influence the system in 
all possible ways, then still .. .". Of course, the complete formulations of many (fundamental 
and phenomenological) laws are conditional. Remember again Hooke's law: "If the elastic 
limit has not been exceeded, then .. .". 
The specific clauses that Cartwright has in mind, are thus much rather part of the 
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content of the (conditional) law expressed by the theory in question, than conditions for the 
law's applicability. Ironically enough, if these clauses are conditions (in Cartwright's or in the 
logical sense) ii implies that they can be negated - i.e. not be satisfied - and the conditional 
formulation of the law can still apply. (It is a case of simple logical equivalence that cp ~ law 
<=> -.cp V /aw). One reason why Cartwright sees ceteris paribus conditions as separate from 
the law and will probably not accept my incorporation of them into a conditional formulation 
of the law, is the following. Her ceteris paribus conditions may involve influencing factors (for 
the physical system under consideration) for which there are not even terms in the language 
of the theory. Look again at her reconstruction of Newton's law of gravity: it drags in ceteris 
paribus conditions involving electricity and nuclear forces, about which the language of 
Newton's theory cannot even talk. So it is impossible to formulate her reconstruction of the 
law as a conditional sentence in the language of Newton's theory. What we have here is 
another manifestation of Cartwright's aim (which is again, not the aim of science) to 
scientifically and truthfully encompass a system in all its limitless complexity and 
interrelatedness. Maybe her "patchwork" picture of the world (see Section 4.6) is her loophole 
to investigate what would otherwise be inexorably entailed by her view, namely that there is 
only one possible object for science: the whole cosmos. 
The conceptual models of theories determine the idealised context(s) - i.e. (truth) 
conditions - within which the theory will be true, simply because that is what an 
interpretation of a linguistic expression does. The idealised nature of models is not "ideal" by 
virtue of any ceteris paribus conditions added to the theory. As I have stated before, ceteris 
paribus clauses are suspended (in their generality) when the theory is interpreted in its 
model(s) - in the same way in which the law's generality is suspended, as is now evident 
form the above. Perhaps Cartwright misinterprets the reason for the fact that truth and 
universality are different concepts. She (Cartwright, 1997: 167) claims that "To say the laws 
of physics are true ceteris paribus, is not to deny that they are true. They are just not entirely 
sovereign". Well, model-theoretically, theories are indeed not simply true, whether conditional, 
ceteris paribus, or not, but they are sovereign. Theories can only be true in their models, 
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regardless of how many - if any - ceteris paribus clauses form part of their formulation. 
Moreover it is exactly because they are sovereign, in the sense of being formulated for all 
possible circumstances satisfying their terms, that they have any chance at all to be true (in 
their models). 
Now, let us look again at Cartwright's distinction between universality and truth. She 
(Cartwright, 1989: 162) claims that theories should not be taken as summaries of laws about 
observable entities, because theoretical entities are not needed to explain the behaviour of 
observable entities, but are rather necessary to systematise observable behaviour - as 
pointed out before. Very much in the constructivist tradition, she then goes on to stress that 
theories are never universally applicable, but their domain (the limit of their applicability) is 
determined by making use of the theory and its concepts themselves. This is interesting in 
the sense that, as far as the constructivists are concerned, it makes it impossible to ever 
move to a meta-level for any reason - like evaluating the scientific content of a theory. What 
Cartwright wants to show, I think, is also along these lines, although she is, more specifically, 
aiming to show that truth and universality do not necessarily imply each other. This, of course, 
is entirely in line with a model-theoretic interpretation of these notions. The notion of 
universality, in model-theoretic terms, is not applicable when it comes to science, and the 
notion of truth, though still important, is ultimately based on the notion of context-dependent 
empirical adequacy. 
All of this illustrates the necessity of the interpretative role models play in science. In an 
article entitled The tool-box of nature (1995), that she co-authored with T.Shomar and 
M.Suarez, Cartwright again claims that "[r]epresentations of phenomena must be constructed 
and theory is one of the many tools we use ... "(Cartwright, Shomar, Suarez, 1995: 139). (My 
italics.) She goes on: "I want to urge that fundamental theory represents nothing and there 
is nothing for it to represent. There are only real things and the real ways they behave. And 
these are represented by models, models constructed with the aid of all the knowledge and 
technique and tricks and devices we have" (ibid.: 140). I have no quarrel with these remarks. 
That is exactly what I am trying to show, in the sense that I want to establish the 
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fundamentally "constructed" nature of science. But, although in a sense I urge the 
"constructedness" of theories just as much as the "constructedness" of models, I view the role 
of theories and their abstract and general nature as a central part of what science is, while 
Cartwright more often than not sounds as if she would much rather do without theories, 
although she of course does acknowledge their organising features. And the reason for that 
is, I think, that she focuses too much on the spurious theory-reality link at the cost of the 
construction of the theory-model-reality link. 
I see the role of theories within the whole representation process as more meaningful 
and maybe more useful - than she sometimes seems to do. To me models are 
constructs, that is (conceptual, i.e. mathematical) structures that do not have to be primarily 
linguistic, while theories are primarily linguistic entities (sets of sentences of some appropriate 
language, that- among other things - describe models in which those sentences are true). 
In my view therefore, theories are absolutely essential to science, because they formulate the 
conceptual content of the models, make this content amenable to deduction and computation, 
and communicate this content to other scientists. The main means of communication in 
science still is language (together with diagrams, physical models, demonstrations, films, and 
so on). 
However, the arguments Cartwright sets out against the "theory-driven" (Cartwright, 
Shomar, Suarez, 1995) approach to models fit well into my model-theoretic account of 
science. It is true that models are not simply deductions from theories, nor is it possible for 
any kind of nomological (law-like, universal, always-the-same) link between theories, models, 
and reality to exist. Briefly the "theory-driven" approach has to do mostly with that old realist 
favourite: approximation. However, this kind of account of science and its theories (in terms 
of approximations) seems somehow to imply a kind of apriori-ness about models, in the 
sense that each new (approximating) model will always definitely bring us closer to "the truth" 
than the previous one. I claim that in general no such guarantees can be given, and I think 
that Cartwright would agree. The advocates of the theory-driven view - according to her 
(ibid.: 148) - see the construction of a new approximating model as one of the following 
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activities: 
• certain correction factors - that are strongly motivated from the perspective of physical 
theory - are introduced into the theory's equations; 
• or, some other model is found for the (revised) theory which implies the revision of some 
of the standing physical assumptions.167 
Cartwright and company (ibid.) are advocating a much more free notion of models in the 
sense that (phenomenological) model construction should be viewed as far more independent 
- in method and aim - from the theory in question. In a sense, at least as far as the limited 
power of the formulators of the original theory over its resulting logically possible 
interpretative models is concerned, it might seem as if that is what I am advocating too. The 
semantic link between theory and model in my approach, however, has to remain. 
Establishing this link is simply not applicable or relevant in a non-statement framework, given 
their disregard of scientific theories as linguistic entities (although they of course do not deny 
that models are interpretations in which a given theory is true). 
Anti-realist supporters of a semantic view of the scientific process, especially someone 
like Bas Van Fraassen, aim to say as little as possible about the "raw" data used as a starting 
point of the process of science (Van Fraassen rejects all empiricist theories of meaning), and 
simply try to fit these data "into some single consistent model [an empirical substructure in 
Van Fraassen's case] which exemplifies the laws and theories as well" (Cartwright, 1989: 
168). Cartwright (ibid.) criticises Van Fraassen however for not explaining how exactly the 
raw data are supposed to be fitted into some model or theory. It is true that he only discusses 
cases where low-level theories (her phenomenological laws I think) are fitted into models of 
high-level theories (her fundamental laws), but never says anything about the lower level 
fitting of raw data to phenomenological laws or - in my terms - into some empirical model 
of the (fundamental) theory. Cartwright (1989: 168) does acknowledge that he might have felt 
that this second kind of fit is already implied in the process of justifying or confirming the 
theory. As I have pointed out in the explication of my model-theoretic account in the previous 
chapters it is extremely difficult - even impossible - to formulate a set of "correspondence 
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rules" to dictate the nature of the final realist link form model to (system in) reality. Speaking 
of empirical adequacy - both in Van Fraassen's narrow and my broader definitions of it -
is all that can be said in general. The actual factors at work at that level of science are too 
model- and (real) system specific to allow closer or stricter definition - in an absolute sense 
- of what happens so that a theory may ''finally be announced 'empirically adequate"'. 
Cartwright (1989: 168 - 169) stresses that, in any case, interaction with raw data is 
impossible in the following sense: "Scientific claims are tested, not against the empiricist's 
data (e.g. 'individual temperature readings from samples of lead, bubble chamber 
photographs') but rather against 'phenomena detected from them (e.g. the melting point of 
lead, the weak neutral current, changes in the rate of solar neutrino emission')". This points 
to the "dual" nature of models (in my terms) in the scientific process: not only do models 
interpret the abstract theories, but conceptual models via their empirical submodels also 
"help" with theory-formulation as mediators between rich complex aspects of reality and the 
research aims (and other context-dependent factors) influencing a given scientific community. 
Also, Cartwright (1989: 169) claims that the questions concerned with dealing with raw 
data or not, involve the whole ceteris paribus problem too - " ... the need for ceteris paribus 
clauses is felt most acutely - and by many felt only at all - when the theory is brought to 
bear, not on a model, but a real, concrete thing". I think I have remarked often enough on the 
difference between her interpretation of the role of these clauses (or rather "conditions" in her 
sense) and a model-theoretic account of their role. She gives as reason for this claim 
concerning ceteris paribus clauses the fact that the movement from (theory to) model to 
aspect of reality is in terms of diminishing generality, which strengthens my criticism in this 
regard. I have pointed out often that the process of concretising has to do with the 
suspension of these clauses and neither with formulating more and more of them or with 
"activating" them. 
Cartwright illustrates (Cartwright, 1994c: 296 - 297) her account of this aspect of the 
scientific process as follows: 
We begin with a very detailed law: any highly homogeneous fused quartz 
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gyroscope placed in space near the earth, electrostatically suspended by a layer 
of superconducting material, will experience a certain amount of precession due 
to spin-orbit coupling. Presumably some regularity of this kind would obtain if only 
enough details of the experimental design were filled in; that after all, is what the 
experimenters are at pains to ensure ... Is [this] highly detailed 'phenomenological' 
law ... indeed a deductive consequence of the general laws (given the descriptions 
of the experimental argument), or not? I think not. I find it instructive to break the 
reasoning process into two chunks: 
• (i) the derivation of the behaviour in an abstract diagrammatic model (the 
simu/acra of the simulacrum model of How the Jaws of physics lie), a process 
elaborating Schiff's original observation [remark] that a spinning gyroscope 
should experience a shift in its precession due to the space-time curvature 
predicted in the vicinity of the earth by the general theory of relativity; 
• (ii) the elaborate fitting of this diagrammatic model to a real gyroscope spinning 
in real space. The full details of this latter will have taken more than twenty 
years of effort by a large team of experimental physicists and technicians. 
At both stages approximation and fudges and totally fictitious 'idealisations' 
of the kinds described in How the Jaws of physics lie occur. 
The fact however remains that Schiff noticed that it is possible to deduce from Einstein's 
general relativity theory that a spinning gyroscope should experience a shift in its precession. 
The movement here is thus - despite, or perhaps rather as a result of, the "totally fictitious 
idealisations" applied - from Einstein's general relativity theory to Schiffs model, to a real 
gyroscope. 
4.4 The process of science revisited 
A last few remarks on the confirmation or succession of theories, to illustrate both 
Cartwright's and my own interpretation of the role of models in the scientific process. Rueger 
and Sharp (1996: 99) very adequately formulate the two basic choices about the nature of 
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our theories with which Cartwright's model of explanation leaves us as follows: our theories 
are either 
• simple and explanatory (in the sense of being classificatory with a wide scope}, but not 
confirmable; or 
• complicated and descriptive (phenomenological, with a narrow scope}, but confirmable. 
As I take these not as options for theories, but rather as characteristic of the different stages 
of the scientific process, I shall just point out that maybe some philosophers of science 
concentrate too exclusively on one aspect of the scientific process. Cartwright feels that 
philosophy of science is often too close to being exclusively philosophy of scientific theories 
to be able to offer a balanced view of the process of science (physics}; and I agree, although 
I do not advocate getting rid of the role of theories as part of the referential process of 
science. Alan Musgrave (1981: 381} claims that we" ... do not falsify a theory containing a 
domain assumption by showing that this assumption is not true of some situations ... , we 
merely show that that assumption is not applicable to that situation in the first place". In other 
words, finding a model in which a certain theory is false, does not necessarily imply the 
disconfirmation of the theory, at first it implies no more than that the theory is simply not 
applicable in that model. 
Blaming the model rather than the theory, might sound indeed like using ceteris paribus 
clauses to protect theories against refutation. However, there is nothing contrived (or ceteris 
paribus for that matter} about this at all, it simply is the way science works (from a model-
theoretic point of view, at least}. For instance, the fact that it is extremely difficult to use 
Newton's laws to determine the route and behaviour of Neurath's bill blown about by the wind 
in St Stephen's Square (Cartwright, 1994b: 283 - 285} does not really say anything negative 
about Newton's laws, except that it is too difficult to apply them under certain 
circumstances. 168 The negative factor is rather that science then seems to have very little to 
say about wind-blown bills, which also is not really true, it is simply that this is a complex 
enough situation to warrant a new arrangement of abstractions, and so some kind of new 
formulation of a combination of certain fundamental laws, which might then lead to the 
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construction of new models or amendments of old ones, which, in their tum, might turn out 
to be empirically adequate of the windswept bill, or whatever situation is being considered. 
More often than not when the question of the continuity of science and the nature of the 
succession of theories in physics is addressed, the example of classical mechanics vs. 
quantum mechanics and relativistic mechanics is used. Let us briefly take a look, in 
Cartwright's terms, at the implications this example has for the role of models in the progress 
of science. Classical mechanics is usually viewed as a limiting case of relativistic and 
quantum mechanics. "Limiting case" here should be taken as meaning "an approximation to 
the new theory when its domain is limited to the domain where the older theory was (still is, 
for that matter) successful". Specifically, the equations of special relativity theory are taken 
to reduce to those of classical mechanics or non-relativist mechanics in the limit where the 
speed of light goes to infinity (which implies that there is very little that differs in the equations 
of these two theories if small velocities are being treated). And also then the equations of 
quantum mechanics are supposed to take on the form of those of classical mechanics in the 
limit where the quantum of action becomes negligible, as it is taken to do in the situation of 
macroscopic objects. Now, although the notion of limiting cases is rather useful in the model-
theoretic approach, even if perhaps mainly in practical terms of saving the time and effort that 
repeating the experimental activity involved in recreating the "old" theory's evidential base 
would cost scientists 169, the notion of approximation is too "naive" in a sense to really fit in 
easily enough (as mentioned before). It creates the illusion of a prioriness, in the sense of a 
definite controllable march towards final truth, which is just not part of a model-theoretic 
account of theories. The "hit and miss" -quality of the construction of models is then somehow 
lost170, and that is one of the best sources of scientific creativity, I think. 
This kind of approach in terms of approximations is also part of the heritage of the 
covering law model via the notion of "inference to the best explanation", as Cartwright (1991 b: 
6) points out in her article Can who/ism reconcile the inaccuracy of theory with the accuracy 
of prediction?. She offers the fact that Newton's laws being able to explain Kepler's laws is 
taken to argue for the truth of Newton's laws (by inference to the best explanation) as 
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illustration of how closely this notion's formulation resembles that of the fallacy of affirming 
the consequent. That is another illustration of why her arguments against the covering law 
account are also directed against Adolf Gri.inbaum's (1954) generic-specific account of laws, 
because in his terms, Kepler's laws are the specific version of Newton's in the domain of 
planetary motion - "[s]o to establish Kepler's laws is to establish a case of Newton's laws; 
and the more encompassing laws of Newton are, conversely, the generalisations of what is 
(almost) literally true in the orbits of the planets" (Cartwright, 1991 a: 6). Again, I think it 
necessary to point out that this view is, in principle, not against any of the implications of a 
model-theoretic approach, although care should be taken not to interpret the notion of 
approximation too naively. 
4.5 The "abstract" and the "concrete" 
The special relationship between theories and models, and models and aspects of 
reality is illustrated very well by Cartwright's characterisation of models in terms of fables 
(Fables and models, 1986). She starts the article with the following statement about her aims 
- the same as in How the laws of physics lie, simply given from a different perspective: "I 
want to defend the view that the [phenomenological] laws may be true, literally true, yet they 
need not introduce new properties into nature. The properties they mention are already there; 
the new concepts just give a more abstract name to them ... we have no need to look for a 
single concrete way in which all the cases that fall under the same predicate resemble each 
other. What we need to understand, in order to understand the way scientific laws fit the 
world, is the relationship of the abstract to the concrete ... " (Cartwright, 1986: 56, 57). 
The most important point about her discussion of the abstract and the concrete in this 
article (Fables and models (1986)) is the conclusion (already mentioned above) that laws or 
theories may somehow be said to be true (although she nowhere spells out that this actually 
means true-in-a-model), but they cannot be universal.171 She (1986: 58) says: "We need not 
assume that they [the theories, or fundamental laws] are at work everywhere, underlying and 
determining what is going on. If they apply only in very special circumstances, then perhaps 
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they are true just where we see them operate successfully - in the artificial environments 
of our laboratories, our high-tech firms, ... ". 172 
Well, I agree that we need not believe that our scientific theories give us laws that are 
"underlying and determining what is going on". However, our bridges remain untouched by 
most storms, our aeroplanes do fly around the planet, our astronauts do walk on the moon, 
and so on and so on. The interpretative development of scientific theories - from the theory 
to its interpretative models, and from there, possibly, via empirical models to some aspect of 
reality - as I see it, is a far more contingent issue than some philosophers would maybe 
care to admit - or be able to handle. I agree with Cartwright about speaking of truth only in 
terms of models - or the "artificial environments" we create for our theories' application -
although I cannot see why that should prohibit me from keeping in the discussion something 
like Van Fraassen's (1980) notion of empirical adequacy to describe the nature of the "last 
jump" from interpretative model via empirical model to the aspect of reality concerned. 
Concentrating on - in my terms - the "jump" or movement from theory to interpretative 
model, she (in Cartwright, 1986: 58) quotes Gotthold Lessing's characterisation of fables as 
having the ability or potential to fill in the "graspable, intuitive content for abstract, symbolic 
statements". This comes close to my view of things, in the sense that my model-theoretic 
approach may be applied to general statements of all kinds, be they symbolic (in both natural 
and mathematical language), purely mathematical, or simply in natural language (think of 
morals like "the grass is always greener on the other side"). 173 
Lessing (according to Gartwright, 1986: 59) also claimed that in order to make "a general 
symbolic conclusion" as clear as possible, it has to be reduced to the particular, so that it can 
be known "intuitively". That is what he meant when he said the general can only become 
graphic or intuitive (anschauend) in the particular. (All very Aristotelian of course, with which 
I also have no quarrel.) Note that there is an ontological (the general exists only in the 
particular; where "exists" means "to be realised, and seen possibly to refer to some real 
system"), as well as an epistemological (the general becomes graphic, anschauend only in 
the particular; referring to conditions of truth - or empirical adequacy for that matter) claim 
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being made here. Both these claims are addressed in my model-theoretic type of approach 
to science by the staggering of the various levels of scientific development, as well as by 
consideration of the nature of the relations and linkages between these levels. 
Cartwright (1986: 62 - 65) discusses Newton's second law of motion: F =ma, in these 
terms. This law is portrayed as an abstract "truth" - maybe theory would be a better choice 
of words - relative to claims about forces, motions, and masses. As it indeed is, and in the 
following way: 
• (1) to be subject to a certain force, say F, is an abstract property; 
• (2) F = ma further claims that whatever object has the property in (1 ), also has the 
property of having a mass and acceleration, the product of which gives the value F. 
Scientists then have to figure out the nature of the typical situation in which real objects have 
these features. This implies that they have to figure out how to "fill in" the value(s) of each 
variable (see Cartwright, 1986: 62 & 63 for detailed discussion of this example) and then to 
construct a model in which each of the variables will behave according to their natures - e.g. 
" ... we have the small mass m located at distance r from the larger mass M. Now we can look 
to see ifthe small mass moves with an acceleration GM/r (since GM/r = Flm). If it does, we 
have a model for Newton's law'' (Cartwright, 1986: 63). 
She goes on (ibid.: 64) to set out exactly what I also accept as my view about the nature 
of theoretical concepts, whether expressed in natural or mathematical language, as being 
abstract: "On my account, force is to be regarded as an abstract concept. It exists only in the 
more specific forms to which it is led back via models ... It is not a new, separate property, 
different from any of the arrangements which exhibit it. In each case, being in this 
arrangement - e.g. being located a distance r from another massive body - is what it is to 
be subject to the appropriate force'. In other words, the abstract notions we are dealing with 
in scientific theories are not something over and above their concrete realisations - they do 
not in any way have "a life of their own" so to speak, floating around somewhere in some 
special kind of reality, they are merely part of the tools (Cartwright's point again in The 
toolbox of science (1995)) we use to formulate knowledge (or scientific) claims. The point is 
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then simply that viewing the laws of physics as general (formal) claims and their concepts as 
abstract (and symbolic), comes down to acknowledging that Newton's F = ma can be true of 
precisely those systems that it treats successfully. It however does not necessarily mean 
(Cartwright, 1986: 67) that Newton has discovered a fundamental structure governing all of 
nature. Again, Cartwright's point about theories being true in limited domains, but not 
universal is illustrated. 
Interestingly enough, this also shows the inaptness of a point Steve Clarke (1998) 
seems to want to emphasise; namely that there is some kind of tendency among realists 
(granted, he refers to fundamental realists, but my remark still is worthwhile, given the overall 
slant of his approach) to believe that one day, somehow, all fundamental laws will have been 
discovered and then the nagging open-endedness of the tiresome ceteris paribus clauses 
can forever be closed. Within a model-theoretic approach the notion of such tendencies 
becomes merely nonsense, since ceteris paribus clauses are not really relevant as such 
when theories are interpreted. The only kind of "open-endedness" at issue in the process of 
science, is the open-endedness of abstract linguistic expressions (which may contain ceteris 
paribus clauses - if any are indeed present) in terms of their potential to be interpreted by 
various different conceptual models, and, moreover, it is a result of this open-endedness that 
it is indeed possible within a model-theoretic scheme to link the fundamental laws to reality 
(or aspects of reality at least). 
The open-endedness that is referred to here can thus never be "closed" since that would 
mean turning to at least a non-statement approach as far as scientific theories are concerned, 
as well as considerably weakening the realist claims still possible in such a context. Which 
is, again, why I see the model-theoretic approach as more sensible than Cartwright's account 
of models. Although she opens the possibility that the models may successfully describe 
reality, the fundamental laws themselves simply have nothing to say about reality. I find it a 
bit strange, that both Clarke and Cartwright agree that models "manifest" the fundamental 
laws, but still seem unable to recognise the simple formal feature of transitivity at play here: 
if models manifest theories, and models describe aspects of reality, how can theories have 
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nothing to say about reality? Moreover, Cartwright herself points out on more than one 
occasion that "[t]o grant that a law is true - even a law of 'basic' physics ... is far from 
admitting that it is universal, that it holds everywhere and governs in all domains" (Cartwright, 
1994b: 281), which means that she does see some kind of relation between theory, model 
and reality, but simply not a universal (a prion) one - or not? 
In Nature's capacities and their measurement (1989), she works out the relations 
between abstractions, idealisations, and concretisations in far more detail, because, there, 
she discusses these notions in terms of causes and their complexities, and in terms of the 
capacities of nature. More about that in the next section. 
4.6 Nature's capacities causally explained 
Cartwright amends her simulacrum account of explanation in her book entitled Nature's 
capacities and their measurement (1989) by arguing that causal claims should play a central 
role in the explanations offered by science. This is an obvious continuation of her attack on 
the Humean characterisation of science (according to which explaining a phenomenon means 
showing it to be an instance of a general law or regularity), which she keeps focussed on 
arguments against the Humean attempt to reduce causal concepts to law-like ones (and 
finally to reduce these to regularities, or statements of association). She offers, instead, a 
metaphysics of enduring causal capacities174• She (1995c: 292) claims that "[l]aws in the 
conventional regularity sense ... must be constructed, and the knowledge that aids this 
construction is not itself again a report of some actual or possible regularities. It is rather 
knowledge about the capacities of [nature] and what these capacities can do if assembled 
and regulated in appropriate ways". 
Cartwright and John Dupre in their article entitled Probability and causality: Why Hurne 
and indeterminism don't mix (1988: 521) see events (constant conjunctions) in a completely 
un-Humean way: " ... events and things have causal capacities: in virtue of the properties they 
possess, they have the power to bring about other events or states .... The Humean tradition 
downplays capacities, and conceives of them as no more than misleading ways of referring 
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to law like regularities. We [Cartwright and Dupre] want to reverse this idea: it is better to think 
of law-like regularities as misleading ways of referring to the exercise of capacities". 
Causality, in the Humean tradition, is depicted in terms of relations between events, which 
holds, as I have already pointed out, in virtue of the regular association of the empirically 
distinguishable properties of these events. Dupre and Cartwright (1988: 521), however, point 
out that, on the other hand, no "right" sort of connections exist between capacities and 
properties of events. "Capacities are carried by properties. That is, you cannot have the 
capacity without having one of the right properties. But the same property can carry mixed 
capacities, and so the true complexity of the situation cannot be revealed by the association 
of properties". And, moreover, since " ... at any stage in [an] inquiry, there are always 
alternative sets of capacity that could account for the statistical data [under consideration]" 
(Cartwright & Dupre, 1988: 522), it is not possible - contrary to Hume - to find statistical 
data that can "settle" the truth of probable cases of regularity. In line with her empiricist's 
sympathies, Cartwright wishes to show that capacities can, however indeed, be measured. 175 
She lengthily discusses the use of probabilities in this regard in quite a few of her more recent 
articles, as well as in Nature's capacities and their measurement (1989). 176 
Cartwright gives (1989: 226 - 227) three main arguments for the real existence of 
capacities: (In the scope of this thesis I am primarily interested in the second argument, given 
its relation to realist considerations.) 
• She bases the first argument on the nature of the composition of causes and the fact 
that scientific explanations and predictions involve causes as well as their behaviour. 
• The second argument is based on the problem of the exportability of information or 
knowledge, that is, the fact that information gathered in one situation can be applied in 
a completely different situation. This is essentially the issue that Poincare referred to as 
the problem of "transduction". 
• Thirdly, she offers an argument that is a counter-attack on the Humean tendency to 
"modalise away" capacities, and here she concentrates on the problems of interaction 
between causes themselves and between causes and capacities, and also on the 
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"duality" of capacities, which refers to the problem of controlling multiple capacities 
associable with one and the same feature of nature. 
One of the most important reasons why Cartwright insists on the reality of causes is, as 
Chalmers (1993: 199, 200) points out, to" ... overcome the inability of the orthodox Humean 
view of laws as constant conjunctions to accommodate the asymmetries that exist between 
the phenomena constantly conjoined ... ". "I agree with Hacking", writes Cartwright (1983: 3), 
"that when we can manipulate our theoretical entities in fine and detailed ways to intervene 
in other processes, then we have the best evidence possible for our claims about what they 
can and cannot do''. So, she offers the fact that scientists can "successfully intervene" in 
nature by "manipulating causes" as an argument for the existence of those causes. This point 
is echoed by Eman McMullin (Cartwright, 1989: 185): "The unordered world of nature is a 
tangle of causal lines; there is no hope of a 'firm science' unless one can somehow simplify 
the tangle by eliminating or otherwise neutralising, the causal lines which impede, or 
complicate, the action of the factors one is trying to sort out ... ". 
However, as she points out (Cartwright, 1991 a: 9), "[t]he punchline of course is that the 
fundamental laws of physics may not be so fundamental either. ... By choice and 
arrangement of materials and either by intensive shielding or very heavy over-determination, 
we create special environments which hold fixed the principal effective parts. We may in this 
way arrive at very precise and reliable regularities without in any way grasping the true form 
of what is going on". Cartwright, of course, is here referring to her notion of a "patchwork of 
laws" - a world of " ... tens of thousands of patches, cut up in no particularly logical way, 
exhibiting tens of thousands of different regularities of countless different forms ... " 
(Cartwright, 1994b), which leaves open the possibility of reality being completely unordered. 
Two brief related remarks on this last statement: I do not see how the acceptance of a notion 
as metaphysical as the notion of capacities, can solve any of Cartwright's anti-realist worries. 
On the other hand, the exact nature of the things in reality that scientific theories may be 
"about" - whether referred to simply as the activities or behaviour of real phenomena, as the 
mechanisms of reality, the capacities of nature, or whatever else - is irrelevant to the 
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successful application of the model-theoretic model of science that I offer. 
The primary problem that she wants to solve with her notion of capacities is indeed 
whether- and to what extent - the laws of physics that are true in certain situations - that 
is in the "highly contrived environments of a laboratory or inside the housing of a modem 
technological device" (Cartwright, 1994b: 281, 282) - carry across to "systems, even 
systems of very much the same kind, in different and less regulated settings" (ibid.). She says 
"[t]he overall programme I want to urge is a careful and detailed philosophical story of the 
evidence about the boundaries of relevance ... for any of our ... fundamental laws. We have 
to allow for the possibility that they are true but not universal; exact but limited in range" 
(Cartwright, 1994c: 293). 
She sets out a hierarchy of laws in Nature's capacities and their measurement (1989) 
and also in her Precis of 'Nature's capacities and their measurement' (1995a), in terms of 
generality - or modality, because the claims at the highest two levels are universal in time 
and space and they support counterfactuals, license inferences, and so on. Her classification 
looks roughly as follows: 
• At the highest level there are "capacity claims" (Cartwright, 1989: 228), which are to be 
taken as being general causal claims. These are statements which associate capacities 
with properties. These claims summarise the range of outcomes that some system can 
cause. She says about these most general kinds of causal statement that "I maintain 
that the most general causal claims - like 'aspirins relieve headaches' or 
'electromagnetic forces cause motions perpendicular to the line of action' - are best 
rendered as ascriptions of capacity'' (Cartwright, 1989: 141). So, for instance, aspirins, 
because of being just that, can cure headaches. The phrase "because of being aspirins" 
indicates that this claim expresses a fact about a special property, namely that the 
property of being an aspirin carries the capacity of relieving headaches. 
• At the middle level there are "causal claims" that give phenomenological (actual) content 
to the capacity claims - they are laws about "what singular causings occur in what 
circumstances what percentage of the time" (Cartwright, 1989: 228). In other words, they 
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are more specific than capacity claims and they describe - usually probabilistically -
what causal claims obtain in some given specific situation. And, thus they can - other 
than capacity claims - be used in a mechanical way to make predictions. Also, they 
can be established inductively, as long as the situation they are prescribing for, or 
predicting of, is the situation they are describing in the first place. "They describe what 
would happen wete the situation like that. But by their very nature they do not describe 
what would happen were the situation different" - (Cartwright, 1995a: 154) - their 
weakness lies in their strength. 
• At the lowest level of abstraction, at the level of the real, that is, there are singular 
causal claims. "Nature's capacities argues that ii is not possible to characterise correctly 
the relation between probabilities and causal laws without referring to singular causal 
facts" (Cartwright, 1995a: 153). That is actually one of the main reasons why this book 
is still very important from a model-theoretic point of view. Because, if it is true that, as 
she claims now, fundamental laws are about the capacities of nature, as Chalmers 
(Chalmers, 1993: 201) points out, then they cannot describe sequences of events as 
well, and therefore they cannot anymore be taken to lie in the sense of How the laws of 
physics lie (1983). 
The fact that capacities enable us to carry over information gathered in one set of 
circumstances to another, is the reason why capacity claims are not simply "higher levels of 
modality, but instead must be taken as ascriptions of something teal" (Cartwright, 1989: 158). 
I will briefly discuss what she has to say on this point, as it points to her realist tendencies 
with regard to capacities, while she remains anti-realist with regard to fundamental (abstract) 
laws. The positivist programme for causality is described by Cartwright (1989: 160) as 
follows: 
At the level of modality: 
Ascriptions of capacity (meta linguistic summaries of facts about causal laws) 
Causal laws (summaries of facts about non-causal laws) 
Functional and probabilistic (non-causal) laws 
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At a non-modal level: 
Occurrent regularities 
Within this system, Cartwright (1989: 160) points out, the claims at a higher level constrain 
the nature of the set of facts at a lower level and in this way license inferences from one kind 
of fact at a lower level directly to another without the need for any support from the lower 
level. She states that this modal view of capacities runs into problems in two areas: 
• ceteris paribus conditions involving interactions, and 
• multiple capacities associated with the same feature of some (real) phenomenon (and 
trying to control them somehow). 
Looking at the first area, the following. These kinds of assumptions about capacities -
that is, for them to remain intact from one situation to another - obviously go a long way 
towards seeing capacities as "things" in reality. But what if the capacity in question is not 
exhibited in this way? Cartwright claims (1989: 163) that the most common reason for 
capacities not to exhibit themselves in new situations lies in the influence of causal interaction 
- the property carrying the capacity interacts with some particular feature of a new situation 
and so the nature of the capacity changes. She (1989: 163, 164) acknowledges that she 
cannot amend the positivist hierarchy of causal laws without admitting interactions into the 
descriptive content of reality. The ceteris paribus conditions on inferences licensed by causal 
laws cannot be specified without already involving notions of causality. Causal claims can 
function as a "tool to get new causal information out of the old" (Cartwright, 1989: 161), that 
is, causal laws can function as inference licenses from one probabilistic law to another, but 
only if, ceteris paribus, the individual singular causes are "right". This ceteris paribus condition 
involves a notion of causality which is at the same - or a higher - level than the one from 
which there is being argued. (See Cartwright, 1989: 160, 161 for a formal discussion of these 
issues.) 
Thus, in the context of capacities, this means then (Cartwright, 1989: 164) that "[c]ausal 
interactions are interactions of causal capacities, and they cannot be picked out unless 
capacities themselves can be recognised. The attempt to 'modalise away' the capacities 
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requires some independent characterisation of interactions; and there is no general non-
circular account available to do the job". She claims that rather, independent evidence that 
some interaction between certain variables and no others - or at a certain level and no other 
-' is occurring, should be found. She illustrates the value of this with the example of 
chemistry (Cartwright, 1989: 165): "One does not say the acid and the base interact because 
they behave differently together from the way they behave separately; rather we [should see 
that we] understand already a good deal about how the separate capacities work and why 
they should interfere with each other in just the way they do". Thus the ceteris paribus 
conditions describe the model in which the fundamental ascriptions of capacity will be true. 
In a model-theoretic account no ceteris paribus clause has the power to describe a model of 
some theory. Rather models are determined - among other things - by the whole linguistic 
expression of the theory (including factors such as the nature of the language in which the 
set of sentences comprising the theory are formulated) as well as by some of the 
applicationary aims scientists have in mind for the theory. Cartwright's aim is to show that the 
regularities that are described by the (phenomenological) laws in the model are the 
consequences and not the sources of these models. 
She sees (Cartwright, 1995c: 290) "natures [or capacities] as primary and behaviours, 
even very regular behaviours, as derivative. Regular behaviour derives from the repeated 
triggering of determinate systems whose nature stays fixed long enough to manifest itself in 
the resulting regularity". Well, as pointed out before, in model-theoretic terms the (relevant) 
empirical model that "drives" the final references of some theory (via its conceptual model(s)) 
to some real system is very much dependent both on the nature of the conceptual model of 
which it is a substructure, and on the nature of the system in reality it shows the theory to be 
Looking at the second problem area (the fact that multiple capacities may be associated 
with the same feature of some phenomenon in reality). the following. The connection between 
causes and probabilities that causal claims make possible can be described in the following 
terms: a cause increases the probability of its effect (while obviously a preventative should 
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lessen it) if all other causes are held fixed somehow. However, Cartwright argues (1989, 
throughout chapter 3) that more important than holding the other causes and their forces of 
possible interference fixed, is that the operation or activity of all other capacities that may be 
at work, should be held fixed as well, whether they are attached to the cause being 
scrutinised or to the other separate causal factors. She claims that only in this way, can facts 
about capacities be connected to facts about probabilities - "An ascription of a capacity 
cannot be taken merely as an inference ticket to get from one fact about probabilities to 
another, that is, as an efficient summary of complicated facts about the pattern of pure 
probabilities; for the pattern it summarises is not a pattern invoking just the probabilities 
themselves but a more variegated pattern involving both probabilities and capacities in an 
essential way" (Cartwright, 1989: 167). 
However, since ascriptions of capacities are found in fundamental laws, Cartwright has 
to say something more about the role of fundamental laws as ascriptions of capacity in the 
causal account of scientific explanation that she is working out. She (ibid.: 175) writes: 
"[m]ore important for my thesis, however, is not the fact that laws which are nearly true, albeit 
for particular situations and finite periods, are not fundamental [which is what Mill also points 
out], but rather that fundamental laws are not true, nor nearly true, nor true for the most part. 
That is because fundamental laws are laws about distinct 'atomic' causes and their separate 
effects; but when causes occur in nature they occur, not separately, but in combination•. As 
pointed out before, these "complex combinations" that we find in Nature are of no particular 
consequence to a model-theoretic realist at all. We have other laws that tell us how to 
combine effects - e.g. the addition of speeds (which by the way is different for Einstein than 
for Newton). 
Now, Cartwright (1989: 178) has been arguing all the while in Nature's capacities and 
their measurement ( 1989) that scientific methodology and its application presupposes that 
these capacities (or tendencies, as Mill calls them, or propensities as Popper calls them) are 
real. In other words, the only way in which fundamental laws can be taken to say something 
about reality, is if they are viewed as ascriptions of capacity. Although this doesn't change 
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their nature, they still lie (according to her) however, because they are still Aristotelian 
abstractions. But, now, at least, they can be interpreted in some kind of realist terms. I fail to 
see the need for this. Whether the function of the fundamental laws of nature is to assign 
stable capacities to specific causes (Cartwright, 1989: 179) or not, does not really decide 
whether these laws may have something to say about reality or not. Rather, it is the ways in 
which specific models may be shown to be linked to certain aspects of reality that hold that 
promise. More about this below in Section 4.7. 
But, if capacities are real (more than high-level Humean modalities), what becomes of 
the lower level modal laws, in particular, what becomes of Hume's laws of association? 
Cartwright (1989: 181) concludes that Nature in no way presents us with them as "given", but 
rather Nature selects the capacities of different entities and determines their interaction. 
It is not the laws that are fundamental, but rather the capacities ... Whatever 
associations occur in nature arise as a consequence of the actions of these more 
fundamental capacities ... Nature, as it usually occurs, is a changing mix of 
different causes, coming and going, a stable pattern of associations can emerge 
only when the mix is pinned down over some period or in some place. Indeed, 
where is it that we really do see associations that have the kind of permanence 
that could entitle them to be called law-like? [Only in ancient astronomy or in 
science laboratories.] ... laws of association are in fact quite uncommon in nature, 
and should not be seen as fundamental to how it operates. They are only 
fundamental to us, for they are one of the principal tools that we can use to learn 
about nature's capacities. 
In these terms then, the basic laws of physics are not laws about sequents of events (ii la 
Hume) but laws about the capacities of nature. I have no quarrel with remarking that "a stable 
pattern of association can emerge only when the mix is pinned down over some period or in 
some place", because that fits my description of the functions of models and the ways in 
which they interact with theories on the one hand, and with aspects of reality on the other 
hand. Keep in mind here too that the conditions in which capacities "reveal themselves in 
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their canonical behaviour are usually in no sense normal at all; (but it] ... requires the highly 
artificial and contrived environment of a laboratory to manifest them" (Cartwright, 1 g59: 200). 
Alan Chalmers (1993: 201) agrees with Cartwright that, if laws are supposed to describe 
capacities, then they cannot be taken to describe Humean sequences of events as well. But, 
then, fundamental laws do not really lie in the sense of How the laws of physics lie, because 
only laws taken in the sense of regularities could be said to lie in this sense (Chalmers, 1993: 
204). Which is close to what is worrying me, although I do not necessarily see scientific 
theories in terms of discoveries of regularities, because it is simply not necessary to think in 
that way, given the descriptions of the nature of theories and models and their interaction in 
my model-theoretic system. Moreover, we all know that science has never aimed at 
describing reality in all its complexity and fullness. The main problem in realist philosophy of 
science has obviously always been, in a sense, to link the simplified versions of reality 
modelled by scientists to fit their theories to the reality of reality as it were. Cartwright (and 
Roy Bhaskar) offer us ways in which to do this with their various descriptions of the 
"exportation of information" or bridging the "unsoundness argument". More about this in 
Chapter 5. Cartwright actually does say something along these lines when she claims (1989: 
184) that" ... abstractions can be taken as claims about capacities; ... and where abstraction 
reigns, ... laws - in the conventional empiricist sense - have no fundamental role to play 
in scientific theory''. 
4. 7 The "abstract" and the "concrete" revisited 
Fundamental laws or abstractions, considered as capacity claims, have the following 
distinct features: 
• Cartwright calls the abstractions made in science material abstractions (which refers to 
the fact that there is no a priori recipe for getting from these abstract fundamental laws 
to the concrete situations (and capacities) they are supposed to be about). This brings 
in the role of ceteris paribus clauses again, since the suspension of these clauses in 
my terms "puts back" what abstraction has "left out". 
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• In Cartwright's terms the laws that constitute the phenomenological context of capacity 
claims are causal, and neither laws of association nor equations. In a model-theoretic 
system the nature of these "laws" may be causal or not. They should merely be specific 
enough to function within the idealised contextual framework of the conceptual models 
of the theory in question. 
What does it mean to "link" an abstract fundamental law making some kind of claim 
about the capacities of nature, to reality? How can a general ascription of capacity like that 
be linked with different situations in reality? Cartwright (1989: 203) discusses these matters 
in terms of what she calls "idealisation" and "abstraction" on the one hand, and 
"concretisation" on the other. She formulates the most pressing worries about these 
processes in terms of the problem of material abstraction. 
Concretisation has to do with the route "downwards" (from abstract law to concrete real 
situation) and involves adding corrections to allow for the effects of interfering or disturbing 
causes that may be at work in a given real situation, because, as pointed out many times 
before, causes are rarely single and never act separately in nature. These corrections are a 
necessity, also in my terms. They are however not ceteris paribus but rather their function is 
similar to that of boundary and initial conditions. II is a necessary feature of the process of 
science, model-theoretically interpreted, that these "corrections" are needed, given the 
abstract and simple nature of fundamental laws (or scientific theories) and the rich changing 
nature of facts in reality (whether this richness is the result of multiple interacting causes or 
of something else). So, Cartwright (1989: 184), is not wrong in pointing out that " ... the 
converse processes of abstraction and concretisation have no content unless a rich ontology 
of competing capacities and disturbances are presupposed", but my point is that that is true, 
however we fill in the ontology of reality. 
The process of idealisation starts in reality, or rather, with some aspect of reality 
(Cartwright, 1989: 187), and rearranges (conceptually) some of its (inconvenient) irrelevant 
features. However, note that the model still says something - albeit something more 
simplified than is the case in reality - about all relevant factors present in the real system 
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focussed on, and leaves out only the irrelevant factors. The ideal model thus still has a link 
with reality, because it sets the aspect being studied in a concrete situation. It is more "real" 
because all relevant factors are present (even if they are, as pointed out, idealised and 
simplified versions of the real ones). However, these models also have an "unreal" side to 
them - they are after all representations, conceptual models about some aspect of reality. 
The laws active in models are phenomenological ones (as pointed out in the beginning 
of this chapter). These kinds of laws are however problematical in Cartwright's terms, in the 
sense that they are apparently subject to a kind of ceteris paribus condition - they tell us 
what happens if the relevant factors are arranged in a specific (ideal) way. The (fundamental) 
laws describing the content of abstractions, however, do not have these ceteris paribus-like 
conditions. I disagree as I have often pointed out. The fundamental laws are not about 
everything. Newton's laws of motion and his law of gravitation were not about everything in 
the universe, but were rather concerned with everything to do with gravitation. For this reason 
it is (some) fundamental laws that need ceteris paribus clauses and not the 
phenomenological ones. The ideal character of the models is ideal because the theory has 
to be true in it, and not because of special ceteris paribus conditions. The only sense in which 
"all other things are equal" in a model is in the sense of satisfying the truth relations between 
the model and its theory. This means that only entities and relations to which the (language 
of the) theory refers (under the relevant interpretation) occur in the model, and there they 
behave as the theory stipulates. 
Cartwright (1989: 190, 191) claims her notion of abstraction to be more Aristotelian than 
Duhemian. For Duhem an abstraction offers scientists images of concrete instruments 
manipulated in reality and images of schematic models of those instruments, constituted with 
the help of theoretical instruments. Scientists then reason about these images and apply the 
laws of science to them. In model-theoretic terms a cycle of the scientific process starts off 
in reality and although the mediation of models - Duhem's images perhaps - are necessary 
to trace science back to reality, it still is claimed that science is about real systems and not 
only about these images. Duhem 177 - rightly this time - claims that if there is 
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correspondence between an abstract symbol and a concrete fact, it can never be in terms of 
"complete parity". And, moreover, a single theoretical symbol may correspond to a variety of 
concrete facts such that these facts underdetermine the possible interpretations of the 
theoretical symbol in question. 
For Aristotle, on the other hand, abstraction means subtraction as it does for both 
Cartwright and me. Aristotle (quoted in Cartwright, 1989: 197) sees the scientific process 
starting off with a concrete "particular" with all its properties. Then " ... we strip away - in our 
imagination - all that is irrelevant to the concerns of the moment and focus on some single 
property or set of properties 'as if they were separate"' (ibid.). In other words, other than 
Duhem, Aristotle believes - like I do, and Cartwright sometimes seems not to - that the 
objects we study are really there to begin with. Abstractions thus do not imply that the real 
aspect of reality science focuses on is changed such that the departure from truth is 
"imperceptibly small", but rather, as Cartwright (1989: 186) puts it, abstraction implies 
subtraction in the sense of disregarding certain factors that are of less importance for 
realising the aims of the envisaged theory than others. 
Now, for Cartwright it is phenomenological laws that offer the descriptions of real 
objects. Cartwright (1989: 225) writes: " ... if we could write [the phenomenological laws] 
down, [they] would literally describe the features of this concrete phenomenon and the 
nomological links within it. [Such a law] would be a highly complex law, and would include a 
specific description of the physical structure and surroundings of the concrete device. 
Possibly it could not be written down; perhaps the features that are relevant to its operation 
make an open-ended list that cannot be completed. But because we are talking about a 
concrete object, it is at least conceivable that some law is true of its operation". Actually, there 
exist no such "open-ended lists" of features relevant to the operation of "highly complex" laws. 
Such lists are only necessary if one's aim is to describe a system in all its complexity, and 
although - as pointed out before - that seems to be Cartwright's aim, it is neither my own 
nor the aim of science in general. Science never tries to describe the features of any concrete 
phenomenon in all its complexity. No empirical model of a specific real system is ever 
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complete - or need ever be complete. 
Cartwright (1989: 224) describes a schematic diagram (diagram 5.1 there) of a helium-
neon laser and points out that it is taken that the concrete object modelled or pictured in that 
diagram operates under the same law as the one in the diagram. Of course the diagram 
offers only a representation of the real system, and is, actually, incomplete in the sense that 
it is not literally true, but that does not make it as abstract as its higher-level theories, 
because it does still offers a description of the real system's essential nature. She then (in 
diagram 5.2) gives a block diagram of a laser (Cartwright, 1989: 225). This diagram is a 
material abstraction of the real laser, because it does not at all attempt to describe the actual 
behaviour of any laser, but rather it "tells what a laser does by virtue of its function and 
arrangement of its parts" (Cartwright, 1989: 226). This diagram is an abstraction from the 
concrete details of a real laser and focuses on its "underlying principles". 
The problem of material abstraction is however - as pointed out before - that there 
is no universal a priori rule that sets out the movement from the abstract law to the 
phenomenological content, because the additions and corrections necessarily made by the 
phenomenological laws depend in each instance on how the abstraction is realised in that 
particular case. 
Cartwright wants to know why or how scientific realists may believe that what happens 
in an idea/ case is commensurable with real cases? Her (Cartwright, 1989: 190, 191) answer 
is as follows: " ... the logic that uses what happens in ideal circumstances to explain what 
happens in real ones is the logic of tendencies or capacities. What is an ideal situation for 
studying a particular factor? It is a situation in which all other 'disturbing' factors are missing 
(or controlled at least). And what is special about that? When all other disturbances are 
absent, the factor manifests its power explicitly in its behaviour. . .. This tells you something 
about what will happen in different, mixed circumstances - but only if you assume that the 
factor has a fixed capacity that it carries from situation to situation". 
The naive realist description of the scientific process in terms of approximations, 
however, conflates two separate actions, namely abstraction and idealisation, which both 
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Cartwright and I {although maybe for different reasons) want to keep apart in our 
interpretations of this process. I assume, on the other hand, that scientific descriptions and 
explanations given by theories and models can be "carried over" to real situations. This is, 
rather than being the result of the reality of capacities, because of the way the model-
theoretic system interprets the links between aspects of reality, models and scientific 
theories, and also, because of the fact that we see these theories being applied - and 
working - all around us every day. 
In Cartwright's case, the focus is simply on kinds of abstraction aiming at formulating 
laws of capacities, where it is causal factors that are isolated and their capacities that are 
studied. But what exactly is it that ascriptions of capacities {or fundamental laws or abstract 
theories) say about real things? In other words, what facts in reality make abstract capacity 
claims true? Given the hierarchy of laws that Cartwright works with, the answer to this 
question lies in the nature of the bearing of abstract theories on the more concrete and 
descriptive laws, that is, the phenomenological laws, that fall under them. It is, however, very 
difficult to answer these questions satisfactorily, because of the problem of material 
abstraction, already briefly referred to in the above. At the centre of the process of material 
abstraction lie activities of correction and addition, which are not ruled {governed, or 
determined) by any set of universal {a priori) rules. {Which is my point exactly.) These 
activities are, also, not of the ad hoc nature they are sometimes thought to be by naive 
scientific realists. Rather, according to Cartwright (1989: 202) they are sufficiently motivated 
in the sense that they genuinely describe other causes, interferences, and so on, that are 
active in the particular concrete situation being considered. These correcting activities are 
necessary, because of the subtractions abstract laws make {when addressing reality for the 
first time in my terms). 
However, as Cartwright points out (1989: 106, 107), to get back to the actual concrete 
laws that constitute the phenomenological content of these abstractions, the initially omitted 
factors must be added in again. But, where do these factors come from? Cartwright (1989: 
204 - 206) explains that the theory itself provides them, and gives an example (ibid.) to 
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illustrate her point, although she also stresses that they are never entirely given by the theory 
since there will never really be an end to further factors relevant to a particular case. She 
says (1989: 207): "I have put 'real' in quotes to signal my worry. For I think that, no matter 
how open-ended the list is, this kind of process will never result in an even approximately 
correct description of any concrete thing. For the end-point of theory-licensed concretisation 
is always a law true just in the model''. 
It seems that Cartwright somehow links the so-called "open-endedness" of the corrective 
celeris paribus - in her terms - clauses to the fact that theories can only be true in their 
models. Again, that is not the model-theoretic conclusion, because of the semantic links in 
terms of satisfaction functions between linguistic systems and their mathematical structures 
(conceptual models) and substructures (empirical models). Alan Chalmers (1993: 196) offers 
the following example in support of Cartwright's views: "The explanation and prediction of the 
return of Halley's comet was certainly a triumph for Newtonian theory. Nevertheless, the first 
'sighting' of the comet on its most recent return enabled the predicted orbit and time of return 
to be corrected and subsequent attempts to track it were able to benefit from that correction''. 
The empirical truth of this illustration is of course not disputed. However, I do not see why it 
necessarily has to be interpreted as implying that theories can only ever explain what 
happens in models. These corrections were made as a result of what "really" happened -
real observations - and consequently led to more sophisticated models of Newton's theory, 
which at the same time are empirically more adequate than previous models. 
There is a very fine difference in emphasis between Cartwright's account (of the process 
of science) and mine, but it is a very important one, because it relates to our attitudes towards 
the realism of our models. I would prefer to say, rather than simply claiming that theories 
cannot say anything about the aspect of reality that their models may be linked with, that 
theories can only explain in that little piece of reality that each of their models "refers" to (or 
rather might refer to). In other words, taking a previous example: the solar system model of 
Newtonian mechanics consisting of only seven planets, (used before Neptune was 
discovered) did indeed refer to the real situation. Although, in reality there were nine planets 
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all along, the fact remains that it is quite possible to concentrate only on some of them and 
not on all at once. Whether and to what degree Newton's laws were empirically adequate 
when using this "restricted" model might seem to be a more difficult issue to deal with. But 
it is not really, since I claim - in agreement with Cartwright - that empirical adequacy (or 
truth) is a notion that can only be used meaningfully if linked with the model offering the 
relevant interpretation of the theory being considered at the time, and the relevant empirical 
model available at the time. 
4.8 Conclusion 
Cartwright is very ambiguous in her statements about the links between theory and 
reality, though I find nothing wrong with the following remark (Cartwright, 1989: 211): "I think 
we cannot understand what theory says about the world nor how it bears on it until we have 
come to understand the various kinds of abstraction that occur in science, as well as the 
converse processes of concretisation that tie these to real material objects". I agree that the 
context-dependence (or ideal character) of the (abstracted) factors "added back" (after the 
suspension of ceteris paribus clauses) when the model is constructed should be taken into 
consideration, but, in my account, this is done by linking the empirical adequacy of the theory 
with the particular conceptual and empirical model, and not by denying the possibility of any 
relation between theory and reality. 
Cartwright's notions concerning ceteris paribus clauses seem to be at the basis of a lot 
of the aspects of her work that are unacceptable to me. These notions are exemplified by her 
treatment of Newton's gravitational law: she enfeebles the absolutely general law by 
rendering it as if it were saying that (as far as we know) the gravitational force only kicks in 
when no other forces are around; and she ignores the fact that we know how to add forces 
and, more generally, in many cases how to merge what different theories are saying about 
different aspects of the same type of system. Apart from this misguided rendering of 
fundamental laws, she also misinterprets the reason for the idealised nature of conceptual 
models as the result of ceteris paribus clauses' stabilising influence. As I have pointed out 
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before, the idealised nature of these models is far rather the consequence of the formal 
aspects of the truth (satisfaction) relations between theories and their models. The focused 
nature of science has nothing to do with some vicious influence that these clauses have on 
the enterprises of science, but is simply part of the definition of scientific knowledge. 
Another of the main shortcomings of her work lies in the fact that she rarely seems to 
take the stages of theory formulation into account, as model-theoretic realism (see chapters 
2 and 5) does. If the structure of scientific theories is analysed both as far as theoretical 
formulation and application are concerned, the model-theoretic nature of the act of securing 
some referential link between some theory's terms and the entities and objects of some 
system in reality becomes clear and obvious. Moreover science does not aim - as 
Cartwright seems to think - at offering complete descriptions of particular concrete real 
systems in all their detail. Even if some system could be isolated - which it cannot be - no 
scientist is ever interested in a// its aspects! 
A last untenable aspect of Cartwright's views lies in her strong metaphysical leanings 
as far as proving the referential nature of fundamental laws is concerned. According to her, 
only if it is taken that fundamental laws refer to capacities of Nature, i.e. that these laws are 
capacity claims, can they be about something in reality. Model-theoretically speaking, the 
specific ontological nature of that about which fundamental laws are, is not only not 
necessarily causal or couched in terms of capacities, but basically irrelevant. In the next 
chapter the main points of a model-theoretic realism will be discussed and illustrated. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: A MODEL-THEORETIC REALISM178 
5.1 Introduction 
The realism issue threads through all of the above. No examination of the nature of 
scientific theories can be complete without addressing the relations between these theories 
and reality. In a model-theoretic model of science such as mine the basic ontological 
assumption made is that science is about something that exists independently of it. This 
ontological assumption has however as little metaphysical content as is possible. Claiming 
that reality exists "outside" of human practice neither means that reality is unknowable nor, 
at the other extreme of the scale, that science simply mirrors it. 
To determine whether science is about an independent reality or not, I believe one has 
to examine both the actions necessary for producing scientific knowledge and those aiming 
to apply such knowledge. From the previous chapters it should be obvious that I argue that 
at least some of the terms of a given scientific theory possibly refer to entities and relations 
of some system in reality if reference has been assigned to these terms by some empirical 
substructure of some conceptual model of the theory. In other words, a scientific theory can 
be said to be "about" the potential of entities in some system of reality to give reference to 
some terms or objects in this way. This potential however, is independent of the existence 
and knowledge of humans. It is the actualisation or realisation of this potential that requires 
human action. (See also Chapter 2.) 
As has been mentioned before, any successful model of a theory is guided by contingent 
conditions which are context-specifically constructed. The range or content of these models 
thus cannot be established a priori, but has to be investigated a posteriori by means of 
historical studies of the development of science. We can however at least say (a prion) that 
formally, the abstract linguistic character of scientific theories allows the possible existence 
of (many different) models constructed to interpret them; and that these models (with the help 
of their empirical substructures) have the ability to realise the potential systems in reality have 
for possibly giving reference to terms in scientific theories. The human-independent potential 
of reality and its contingent context-specific realisations are thus conceptually speaking 
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fundamentally different, even if they are epistemologically (and methodologically) related. 
"Reality" and "knowledge of reality'' - i.e. ontology and epistemology in their general senses 
- should not be confused. Thus the historical reality of theories and models is dependent 
on the actions of humans, while the reality of the ongoing potential of systems in reality to 
give reference to the terms in these theories and models is not. The need for acknowledging 
the conceptual stratification of the conceptual development of science should now be even 
more obvious, since at the level of the theory alone, all that is apparent is the multi-
interpretability of the theory and thus the possibility of it finally referring to a variety of systems 
in reality. 
In The Scientific Image (1980), Bas Van Fraassen remarks that realists believe scientific 
theories offer "a faithful replica, in all aetail, of our world". I am arguing (in contrast to Van 
Fraassen's straw man-realist) for a view of realism that is more sophisticated in the sense 
that the intricacies of the various semantic relations between reality - in terms of real 
systems - and scientific theories are taken into account and it is acknowledged that absolute 
universal statements about these relations fit as uncomfortably within a scientific realist 
framework as in any other framework. 179 The identification (discovery) of particular instances 
of the general terms of theories becomes possible only through interpretations of these 
general terms, such as mass, momentum, and so on, in context-particular models of the 
theories. 
As acknowledged above, the possibility of discrepancies between theories, models and 
actual systems in reality has to be acknowledged and as Nancy Cartwright, Ronald Giere and 
their allies rightly advocate, the need for particular conditions to make "real" sense of general 
theories has to be accepted too. But this neither leads necessarily, for instance, to Van 
Fraassen's notion of empirical adequacy concerning only the phenomena, nor to typical 
scientific realist claims that real systems are approximately captured by models of theories. 
I simply claim that there may possibly be a set of models of some theory which fits some 
systems of reality and add that it is via historical studies concentrating on the context-specific 
models already constructed to interpret the relevant theories - and perhaps by constructing 
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some new ones - that this can be determined. It is this inherent feature of science - that 
is the multi-interpretability of its theories - which should be emphasised if a sophisticated 
realist interpretation of the conceptual development of science is offered. And the multi-
interpretability of scientific theories is the counterpart of the abstract nature of science. In this 
sense, it seems natural that it is so difficult to describe the relations between science and 
reality in simple terms and impossible to give one foolproof set of rules or recipes for theories 
to refer to reality. 
Somehow Ronald Giere's (in Churchland & Hooker, 1985: 82) remark that man is not 
the measure of all things but rather the measurer, seems very fitting in this sense. The 
structure of science's development hangs necessarily together with its theoretical nature. The 
verification procedures for the content of science however are never given beforehand by 
fixed rules, but are a result of the context-specific actions and constructions of human 
scientists. Notions like "constructed reality" and "real science" should therefore not be viewed 
as representing opposing interpretations of science, but should rather be accepted as the two 
poles of one very complex time-bound relationship. 
5.2 Reality and science 
Model-theoretically speaking science studies systems in reality. This refers to the 
abstracting simplifying nature of science. As already often pointed out in the above, no-one, 
not even scientists, can study reality in all its fullness at once. Not only do scientists focus on 
some particular system of phenomena in reality, but also they aim to "adjust" that system in 
such a way that they can focus only on certain of its features. The kind of abstraction that 
Gartwright talks about and that I have discussed in a model-theoretic context in Chapter 2 is 
a necessary and sufficient condition for scientific knowledge. If certain abstractions are made 
from the richness of experiences that reality has to offer, scientific knowledge of the real 
system in question becomes possible. And, vice versa, if some knowledge claim is offered 
as part of science, the nature of that claim will (relative to the complexity of the universe) be 
simple and it will be about a sufficiently abstract version of some real system (even if that 
155 
system is the cosmos!). 
Reality is not unknowable, but rather only knowable in a certain way. I am aware that 
this sounds particularly Kantian, but that is entirely my purpose. The basis of a model-
theoretic methodology is Kantian in the sense that it implies that we can only know reality 
through science, but that scientific knowledge can only be achieved through certain 
abstractive actions. However, the Kantian Ding-an-sich is the reality we study via science. 
There is no other "underlying mechanism" or anything else that is somehow so fundamental 
to the ontology of reality that we cannot know it. Knowing through abstraction is knowing. 
There is no other kind of knowing, scientifically speaking. And, moreover, this kind of knowing 
is adequate in the sense that it does indeed allow us to study, discover, and utilise knowledge 
about reality. 
Any kind of realism that decides how reality has to be in order for science to be possible 
- such as that of Bhaskar (1978) - is too metaphysical for my taste. I have been arguing 
all along - and pointed out many times, see Section 2.1 for instance - that a model-
theoretic realism is one that focuses more on science than it does on reality. Connecting an 
ontology of science to an ontology of reality however often seems to be strangely lurking 
behind many philosophic accounts of science. It seems as if Cartwright (1989), for one, has 
been seduced. Her hierarchy of "capacities" somehow seems to be offered as a kind of 
mirror image of her hierarchy of scientific laws - fundamental laws are capacity claims, 
phenomenological laws depict causal relations in reality, and the experimental stage of 
science focuses on "singular causings". Roy Bhaskar (1979, 1981) also seems to have been 
caught, albeit perhaps in a different, but not necessarily lesser, way. In Bhaskar's terms the 
mechanisms of reality form part of the lowest - ontologically deepest - level of reality and 
their scientific counterparts are causal laws. The actual events produced by these 
mechanisms still form part of the "intransitive" (real) dimension of science but are conducive 
to the identification of constant conjunctions or patterns of events at the "transitive" dimension 
of science. 
From the above - as has already been implied in the introduction to Chapter 2 - it is 
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obvious that I plead for a distinction between ontology and epistemology with regard to 
science. I am aware that philosophers such as Joseph Margolis (1995) deny that this is 
possible. The reasoning behind disclaiming that such a distinction is possible seems to me 
as mainly based on the notion of science as a social construction. This is another of many 
contemporary echo's of Bachelard's (1934) point that it is difficult to see how science can be 
said to be about a human-independent reality if our notion of reality seems to be so very 
dependent on human action. One of the problems here, I think, is a certain vagueness of 
terminology. 
In trying to clarify this confusion, let us first make ii clear that in model-theoretic terms 
science is indeed also an individual and social construction. Science is "transitive" in 
Bhaskar's sense as against the "intransitivity" of reality. Scientific knowledge can change and 
is contingent on the actions of scientists formulating it. However the notion of "reality" is 
sometimes used as a group noun to refer to the immediate "stuff' or results of scientific 
knowledge. That is, the idealised pictures of the "external" world that science offers us are 
somehow seen as constructing a reality about which science is. Since these "images" are 
also still changeable because they are part of science, it is then perhaps concluded that 
reality too is changeable and therefore that a scientific epistemology is necessarily linked to 
an ontology of this (scientific) reality. 180 The "immediate" pictures that models of scientific 
theories offer of some system in reality are however just that- i.e. representations of reality. 
The reality that is independent of science, in the sense that it exists regardless of whether its 
processes have already been "discovered", "explained", or "described" by science, is perhaps 
better denoted by the - somewhat outdated - term "Nature". Reality in this sense is not 
dependent on human actions at all (except in so far as it encompasses humans and their 
actions or technology based on science). It is a complex system of "mechanisms" the 
processes of which continue now as they have done through the ages. And, it is the ontology 
of reality in this sense that is separate from scientific epistemological factors. The "reality" of 
science is an idealised version of this "Nature" and consists of already established theories 
and the various actions of scientists as well as the results of these actions. This "reality" is 
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a social construction and this is the reality the more moderate constructivists claim to be 
constructing, in the sense that science cannot be studied without taking these matters - i.e. 
the human activities and their context-dependent motivation driving the scientific process -
into account. 
The ontology of this "scientific reality" and the epistemology of its generator - i.e. 
science - can indeed not be separated. In a model-theoretic account of science this 
becomes even more clear. The models that offer us these pictures are an integral part of the 
process of science. The set of conceptual models referred to as the "intended" models of 
scientific theories in the above, are shaped by the already established pictures of this kind. 
And, moreover, at the interpretative stage of science the justification for, and evaluation of, 
scientific theories are offered and carried out within the context of this "scientific reality". The 
point is however, that in the final instance, although science is "social" and "constructivist" it 
is not a reflexive enterprise in the usual social constructivist meaning of the word. Science 
is not about something that it has constructed itself and that is inherently of the same nature 
as science itself. Science is about "Nature" and about discovering the intricacies of the 
mechanisms according to which "Nature" operates. In this sense, as pointed out above, 
ontology - in the sense of the ontology of that about which science is - and epistemology 
have to be separated. 
The "game" of post-Kuhnian philosophy of science has one trick that has to be learnt if 
the realist quest is to be salvaged. This is the trick of keeping constant one of the changing 
factors at issue (i.e. "Nature" in this case) while acknowledging the variability of all the 
(transitive) others involved. Bhaskar (1978) claims that the relationship between science and 
reality seems problematic only if one either accepts the social character of science, but 
denies that its object of study is independent of all social activity (the so-called "epistemic 
fallacy"), or if one accepts the independence of reality, but denies the social nature of science 
(the so-called "ontic fallacy''). 181 A model-theoretic realism is not guilty of either of these 
fallacies. He (Bhaskar, 1989) depicts the basis of a valid realist philosophy of science in 
terms of a choice between either an epistemological or an ontological relativism. He chooses 
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an epistemological relativism and refers (Bhaskar, 1989: 57) to it as the" ... correct thesis of 
epistemic relativity, which asserts that all beliefs are socially produced, so that all knowledge 
is transient, and neither truth values nor criteria for rationality exist outside historical time ... ". 
To ontological relativism he (ibid.) refers as the" ... incorrect thesis of judgemental relativism, 
which asserts that all beliefs are equally valid, in the sense that there can be no (rational) 
grounds for preferring one to the other". 
Making the choice - as a model-theorist would also do - for Bhaskar's epistemological 
relativism, and thus acknowledging that truth criteria as well as criteria for (scientific) 
rationalism are part of the philosophy of science, does not mean that any criterium goes, but 
rather the opposite. The construction of these kinds of scientific criteria is, model-theoretically 
speaking, undeniably a function of the conceptual and empirical models of scientific theories. 
Validating them is the function of the various semantic relations that exist between reality as 
"Nature" and these models. 
Before we tum to a closer examination of these relations, a last few remarks on science 
as it is depicted in model-theoretic terms. Around 1960 philosophers of science found 
themselves in somewhat of a crisis. The logical empiricist inspired way of thinking about 
scientific knowledge as being the "crowning achievement" of human reason suddenly seemed 
horribly empty. It began to seem less than clear what exactly it is that determines the line of 
research science should pursue at a given time, and, consequently, to determine which 
scientific theories are finally getting at "the truth". Philosophers of science became obsessed 
with questions like "What do we really know?", "What should we believe?", "What is 
evidence?", "What are good reasons?", "Is science as rational as people used to think?". 
These questions lead to serious uncertainty about the nature of reality: "What is the world?'', 
"What kinds of things are in it?'', "What is 'true' of them?", "What is 'truth' in this sense?", "Are 
the entities postulated by theoretical physics real, or only constructs of scientists' minds for 
organising experiments, or worse, simply figments of their fertile imaginations that come in 
handy when they start formulating theories?". 
Philosophers of science have been divided over the answers to these questions for 
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centuries. During the sixties - and ever since - the debate between realists and anti-realists 
has become far more intense though because of the strong historical and social flavour of the 
specific crisis they found themselves in. The opening phrases of Kuhn's The structure of 
scientific revolutions (1970) decided the context of this debate: "History, if viewed as a 
repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in 
the image of science by which we are now possessed" (Kuhn, 1970: 1). Part of the 
background of this debate 182 is the old division between confirmation or verification and 
falsification. Carnap, for instance, tried to explicate verification in terms of a theory of 
confirmation because he believed that knowledge has rational foundations, while Popper held 
that rationality consists in (critical) method, and that our (scientific) knowledge is fallible. 
As Hacking (1983: 5) however points out in his book Representing and intervening 
(1983). these philosophers also share something, that is, they share the image of science 
that Kuhn's work rejected. They both thought (Hacking, 1983: 5,6) - among other things -
that 
• there is a clear division between observation and theory; 
• the growth of scientific knowledge is cumulative; 
• science has a pretty strict deductive structure; 
• scientific terminology ought to be as precise as possible; 
• there is a distinct and fundamental difference between the context of justification and 
the context of discovery. 
Kuhn disagreed with all of the above and stressed that above all science is essentially 
historical. 
My arguments in this section thus far imply that scientific actions - and their authority 
- are not about Nature in the traditional confirmational sense of satisfying some set of 
atemporal methodological rules and offering a body of neutral pure objective data about 
reality. But, neither do the entire scientific enterprise and its products offer simply sets of 
(false) context-specific data. Rather, science is about "Nature" in the sense that it is a system 
of knowledge claims that operates according to a set of contingent rules and offers a body 
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of equally contingent183 data about systems in reality that offers us "snapshots" of "Nature". 
5.3 A modified image of science 
Let us look again at the features of the image of science that Popper and Carnap share, 
but which are unacceptable to Kuhn, as they are accommodated by a realist model-theoretic 
account of science. 
5.3.1 The distinction between observation and theory 
I think it is obvious that a model-theoretic realism implies that observational and 
experimental actions and actions of formulating and applying models and theories take place 
at different stages or levels of the scientific process, although they constantly complement 
each other. Abstractions based on established and new observations play a major role at the 
beginning of the process when the intended model of some future theory is being 
constructed. Observational results also direct - together with the thematic preferences and 
other specific factors guiding the interpretations of scientists at this stage - the transition 
from the intended model to the theory in the sense of the interactive conceptual movement 
between this model and the selected aspect of reality. In formulating the theory - and thus 
fixing its class of possible models - the intended model, but also the variety of features in 
reality that are to be dealt with by the theory and its models, must be taken into account. 
During the interpretative stage of science observation again plays a definite role in the form 
of experimental data embodied in empirical substructures of conceptual models of the theory 
in question. Throughout all of these stages it has to be noted though that established 
theoretical frameworks - especially those concerning the interpretation of experiments and 
the use of instruments - are never separate from observational activities. 
Observation thus permeates the whole process of science, and moreover, the old fixed 
distinction between "observational" and "theoretical" terms dissolves.184 Theoretical terms -
such as mass, electron, force - are neither empty metaphysical results of the linguistic 
formulation of scientific theories, nor can their reference be "fixed" once and for all by the so-
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called bridge relations that are supposed to give them "observational" content. Rather, the 
meaning and reference of these terms slowly emerge during the various interpretative stages 
of science via the conceptual and empirical models of the theories containing them. 
Dilworth expresses related ideas. He (Dilworth, 1994c: 155) writes: 
In seeking to understand why the laws of science take the form that they do, the 
scientist attempts to conceive what the reality underlying them must be like. He 
thus constructs an idealised model, which has as its source that which he feels he 
does understand ... The model should be constructed so as to depict a physically 
possible, albeit idealised, reality, whose existence would naturally manifest itself 
in the laws requiring explanation .... a scientific model represents an ontology the 
nature of which may be taken as being responsible for the epistemology we 
associate with scientific laws. And ... the very fact that an explanation of such laws 
should be tentative necessarily suggests that that aspect of reality which is 
responsible for them is not open to direct inspection. Thus, if we consider models 
which depict these (perhaps temporarily) hidden aspects of reality as constructing 
the essence of scientific theories, we can characterise theoretical terms as terms 
used in referring to those entities in the real world (should they exist) as they are 
depicted in such models. 
5.3.2 Science is cumulative 
I have already discussed this issue in Chapters 3 and 5. Briefly, the following. The 
metaphor of a clock 195 nicely describes my view of the way in which science can indeed be 
said to be cumulative. Take the hour-hand to represent scientific theories, the minute-hand 
to represent the various context-specific models, and the second-hand to represent empirical 
data at the level of reality. I claim that the process of science is similar to the speed of the 
hands of the clock: theories change very slowly, models more quickly, and empirical data 
(observations etc.) the quickest, while definitive relations hold between these three aspects 
of science. (Maybe shifting to a new disciplinary matrix is analogous to buying a new clock.) 
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Each model of a given scientific theory is subjected to extremely strict testing against 
reality- by whatever form of testing is applicable to the model in question - and it is seldom 
that a model withstands these tests without at least being modified in some way, i.e. without 
the intention shifting to some other model(s) (of the same theory) with better empirical fit. 
Theory changes usually occur only when the possibility of changing and modifying the 
relevant models of the theory concerned has been exhausted. But even if a specific model 
of a theory is "discarded" the possibility of transforming that model and using it for other 
purposes in another interpretation of the same (or another) theory always exists. (Think of 
epicycles - the precursor of Fourier analysis - and the ether - the precursor of fields in 
space-time.) Thus the different levels of the scientific process are inherently related and it is 
this fact that guarantees the continuity of scientific knowledge. 186 
5.3.3 The deductive structure of science 
Well, this is a difficult one. In my terms, a theory consists of a deductively closed set of 
sentences (in some appropriate language)187, i.e. the theory contains all the sentences 
deducible from the axioms of the theory. In model-theoretic terms, the generalising activities 
of abstraction that take place at the beginning stages of the formulation process of a scientific 
theory are in direct contrast to the particularising activities of interpretation during the 
applicatory stages of science. 
5.3.4 Scientific terminology 
Scientific terminology tries to be as precise as possible, simply in the sense that it would 
seem a bit funny to be using vague ambiguous terms to formulate so many hours of detailed 
exacting research. But, if by "precise" is meant something like "having only one obvious 
absolute meaning or interpretation", I cannot agree, because such an approach totally 
ignores the model-theoretic implications of the scientific theory as a generalising statement. 
I am referring here to the various interpretations possible of one scientific theory by virtue of 
its abstract nature. The meaning and use of scientific terminology are also linked to specific 
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models and are thus perhaps more contingent than some philosophers would like, since 
theoretical terminology has model-specific meaning and reference. 
5.3.5 The contexts of justification and discovery 
I agree with Kuhn that these contexts cannot really be separated. Even if they are taken 
in the trad~ional sense of the context of justification being about and using so-called "internal" 
features of theories, and the context of discovery being about and using factors "external" to 
scientific theories, the constant interaction and overlap between these contexts during the 
process of science become obvious in model-theoretic terms. It is possible to see that 
justification will perhaps play a larger role in the movement from the theory via its various 
models to systems in reality, than in the initial development from an aspect of reality to the 
theory via the intended model. And, surely one could say that discovery will be very important 
in the initial stages of theory formulation, but so will it be in the final examining of systems of 
reality giving reference to the terms in the model(s) of some theory. Again, it is the 
interconnectedness of these stages or levels that makes it very difficult to separate these 
contexts. 
It is however undeniable that both have important roles to fulfil in the process of science 
as a whole, as is specifically illustrated when the question of the truth of a theory in some 
conceptual model is examined. Scientists work within the context of the logic of justification 
when they construct the conditions and structure of the interpretation they work from in such 
a way that the theory (being the deductively justified consequences of axioms) has the best 
possible chance of being true under that interpretation. However, they work in the context of 
the logic of discovery when they determine the "truth" or "empirical adequacy" of the 
interpretation itself - that is the "fit" of the interpretation to some real system - because 
here they have to do with a multitude of different (often entertwined) tests, varying from the 
empirical to the mathematical according to the specific interpretation they work from. More 
on the model-theoretic notion of empirical adequacy in Section 5.4. 
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5.4 The empirical interpretations of scientific theories 
5.4.1 Introduction 
The different accounts of science offered by the various non-statement approaches to 
the status of scientific theories all offer - among other things - variations on the theme of 
scientific realism. The model-theoretic tools these views are equipped with seem to offer a 
very good chance of, on the one hand showing that there are, indeed, certain empirical 
relations between the terms of theories and the entities in real systems, and on the other 
hand, defining the nature of these relations more and more precisely. I shall first discuss 
these issues in sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3. 
Finally I shall, against the background of these discussions, analyse some "traditional 
realist problems". Typically the main "problematic" areas of a realist approach to science are 
the following. The problem of explaining the success of science, given the realist notion of 
approximate truth, lies in what Worrall (1994: xviii) refers to as "the argument from radical 
changes". This comes down to the problem of explaining - or justifying - the "approximate 
truth" of theoretical concepts that (supposedly) have been "discarded" in the progression of 
science - for instance "ether". A second related problem is to be found in the issue of 
underdetermination of theories by empirical data. How can the same theory be applicable to 
- or explain even - more than one phenomenon (or group of phenomena) if theories are 
"approximately true"? Finally, there is a problem, typical of many varieties of scientific realism, 
concerning the "additional" metaphysical content that theories that "really refer" seemingly 
need - given that it is often implied that mere empirical results, i.e. theories having the "right 
empirical consequences", are not "enough" to justify these forms of realism's existential 
claims regarding the phenomena their theories are "about". 188 
5.4.2 Empirical adequacy 
The main question that one tends to want to answer in a realist context is, of course, 
how exactly scientific theories "get to" reality. The problem is that there is no simple answer 
to that question. The conclusion drawn from claims like these - e.g. "there is no final 
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description of the links between scientific theories and reality such that theories invariably 
refer to "something" in reality" - should however not be that therefore realism is untenable. 
A model-theoretic approach to realism shows us exactly that, and more importantly, such a 
realism offers us the tools to examine - and make sense of - the various and complex 
empirical links between scientific theories and real systems. It may seem that - perhaps as 
a result of the many-to-many relations between theories and their conceptual and empirical 
models, as well as between these models and systems in reality - model-theoretically one 
merely ends up in the empirical substructures of some conceptual model of a given theory, 
rather than "in reality". Well, what does it mean to be "in touch" with reality? I cannot see it 
meaning anything more than being in touch with the empirical practices of science. And, that 
is precisely what the empirical models embedded into a given theory's conceptual model(s) 
allow us to do. Of course, they allow this in a conceptual way, but then, the content of science 
- i.e. the set of its knowledge claims - is conceptual too is it not? A model-theoretic realism 
is thus a realism about objects in reality and the relations between them, although conceptual 
models (and the empirical models isomorphically embedded into them) are used to describe 
real systems by describing the systems' objects and the relations between these objects. 
In structuralist terms, if the data concerning the real system in question can be 
conceptualised in terms of a potential model of the theory in question, that is, if the data 
satisfy the framework conditions of the theory, then some empirical claim in terms of the 
theory can be made concerning the specific "range of phenomena" in question. Such an 
assertion will be empirically testable and so it may be shown that the real system in question 
also satisfies the empirical laws of the theory. This then will imply that the potential model of 
the theory is indeed an actual model of the said theory, and thus that this model is an element 
of the theory core. And then it may be concluded that the real system in question offers (at 
least) one application of the theory in question. 
In my terms, the structuralist notion of a "potential model" might be viewed as one of 
the conceptual models of a certain theory. The notion of an "actual model" may be very close 
to my notion of an "empirical model" since roughly it seems that they do the same work. In 
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model-theoretic terms, if it can be shown that a conceptual model of a given theory has an 
empirical substructure in which the experimental and observational data concerning a certain 
real system are conceptualised (or represented), the theory may be said to refer to the real 
system in question. The "empirical claim" that in structuralist terms proclaims a certain 
potential model of a theory to be an actual model of the theory is, in my terms, represented 
by the various model-theoretic relations between the theory, its conceptual model, its 
empirical models, and some real system. This notion of showing a potential model to be an 
actual model of a theory also reminds of Suppe's definition of empirical truth in terms of which 
the class of causally possible systems is claimed to be the theory-induced class of systems. 
(See Chapter 3.) 
Van Fraassen considers a theory to be empirically adequate if some model of the theory 
is such that (real) structures describable in experimental and measurement reports are 
isomorphic to an empirical substructure of the relevant model of the theory. 
In terms of Beth's state-space approach the link to reality is given via some satisfaction 
function between some (mathematical) state-space describing some physical system, and 
a set of elementary statements concerned with physical measurements. This means that the 
actual state of a physical system at a certain time may be given by defining some state-space 
representing the possible states of that system and some satisfaction function, which holds 
if the actual state of the system (described by some elementary statement) is an element in 
the domain of the relevant state-space. 
In Suppe's terms a theory is empirically true if the semantic relations holding between 
the propositions in the theory-formulation 189 language and the class of causally possible 
physical systems are those that hold in the case of theory-induced physical systems as well. 
If a physical system is in the class of theory-induced systems, the domain of the physical 
system will be a subset of the domain of the theory, and the sequence of states of that 
physical system will be determined by the theory's laws. This implies that propositions in the 
theory-formulation language may refer to and describe some physical system because a 
physical system in the theory-induced class of systems restricts the theory to a single 
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sequence of states. 
Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism (Van Fraassen, 1980) denies the need for 
dwelling on questions concerning reference between theoretical entities and aspects of 
reality. According to this view, relations of empirical adequacy between phenomena and 
"empirical substructures" of models of theories that refer to "observational" terms of theories, 
are sufficient for the needs of philosophy of science. 
Let us briefly examine the distinction that Newton made between "apparent motion" and 
"absolute or real or true motion" as Van Fraassen (1976: 624ff., 1980:44ff.) sets it out. In 
Ptolemy's terms the earth is stationary. In Copernicus's terms the sun is stationary. In 
Newton's terms neither the sun nor the earth is stationary. Planetary motion in Newtonian 
celestial mechanics is observed relative to the earth's motion. The notion of apparent motion 
is introduced such that the apparent motion of particular bodies accounts for the differences 
of their "true" motions (Van Fraassen, 1976: 624). Ptolemy need not have made the 
distinction between true and apparent motion, since to him "true" motion was exactly what 
was observed. In Copernican terms we can only observe the planets' motion relative to the 
earth, which is not stationary and thus the apparent motion of the planets are the difference 
between the earth's true motion and the true motion of the planets. Newton generalised 
apparent motion - i.e. motion relative to the earth - to the motion of one body relative to 
another. Any observed motion thus became a relative motion and an apparent motion is 
motion relative to an observer (Van Fraassen, 1980: 45). 
Newton separated the reality he "postulated" from the phenomena he "saved" (Van 
Fraassen, 1980: 44) by referring to the "absolute magnitudes" of his axioms and to their 
experimental determination as "sensible measures" (ibid.). Apparent motions "form" (ibid.) 
relational structures defined by measuring relative distances, time intervals, and angles of 
separation. These relational structures Van Fraassen (ibid.) calls "appearances''. In a 
mathematical model of Newton's theory bodies are located in Absolute Space in which they 
have '1rue" motion (ibid.). Van Fraassen (1976: 624) writes: "[b]ut within these models we can 
define structures that are meant to be exact reflections of ... appearances and are, as 
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Newton says, identifiable as differences between true motions. These structures, defined in 
terms of the relative relations between absolute locations and absolute times ... I shall call 
motions ... ". The notion of "appearances" thus refers to the actual observed motions - the 
"phenomena" -while the notion of "motions" refers to the terms of some mathematical model 
of Newtonian celestial mechanics. 
Van Fraassen (1980: 45) continues "[w]hen Newton claims empirical adequacy for his 
theory, he is claiming that his theory has some model such that a// actual appearances are 
identifiable with {isomorphic to) motions in the model". Thus, in Van Fraassen's and my 
terms, empirical adequacy - in Newton's terms - would mean that all empirical models 
{substructures) of Newton's theory will be isomorphically embedded in the particular 
{conceptual) model defined above. However, as both Van Fraassen and I stress, all that is 
really necessary or possible for determining the empirical adequacy of a given theory, is that 
it has at least one {conceptual) model with an embedded empirical model {adequately 
empirically related to some real system). 
In model-theoretic terms the models of the theory should thus indeed be adequate to the 
phenomena, but if the fact that the theory may be "adequate" to {true in) its {conceptual) 
models is taken into account as well, we have a model-theoretic realism that addresses the 
possible meaning and reference of "theoretical entities• without relapsing into the 
metaphysics typical of the usual scientific realist approaches. Remember that the deductive 
structure of theories is mirrored semantically in the {conceptual) models of the theory and 
thus cannot be represented fully by looking only at empirical substructures of these models.190 
Surely in terms of the above, it is the appearances that allow us to make sense of the motions 
(via the relevant models) which in their tum allow us to apply Newton's theory in a certain 
way? 
A clear manifestation of the empirical link between a model and some system in 
reality is given by the dimensional analysis in terms of the basic units in a derived physical 
quantity. According to the Oxford concise science dictionary (1996), a unit is the "specified 
measure of a physical quantity such as length [e.g. centimetre], mass [e.g. gram], time 
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[e.g. seconds], etc., specified multiples of which are used to express magnitudes of that 
physical quantity'' (ibid.: 751). The basic units of physical quantities are multiplied and 
divided to get derived units with dimensions, e.g. a unit of the form LPMQT', where L, M, 
and T indicate length, mass, and time, respectively, and p,q and rare (usually) integers. 
Examples: length (distance): L = L 1M"T°; mass: M = L0M1T"; time: T = L0M°T1; frequency, 
that is "per time": 1/T = L0M"I'; speed: UT= L1M°T·'; acceleration: (UT)/T = L1M°T->; 
momentum, that is mass " speed: M(UT) = L 1M1T"1; force, that is mass x acceleration: 
M(UT2) = L1M1T->; energy, that is, work, that is momentum" speed= force" distance: 
L2M1T"2; action, that is momentum " distance= energy x time: L2M1T"1; power, that is force 
" distance .. time =work per time: L2M1T"3• The definitions (given in conceptual models of 
the measurement theory in question) of the basic units (and hence of the derived units) 
link these units empirically (calculations given by some empirical substructure of the 
conceptual model in question) to certain very definite aspects of reality. A second is the 
duration of 9 192 631 770 periods of a certain specific radiation emitted by a caesium-133 
atom (that is the radiation corresponding to the transition between hyperfine levels of the 
ground state of this atom). A centimetre is the length of the path travelled by light in a 
vacuum during a time interval of 1/(2.99792458><10"') second. A gram is one-thousandth 
of the mass of a certain platinum-iridium object kept by the International Bureau of 
Weights and Measures at Sevres, near Paris in France. 
As shown above, the science of measurement (metrology) offers some of the clearest 
examples of the empirical relations between models and aspects of reality. In physics too we 
have extraordinarily accurate theories. Penrose (1997: 51) writes: "In quantum field theory, 
which is the combination of quantum mechanics with Maxwell's electrodynamics and 
Einstein's Special Theory of relativity, there are effects which can be computed to be accurate 
to about one part in 1011 • Specifically, in a set of units known as 'Dirac units', the magnetic 
moment of the electron is predicted to be 1.001159652(46), compared with the experimentally 
determined value of 1.0011596521(93)". This last instance also shows that the highly 
regulated results of experimental situations may indeed be "carried over" to the "complexities" 
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of reality, quite successfully and without too much ado. This is the subject of the next section. 
5.4.3 Transduction 
The problem of transduction refers to the problem of "carrying over" the results of some 
idealised (experimental in this case) context to the complexities of real systems. Bhaskar 
stresses the fact that scientists produce the empirical grounds for the laws of nature in their 
laboratories, but not the laws themselves. (In my terms this refers to the distinction between 
science, the "reality'' of science, and "Nature" that I discussed in the first sections of this 
chapter.) He (Bhaskar, 1986: 30) claims that distinguishing between "real and universal ... but 
non-empirical laws and their real and empirical but contextually localised grounds" dissolves 
the problem of transduction. The justification for each individual law can thus be found in the 
Bhaskarian stratification of nature, and not by tying laws to closed systems and ceteris 
paribus conditions (as "classical" empiricists seem to do). 191 Cartwright (1995a: 155) echoes 
this when she claims that scientists should" ... figure out how to combine laws together and 
how to cash out ceteris paribus conditions ... ". This has to be done, given her problem of 
material abstraction, against the material conditions of the situation in question, and the only 
way in which this is possible, she claims, is to assume the existence of capacities. A model-
theoretic realism needs neither a Bhaskarian analysis of reality nor Cartwright's notion of 
capacities to make sense of the experimental situation and its links to real systems. 
Cartwright (1989: 181) concludes that Nature in no way presents us with its laws as 
"given'', but rather Nature selects the capacities of different entities and determines their 
interaction. "It is not the laws that are fundamental, but rather the capacities ... laws of 
association are in fact quite uncommon in nature, and should not be seen as fundamental to 
how it operates. They are only fundamental to us, for they are one of the principal tools that 
we can use to learn about nature's capacities" (Cartwright, 1989: 181, 182). The fact remains 
though that Cartwright's aversion to fundamental laws - and her consequent metaphysics 
of reality in terms of capacities - show that she does not understand the process of science 
in model-theoretic terms at all. Fundamental laws can only be said to "lie" about real 
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situations if science is taken as striving towards some final model via which Nature can be 
explained and described in all its complexity. If it is however - model-theoretically -
understood that the reality of science is a constructed one, and moreover, that this fact is the 
flipside of the abstract nature of science, fundamental laws become an integral part of the 
process of science and the need for devising some total ontology of reality - as "Nature" -
disappears. Never can all the ceteris paribus clauses of a given scientific theory be "cashed 
out" at once, rather the model-theoretic process of science is such that different sets of these 
clauses are suspended through different models of the same theory, relating the theory to 
possibly different aspects of reality. 
Bhaskar also claims that causal laws are "ontologically uncoupled" (Bhaskar 1986:44) 
from patterns or sequents of events. Empirical regularities only occur as a result of active 
interference in nature: therefore this ontological distinction - between the empirical regularity 
that scientists produce (in the transitive dimension) and the causal law (in the intransitive 
dimension) that it enables us to identify - has to be presupposed and acknowledged if 
experimental (and thus scientific) activities are to be comprehensible. 
If something like Bhaskar's transcendental realist assumptions about the relations 
between reality and science are not made, any scientist could generate any pattern of events 
at will, rendering all scientific activity totally uninteresting. In other words, a realist philosophy 
of science should indeed be able to sustain an epistemological relativity, but fight against 
surrendering to ontological relativism, as discussed above. As pointed out before, a model-
theoretic realism can - as it should be able to do - accommodate such a Bhaskarian 
epistemological relativism. The varied nature of the conceptual models of a scientific theory 
represents precisely such a relativism. A model-theoretic framework however offers -
besides the fact that, as in the transcendental realist case, no ontological relativism need 
follow - two additional implications of a realist nature: 
• retaining the notion of a scientific theory (as the only means by which all the possibilities, 
offered by the variety of models, can be encompassed) protects the epistemological 
choices at the conceptual (model) level from dissolving into a meaningless multiplicity, 
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and 
• the internal structure of the relations between the conceptual models of a specific theory 
and systems in reality prohibits the stark anti-realist implications usually associated with 
the problem of the underdetermination of theories by data (and models in this 
framework). 
We as philosophers cannot tell which model (of a certain theory) provides the most adequate 
description of reality, because the ontology which a realist philosophy of science can offer is 
limited to descriptive claims about the structure of reality, while the epistemology it offers 
centres around the conceptual structure and development of scientific knowledge. Thus, 
although something akin to Bhaskar's distinction in terms of transitivity is also assumed in a 
model-theoretic realism, such a realism need, I stress again, not dwell on the kind of 
metaphysical musings about the actual structure of reality that both Bhaskar's notion of law-
like mechanisms, and Cartwright's capacities leading to some patchwork of laws, seem to 
imply. Only science itself can offer us an ontology which can specify the contents of the 
structures reality contains and the particular ways in which it behaves. 
Scientific method should thus ideally provide a model-dependent theory-dependent 
strategy, because such a strategy offers within a realist context the possibility of modifying 
or amending our existing models and theories in the light of further research. The 
methodological principles of a strategy like this will themselves depend on the theoretical 
picture provided by currently accepted theories. Both our new theories and the methodology 
by which we develop and apply them depend upon previously acquired theoretical 
knowledge. And this fact about the continuous nature of science, as well as science's various 
relations to reality can best be supported and explained by a model-theoretic realist 
conception of scientific knowledge. 
Thus in explaining phenomena a model-theoretic realism tries to show how these 
phenomena may be embedded - via some empirical model - within a conceptual model 
of some theory so that any real system exhibiting the phenomena in question may be within 
the reference of the theory's terms. Patrick Suppes's approach 192 seems to me to hold the 
173 
most promise as far as solving problems concerned with possible relations between 
theoretical entities, empirical data, and phenomena go. In my terms, proving the existence 
of relations of isomorphic embedding between empirical models and conceptual models 
(which incorporate Suppes's hierarchy of models between, at the highest level, theories of 
experiments, and the notion of experimental design, closest to reality) offers a way in which 
to refer to the contingent and complex relations between real systems and mathematical 
models of theories in a precise way. These relations can otherwise only be examined and 
analysed a posteriori as part of historical studies of science. 
From this viewpoint Cartwright's recent attacks (1989, 1994a, 1994b, 1995a) on 
"fundamentalism" seem rather pointless. Very few philosophers of science still try to "close" 
the open-endedness 193 characteristic of models (and accompanying ceteris paribus clauses 
in Cartwright's terms). Cartwright however does seem to have come to other insights lately, 
in so far as she (Cartwright, 1997) now stresses that pluralism - the view of the sciences 
that she (1989, 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c) has been advocating for the past few 
years - does not necessarily imply anti-realism. She (Cartwright, 1997: 167) writes: "To say 
the laws of physics are true ceteris paribus is not to deny that they are true. They are just not 
entirely sovereign". In an approach such as I am offering the abstract nature of theories, the 
"stabilising" and controlling nature of ceteris paribus clauses, the idealised nature of models, 
and the model-specific suspension of the said ceteris paribus clauses all fit into and can be 
accommodated in a logical reconstruction of the scientific process. Such a reconstruction can 
meaningfully address questions concerning the "truth" of theories, as well as their possible 
reference to reality. 
5.5 The succession of theories, verisimilitude, underdetermination, and other 
intertheoretic issues 
In what follows I shall discuss some of the problems - briefly mentioned in the 
introduction to this chapter - that are typical of "traditional" realist accounts. 
The main realist problem concerning the succession of theories lies in explaining the 
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different meanings or interpretations (or references) certain theoretical notions have been 
given through the history of science. Larry Laudan (in Cushing, Delaney and Gutting, 1984: 
90) remarks that realists typically claim that scientific theories are "approximately true" such 
that their "central" - empirical - terms "genuinely refer'' (ibid.) to real (physical) phenomena. 
This property of approximate truth is then offered as justification or explanation of the success 
of science. Laudan (ibid.) writes: "Our theories are successful, the realist maintains, precisely 
because they come close to representing things as they really are". Putnam (1975: 73) refers 
to this approach to the success of science as the "no miracle" approach.194 
Laudan (ibid.) puts his finger on the problem when he comments (ibid.) that we - as 
realists - know very well that our theories are not "true simplicitet", but at the same time the 
"truthlikeness" of our theories cannot be left uncommented on. The fundamental flaw 
underlying the notion of approximate truth 195 lies in its very definition. There simply is no 
reason to believe that approximately true scientific theories necessarily will be successful 
scientific theories, or vice versa. 196 (The study of the verisimilitude of theories is a highly 
technical area. More on this a little later on in this section.) 
Now Laudan (in Cushing , Delaney, and Gutting, 1984: 92) points out two alternative 
ways in which to examine the success of science. The first is an examination of the specific 
semantic features of scientific theories that allow these theories to be so successful (ibid.). 
The second alternative lies in "epistemic and methodological questions" concerning the 
"selection procedures which scientists use for picking out theories with impressive 
credentials"197(ibid.). It seems, however, as if Laudan (ibid.) feels that realism has very little 
to say on these issues. A model-theoretic realism however can - and obviously does -
address both these issues, albeit perhaps with not exactly the kind of slant that Laudan 
wishes for. 
As far as the semantic features of successful theories are concerned, a model-theoretic 
realism cannot offer a prescriptive discussion of these features. Rather, it explains how the 
semantic relations of theories in terms of their conceptual models may be used to "track" the 
"real" referents of these theories. Such a realism is thus descriptive in the sense of claiming 
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that a successful scientific theory will have such-and-such semantic features, rather than 
being prescriptive in the sense of claiming that a theory with such-and-such semantic features 
will definitely be successful. The reason for this again lies in the fact that this model of realism 
is a context- or model- specific realism in the sense that no absolute discussion of the 
empirical links between conceptual models of theories and the systems in reality is offered, 
and moreover, as Van Fraassen (1980) too points out, all the data concerning all phenomena 
will never be "in" at a given time. With regard to the second alternative Laudan mentions, 
briefly the following. A model-theoretic realism is perhaps the only kind of realism that can 
indeed say anything about these "selection procedures". While Laudan (1981a, 1981b) sees 
the answer in the so-called "problem-solving" ability of the theory, model-theoretic realists find 
the answer in terms of models of the theory and its various links to real systems, as well as 
to other models of the theory in question. 
Jarrett Leplin (1997) offers another - rather familiar - approach to explaining the 
success of science in realist terms. He offers this approach in terms of a definition of a so-
called "novel" prediction with the understanding that a theory that is capable of making such 
predictions would be a better choice than one who does not have this ability. Briefly, his (ibid.) 
definition seems to come down to the claim that a prediction is novel for a theory if no 
information about the predicted phenomenon is necessary for the prediction of that 
phenomenon by the theory in question, and if there is no other theory that can explain the 
prediction of this phenomenon. 
The idea of "novel" predictions to account for the succession - and the success - of 
theories has been with us most prominently since Lakatos. 198 Model-theoretically speaking, 
his (Lakatos, 1987) distinction between progressive and degenerative research programmes 
- as well as Leplin's version of this distinction - essentially come down to nothing more 
than the kinds of changes taking place at the conceptual level of science in terms of the 
construction of models of theories. A new model of the same theory will be able to make 
predictions concerning the system in reality the theory is focussed on, that older models (of 
the same or older theories) could perhaps not make. And whenever it becomes impossible 
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to construct a new model in these terms, it is time to make a theory change rather than a 
model change. Such a "new'' theory will then presumably have some models that can make 
"novel" predictions in the usual sense of these predictions not being contained in the previous 
theory's models. The validity of science in terms of its conceptual (model) level however turns 
the notion of "novel" facts into a far less rigid feature of "new'' theories than is usually implied. 
A model-theoretic realist account of science offers all the tools necessary for the 
technical study of the "truthlikeness" or "closeness to the truth" of scientific theories. The 
study of verisimilitude had its beginning with Karl Popper's Conjectures and refutations 
(1963). This book contained a proposal for a definition of "theory y is closer to the truth (has 
larger verisimilitude) than theory x". It is interesting to note that Popper's approach to theories 
was firmly in terms of the statement approach - i.e. the view of theories in terms of 
deductively closed sets of sentences, although the study of the verisimilitude of theories may 
better be done in a model-theoretic context that has decidedly non-statement characteristics 
too. In 1974 David Miller and Pavel Tichy showed (independently of each other) that Popper's 
definition of verisimilitude is not usable, since according to it no two theories containing false 
sentences are comparable. Development after that has mainly been in the "non-statement" 
approach - or rather in the spirit of my model-theoretic approach in which both models and 
theories play their equally essential roles. This work is exemplified by a large number of 
publications, of which the following is a selection of the more important and representative 
recent papers: Brink, C. & J. Heidema (1987), Burger, l.C. & J. Heidema (1994), Kieseppa, 
I. (1996), Kuipers, T.A. F. (1987), (1992), and (1997), Niiniluto, I. (1987), and (1998), Oddie, 
G. (1986), Ryan, M. & P.Y. Schobbens, (1995), Zwart, S.D. (1998) and Zamora Bonilla, J.P. 
(1996). 
Another interesting problem presents itself in these terms. This is the problem of 
underdetermination. A model-theoretic interpretation of the occurrence of underdetermination 
of theories by data (and by models!) offers at least new insights to notions such as scientific 
progress by accumulation, scientific truth, the problem of reference, and the nature of the 
relationship between language and reality. (See Chapter 6 for final conclusions in model-
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theoretic terms concerning these notions.) 
Traditionally (that is, in terms of the received or statement view of science) the nature 
of underdetermination has been understood in terms of possible relations of a many-to-one 
nature existing between phenomena or systems in reality and the observation terms of the 
theory in question, as well as one-to-many relations between sets of protocol sentences 
(formed from the observation terms and expressing data) and possible theories incorporating 
or explaining such a set of protocol sentences - that is, the existence of incompatible but 
empirically equivalent theories. So empirical data are too incomplete to determine uniquely 
either a real system, or a model, or a theory. If - as has been explained in more detail in 
Chapters 2 - the interpretative chain between theories and systems in reality is stretched 
such that conceptual models are interposed between theories and real systems, the character 
of the underdetermination "problem" changes positively. 
Within a model-theoretic account of science the above mentioned problematic relations 
are analysed in terms of two sets of relations. The first set is a set of one-to-many relations, 
and the second is a set of relations that may be many-to-many, many-to-one, or one-to-many 
relations. The one-to-many relations in the first set are interpretative relations between the 
terms in some theory and the terms in its various models. These relations assign meaning 
(and potential reference) to the theoretical terms. The second set of relations in different 
types of combination exist between the terms of models (or of only one model) and the 
objects and entities of some real system (or systems). 
The realist advantage of a model-theoretic account of science is that it illustrates that 
the complexity of this last set of relations need neither be circumvented somehow, nor be 
regarded as sufficient to shoot down any realist aspirations. Retaining the notion of scientific 
theories as linguistic expressions at the "top" level of science solves the problematic part of 
the first set of one-to-many relations by the simple fact of the incompleteness ("open-
endedness") of interpretations of formal languages. The possibility of a given scientific theory 
being interpreted in more than one mathematical model (structure) is natural in a very basic 
sense in model-theoretic terms. Postulating the various relations between terms in models 
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and aspects of reality also in these terms is perhaps not as basic, but seems to be the 
obvious and best explanation for the successes of science and consequently the best 
affirmation of scientific realism. Rather than try to wriggle out of the whole referential mess, 
advocates of a model-theoretic account of science accept that the relations between the 
terms of conceptual models and real phenomena cannot be described or defined {or even 
explained) by some rigid {barren) set of absolute correspondence (bridge) principles. 
Model-theoretically speaking theories are not simply underdetermined by data in the 
familiar Quine-Duhem way, but theories are also underdetermined by their individual models. 
{The theory is the set of sentences true in a// its models. Many different theories are also true 
in any particular model.) The underdetermination of theories by data is the original problem 
of explaining the existence of empirically equivalent, yet incompatible, scientific theories. In 
the history of {the philosophy of) science instances of such theories are quite common -
think of the various ways in which an electromagnetic field has been described from Faraday 
through Einstein to Feynman. In general model-theoretic terms the underdetermination of 
theory by data is not really a problem. Underdetermination becomes a problem only if one 
believes in some "absolute" semantic content of a theory, which that theory, as syntactic 
{linguistic) entity, is not able to capture uniquely. Otherwise, if the various thematical factors, 
such as the traditions within which scientists work, are all taken into account, together with 
the abstractive nature of science and the interpretative nature of its application, 
underdetermination of theory by data becomes a necessary feature of science rather than an 
insurmountable problem. The variety of links between the conceptual models of scientific 
theories and systems in reality in terms of the empirical models of the theory in question 
dissolves the usual anti realist implications of the notion of underdetermination. These links 
can, in terms of a model-theoretic realism, be shown to be valid and, moreover, such a 
realism shows exactly how scientific theories can still be about real systems even if the 
objects and entities of these systems are somehow described in different conceptual terms. 
As far as the underdetermination of theories by their conceptual models is concerned, 
briefly the following. The models of a theory say "more" than the theory in the following formal 
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sense. The set of sentences true in some model M of a theory T in a first-order language L 
is larger than T. A theory Tis usually incomplete in the sense that there is a sentence a such 
that neither a nor -.a is in T. A particular model M of theory T is however "complete" in the 
sense that a model "divides" the language L into true (including T) and false sentences. The 
choice of a model for interpreting a particular theory is underdetermined in the sense that 
such a choice is limited by the empirical model in which certain "observation" sentences are 
true, but this empirical model is just a (small) substructure of the to be chosen model. This 
is not an arbitrary choice though, precisely because the model has to "make" the theory's 
sentences true while keeping true the sentences in L that have been shown to be empirically 
adequate. Again, this takes out a lot of the strength behind the usual antirealist implications 
of underdetermination, given the nature of the empirical models of a theory as set out above. 
Related to the problem of underdetermination is the question of the various relations that 
may exist between theories and their models. Is it possible to have one structure that makes 
(under two interpretations) the sentences of two theories (even in different languages) true? 
Yes (although maybe "in the limit"); one of the models of Einstein's general theory of relativity 
in its low velocity low field limit is given by Newtonian mechanics. In general though it should 
not merely be said that all models of preceding theories are models of limiting cases of 
succeeding theories. Such an approach trivialises the idea of "limiting cases" to an absurd 
extent. A model-theoretic realism is not merely about the same things being called by 
different names. Rather it is about the entire conceptual organisation of objects and relations 
on them, i.e. of structures, in such a way as to give the best possible explanation for real 
systems at a given time. 
Can the same theory have two models that are both valid? Yes, well that depends on 
the strength of one's realism I suppose. The model of Newton's theory representing our solar 
system that consisted of only seven planets before the discovery of Neptune, the one 
containing eight planets before the discovery of Pluto, and one containing all presently known 
nine planets in our solar system, may all be constructed as models of Newtonian celestial 
mechanics. And, moreover, they all refer to certain systems in reality as well. Whether they 
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each are as "successful" as the others is a different question, the answer to which will have 
to be found in terms of the research aims of the specific application. In this context, note that 
then obviously, the same empirical model may be embedded into different conceptual models 
of the same theory. For instance, think of the various models of Einstein's equations - they 
have to be empirically equivalent - which in my sense means that they must have the same 
empirical model - since they are all about the same aspect of reality, although this shared 
empirical model is in each interpretation of the Einsteinian equations isomorphically 
embedded into completely different conceptual models of the general theory of relativity. 
Let us very briefly look at the structuralist approach to these problems. They approach 
the question of underdetermination mostly via what Moulines refers to as "intertheoretical 
links"199• Roughly, (Sneed, 1984: 367) "an intertheoretic relation is a one-to-one 
correspondence a between subsets of the elements of models of T1 and T2 together with a 
general set-theoretic relation>. and a relation p between the potential models ... of T1 and T2 
so that in p-related models ... a-corresponding elements are A-related. . .. thus we may say 
that elements e1 and e2 in the models for T, and T2 are 'the same' if there is an intertheoretical 
relation <a,>., p> between T1 and T2 so that>. is the identity relation on sets and o(e,,e2)''. 
Sneed (1984) remarks that in a case where the purely formal properties of all the 
theoretical elements of theories are exactly the same - i.e. Mp(T) = Mp(T') - but the basic 
laws of the two theories differ, the meanings of the theoretical elements are different in the 
different theories. In the non-statement sense in which "giving" the axioms of a theory means 
"giving" the set of models of the theory in question - i.e. all structures that satisfy these 
axioms - it is the case that the "meaning" - I prefer "reference" - of theoretical terms will 
be "different" if the "basic laws" - i.e. axioms - of two theories differ. However since these 
theories' framework conditions may still be the same - in Sneed's sense of their potential 
models being identical - I should think that it would still be possible to see continuity 
between the theories. Be that as it may, a difference in empirical laws resulting in different 
reference for theoretical terms is surely to be expected? I can only think that the usual 
underdetermination insecurities are lurking somewhere in Sneed's mind in the sense of 
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different sets of empirical laws with identical potential models turning out to have the same 
partial potential models - i.e. intended applications. Underdetermination's sting however 
may be much reduced in model-theoretic terms as shall be discussed below. 
As example of a case of meaning change for terms referring to theoretical individuals, 
he (Sneed, 1984: 365 - 366) gives the following analysis of terms referring to electrons in 
classical electrodynamics and terms referring to electrons in relativistic electrodynamics. 
According to Sneed (ibid.) the two theories have the same partial potential models but not the 
same potential models. Well, this agrees with the description of sets of partial potential 
models as theory-independent subsets of the set of potential models of the theory. The 
empirical claim concerning electrons in each case will show each partial potential model as 
being in the specific theory's core and so "tum" the relevant potential model in question "into" 
an actual model of the relevant theory. Sneed (1984: 366) writes "[a]ssuming the pre-
theoretical description I of the intended applications and the reduction relation p are the 
same, then the relevant [theoretical individual kind terms]200 ••• can have the same denotation 
only if the denotation of both lie wholly within the intersection of the contents of T1 and T2". 
For instance, Sneed (1984: 361) claims that classical rigid body mechanics (T') reduces 
to Newtonian particle mechanics (T) in the following terms (ibid.): T'reduces to T via a 
reduction relation p in which the individuals of T' - i.e. rigid bodies - correspond to sets of 
individuals of T - i.e. particles. By the reduction relation p, every intended application of T' 
(i.e. a member of I) may be conceived as a set of Newtonian particles in several ways and 
are intended applications of T that are not "identified" with rigid bodies. Thus Sneed (1984: 
360) writes "[r]oughly, rigid bodies are 'conceptualised' as certain kinds of Newtonian particle 
systems. Those Newtonian particle systems of this kind which, in addition, satisfy the laws 
of Newtonian particle mechanics 'make up' rigid bodies that satisfy the laws of classical rigid 
body mechanics". 
Two terms can however not be theoretical in both theories (Sneed, 1984: 367). They are 
either non-theoretic in T1 and theoretic in T2, or non-theoretic in both. This is kind of obvious, 
though, as Sneed (1984: 368) explains: "For the kind of intertheoretic relation required for an 
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element to be regarded as 'the same' in two theories is just the kind that is a necessary 
condition for a theory-independent determination of the element." The only way in which the 
same element may appear theoretical in two different theories is that there are no methods 
of determining (ibid.) it in either theory. This is entirely possible, although, as Sneed (ibid.) 
points out no real life examples come to mind, probably, he (ibid.) claims, because the lack 
of such determination possibilities would make us view such theoretical elements as without 
any "empirical content" (ibid.). These terms can however be theoretical in both theories in 
model-theoretic terms. Moreover this can indeed be determined - independent (or not) of 
each other - in terms of the conceptual interpretations of these terms offered by the various 
models of the two theories concerned. 
This point becomes more obvious in Van Fraassen's terms. Recall that according to him 
(Van Fraassen, 1976: 631) a theory is empirically adequate if "all appearances are 
isomorphic to empirical substructures in at least one of its models". Van Fraassen's answer 
to the implications of the notion of underdetermination is given in terms of the empirical 
strength of a theory. He (Van Fraassen, 1980: 67) writes: "If for every model M of [theory] T 
there is a model M' of T' such that all empirical substructures of M are isomorphic to 
empirical substructures of M', then T is empirically at least as strong as T' [sic]" - put in this 
way it seems rather as if it is T'that is empirically at least as strong as T. Earlier Van 
Fraassen (1976: 631) wrote that "Theories T and T' [each being as least as strong as the 
other in the above sense] are empirically equivalent exactly if neither is empirically stronger 
than the other. In that case ... each is empirically adequate if and only if the other is".201 
In these terms he (Van Fraassen, 1980: 59) discusses the "classic" example of 
underdetermination related to the fact that in classical mechanics all measurements may be 
reduced to measurements of time and position, and (ibid.: 60) writes: " ... if two bodies have 
different masses and if they were brought near a third body ... they would exhibit different 
acceleration. But ... there are models of mechanics ... in which a complete specification of the 
basic observable quantities does not suffice to determine the values of all the other 
quantities. Thus the same observable phenomena equally fit more than one distinct model 
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of the theory".202 Van Fraassen (1980: 60, 61) explains that the various different treatments 
of "mass" offered by the axiomatic theories of mechanics developed in this century "are 
demonstrably empirically equivalent [in his terms of his definition of the term) ... Therefore 
from the point of view of empirical adequacy, they are indeed equal". 
A last remark on underdetermination in model-theoretic terms. Van Fraassen (1980: 63, 
64) claims that realists" ... wish to play down ... underdetermination, arguing that any precise 
definition of empirical adequacy and empirical equivalence will lead to the conclusion that a 
physical theory is completely adequate only if it is true". A model-theoretic realist rather 
claims that if theories are empirically adequate, it means they are true in certain models the 
empirical substructures of which conceptualise the empirical data of the relevant real system. 
Van Fraassen (ibid.) agrees that physical theories describe "much more than what is 
observable" (ibid.). However it is still the empirical adequacy of the theory in question that 
really matters. He (Van Fraassen, 1980: 64) claims that the notion of empirical adequacy 
does not "collapse• into a mere notion of (metaphysical) truth, since "it relates the theory to 
the actual phenomena (and not to anything which would happen if the world were different, 
assertions ... which ... have, to my [Van Fraassen's] mind, no basis in fact but reflect only the 
background theories with which they operate)" (ibid.). The point that Van Fraassen wants to 
make here is, I think, that empirical adequacy offers us a way in which we can delimit all the 
talk about the various possible models of some theory so that we can show one of these 
models to be actually about some real system. Van Fraassen of course would only agree that 
it can be shown that some model is about the phenomena in some real system and not that 
this fact somehow links the theory to the relevant real system as well. Since in model-
theoretic terms the models of a theory both interpret the theory and conceptualise the aspects 
of the real system in question, here it is argued that the property of empirical adequacy 
concretises not only (at least one of) the models of some theory, but also the theory itself. 
Empirical adequacy of a theory thus does not collapse into a simple notion of "truth" but rather 
in a more subtle way, it collapses into the notion of "articulated reference respecting the 
data". 
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Related to the problems of underdetermination are problems concerning the "extension" 
of theoretic terms. Sneed (1983: 352) thinks - correctly - that "[!]he meaning of terms 
referring to theoretical elements in a theory depends on the theory's empirical claims and may 
change as the theory develops naturally". Let us see what he (Sneed, 1983: 352, 353) views 
as the "meaning" of a theoretical term such as the mass function in Newtonian mechanics. 
First he (ibid.) claims that we have to know the extension of the theoretical terms itself, i.e. 
the extension of "mass". At first the denotation of the term may be taken (ibid.) in terms of a 
particular set of ordered pairs <particle, real number> (i.e. a function). This will not do, 
however, according to Sneed (ibid.), since there is no specific absolutely fixed set of mass 
values that scientists necessarily have to use. (They may, for instance, change the units in 
which mass is measured.) Then the extension of mass may perhaps be extended such that 
it includes "all 'acceptable' assignments [of values] in actual applications" (ibid.). But this 
would in its tum have to be extended to include all as yet "undiscovered" mass assignments. 
(All of this is basically an example of the underdetermination of "mass" by the theory in 
question's individual models.) 
The problem of the extensions of theoretical terms takes on a different character in 
model-theoretic terms, because the notion of a scientific theory serves all the while as a kind 
of touchstone for its various models. In this sense, extensions of theoretical terms are given 
in terms of the models of a particular theory. The interpretative function of conceptual models 
replaces the old rigid statement approach notion of "bridge" principles. The point of a model-
theoretic realism is exactly that instead of offering simply one intended model of "reality'', a 
theory is depicted as a way of constructing or specifying a collection of alternative models, 
each of which represents, explains, and predicts different aspects of the same (or different) 
real system(s). Newtonian dynamics offers a theory that is true of some real systems and has 
many different - very familiar - models - e.g. the harmonic oscillator and a two-body 
system in which one point mass moves in a closed orbit around the other (strictly speaking 
both move around their joint centre of mass). 
The issues concerning the extensions of theories come down to another related issue, 
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namely the "unfixability" of the set of intended applications - the conceptual and there-in 
embedded empirical models in my terms - of a given theory. Sneed (1983: 353) remarks 
that certain specialised laws may be added to the "basic" (ibid.) laws in the core of some 
theory. For instance (ibid.) "[t]he 'theory element' containing [Newton's second and third laws, 
i.e. the 'basic' laws of Newton's theory) alone determines one extension for 'mass', given the 
range of intended applications. If we add the requirement that only 'gravitational' forces 
appear in some subset of the range of intended applications, we impose additional 
requirements on the entire array of mass functions and thereby change the extension of 
'mass' in Newtonian particle mechanics .... In part, as the specialisation net grows the 
extension of 'mass' could be narrowed down so much that the mass function for the entire 
range of intended applications [is) uniquely determined 'up to a change in units"'. In model-
theoretic terms also, the class of models can be "narrowed down" by strengthening the 
axioms of the theory2°3, which are close to the structuralist "basic" or "proper" empirical laws 
of the theory. 
A model-theoretic realism implies that a naive interpretation of incommensurability is a 
rather empty philosophical notion that has no real bearing on the process of science. Such 
a model-theoretic account of science makes it possible to examine technically various formal 
relations between different theories and their interpretations. Examples of such relations are: 
• The interpretability of language L1 in language ~ - in which every primitive term of L, 
becomes a defined term in ~. 
• The interpretability of theory T1 (in L1) in theory T2 (in L2) - where L1 is interpreted in L2 
and all the sentences of T 1 as interpreted in ~ become sentences of T 2• 
• Limiting interpretations - where terms of L1 become, when some limit is taken, 
equivalent to terms of L2. For instance Einsteinian mass (which depends on velocity) 
becomes Newtonian mass (which is independent of velocity) in the limit when the 
velocity is very small compared to the velocity of light. 
Aspects like these and many more similar considerations must be taken into account when 
considering whether two theories are incommensurable or not. Only then could one 
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eventually come to a definition (or probably different definitions) of what "incommensurability'' 
may mean, and then continue to treat it technically. 
5.6 Conclusion 
A last few remarks on the scope of a model-theoretic realism such as the one 
expounded in this chapter. In Chapters 1 and 2 I have mentioned that although I am 
concentrating on the natural sciences, this kind of model-theoretic account is probably 
applicable to the social sciences as well. It should be obvious though that different levels of 
both the formulative and the interpretative chains of such a model of science will be 
emphasised differently. For instance, the typical sociology of science fixation with analysing 
the nature of the particular scientific community in question, and the typical constructivist 
dependence on the theoretical framework in question, both at least result in emphasising the 
role these factors play in the process of science. At most these schools of thought have 
shown that sciences more vulnerable to the influence of these factors (sometimes to the 
exclusion of factors such as empirical testability - think of the interpretation of the fine arts 
and literary studies) should be treated differently from those who do not have this ''weakness". 
A model-theoretic realism nicely caters for both these points. It is obvious that the 
construction of both the conceptual intended and the interpretative models of some theory 
would be a far more complex enterprise in the social sciences than in the empirical sciences. 
However, at the same time, a model-theoretic account of science is the one consistent 
account available I know of that acknowledges and addresses the role of typical socio-
constructivist features of the growth of scientific knowledge. Kuhn (1977: 295) points out that 
if the term "paradigm" is to be fully understood, "scientific communities must first be 
recognised as having an independent existence". The same goes for understanding the 
development of scientific theories - from their origin to their applications - in a model-
theoretic context. 
Ian Hacking (in Tauber, 1997: 163) sets out two types of realism, i.e. realism about 
theories, and realism about entities. He (ibid.) describes realism about theories as a result 
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of our desire to" ... form true theories about the world, about the inner construction of matter 
and about the outer reaches of space", while he (ibid.) claims that realism about entities" ... 
asserts the existence of at least some of the entities that are the stock in trade of physics", 
and he (ibid.) understands by "entities" for instance "processes, states, waves, currents, 
interactions, fields, black holes". A model-theoretic realist is mostly a realist about entities, 
with the understanding that these entities are described (and their behaviour explained) by 
scientific theories and their conceptual and empirical models. 
Fine (1986a: 150) claims that the process of science has a teleological side in the sense 
that " ... the significance that realism attaches to science lends itself to the view that what 
science does ... is exactly what it aims to do. Thus we get the realist slogan that science aims 
at the truth, with the realist connection between truth and the World being understood". In 
model-theoretic terms the aim of science simply is to offer certain idealised "insights" into the 
complex workings of "Nature". No statements about "absolute truth" or the unqualified "truth 
of scientific theories" are offered in such an approach and ii is shown that such notions are 
empty concoctions left over from the philosophy of science practised during the first half of 
the twentieth century. Rather, systems in reality may be explained in terms of certain models 
interpreting a certain scientific theory. Scientific theories cannot be universally true, but 
merely true in (a) particular conceptual model(s) of it. 
Moreover, these theories' statements are never meant to apply universally in a ceteris 
paribus way. Scientific theories are formulated ceteris paribus (see my discussion in Chapter 
4), however, their application and interpretation are context-specific, i.e. model-specific, and 
never f1Xed in any unqualified way. The closer we get to systems in reality, the fewer of these 
ceteris paribus conditions we need. Models are idealisations of real systems. However these 
ideal circumstances in which the theory is shown to be true are not as they are by virtue of 
the fact that all other things remain equal, but are rather the results of focussing on a specific 
real system and constructing a particular model driven by the scientific tradition, application 
goal, and other "thematic" factors present. 
It is moreover precisely because of the idealised nature of models that we still have the 
188 
possibility of having contact with reality given the abstracting way in which science and its 
enterprises operate. Idealisation does not mean universalisation, however. It is precisely 
because the model is so specific - in terms of its focus on selected features of some real 
system - that it is so ideal. This however in no way implies that no links with the "real 
complex" systems are possible, but rather that these links are established and checked in a 
certain specific (scientific) way, i.e. a model-theoretic way. 
The slogan of a model-theoretic realism is "truth without universality". This is meant in 
the sense that it is the specific model-theoretic kind of truth that is at issue, and that theories 
are never examined for their relevance to reality in their stark linguistic terms, but always in 
terms of their (conceptual) interpretations in their various models. Theories in this sense are 
not viewed merely as general knowledge propositions, but rather as the means of organising 
systems of their models in such a way that certain systems in reality can be (empirically) 
"embedded" into these models. 
A last remark on the nature of scientific reality. Trivially, for those who assume that 
science is about independent "Nature", we all address the "same reality''. However, the notion 
of a particular "scientific reality'' - that I have claimed above to be constructed and to offer 
"snapshots" of "Nature" - can also be communicated and shared although it may well be that 
no objective (neutral) way exists to describe it, precisely because of its model-theoretic origin 
and its changing historical context. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
6.1 The meaning of a model-theoretic realism for philosophy of science 
A model-theoretic approach to science supersedes and encompasses the best aspects 
of both the statement and non-statement accounts of scientific knowledge. Although in both 
the latter accounts - albeit in different ways - it seems that the notion of a scientific "theory" 
- however this notion is interpreted - may be given some realist interpretation at least, the 
unnatural (and simply wrong) rigidity of the statement approach's correspondence rules as 
well as the non-statement disconnectedness of scientific theories and their models do not 
allow for reference to reality in a satisfactory way. In a model-theoretic approach a scientific 
theory is a certain (deductively closed) set of sentences linguistically expressed.204 The 
conceptual embodiments of the contents of these theories are done via their models and the 
referential relations in question in a realist context are determined both by the empirical 
substructure, isomorphically embedded in some conceptual model of the relevant theory, and 
by the nature of the real system in question. By maintaining such an encompassing 
interpretational link from the theories themselves all the way through their models to some 
real system(s) the complicated and changing character of science may be described and 
accounted for in a more adequate way than is perhaps the case with some statement and 
non-statement approaches to science. 
The problem haunting philosophers dabbling in more metaphysical aspects of scientific 
theories - like Bhaskar and the later Cartwright - is exactly to show that - and how -
through the complicated contingencies of science a given scientist is still dealing with the 
same physical phenomenon as her predecessors and her peers. These considerations are 
related to the underdetermination issue, since the problem is to show that the scientist in 
question can "get to" the same phenomenon whichever theory (from the class of theories 
underdetermined by the phenomenon in question) she chooses to use. And, in this sense, 
Cartwright's capacities - in as far as they somehow have some stabilising influence on the 
"complex uncontrollability" of nature - may indeed seem to have a lot going for them. She 
(Cartwright in Boyd et al., 1991: 386) writes: "Competing theoretical treatments - treatments 
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that write down different laws for the same phenomena - are encouraged in physics, but 
only a single causal story is allowed. Although philosophers generally believe in laws and 
deny causes, explanatory practice in physics is just the reverse". First, we know that science 
is not about stabilising in the sense of somehow changing the complexity of Nature into a 
controlled system. Rather science is about offering a glimpse as it were of some specific 
aspect of Nature. Such a representation of Nature is perhaps "stable" in so far that it focuses 
only on relevant features of the aspect of nature it concentrates on at a given time. However 
a model-theoretic realism shows that underdetermination - in a sense the converse of 
allowing only a "single causal story" - is a necessary characteristic of science, since the 
abstracting nature of the methodology of science specifically implies that other routes to the 
same condusions are possible under a different abstraction from the same aspect of nature. 
The necessity of looking to Nature - and, in philosophy of science terms, thus perhaps 
turning to metaphysics - for solutions to the supposed puzzles concerning 
underdetermination dissolves within the framework of a model-theoretic realism. As pointed 
out in Chapter 5, the main assumption of such a realism concerning Nature is simply that it 
(i.e. Nature) exists independently of science. This basic condition is emphasised and worked 
out by the model-theoretic insistence on the roles that both science - in the guise of a 
specific conceptual model of a given theory having isomorphically embedded into it a certain 
empirical model - and Nature - in the sense of the characteristics of some real system 
satisfying the empirical results embodied by the specific empirical model in question - play 
in the processes of science. No metaphysical characteristic of Nature somehow worked into 
the mechanics of science is necessary to make sense of a scientifically realist picture of 
Nature. Rather the definition of the methodology and strategies - and aim - of science, 
model-theoretically interpreted, already takes care of all of that. And, a scientist can "know'' 
that she is working with the "same phenomenon", even if using "different" theories, simply 
because of the possibility of analyses that a model-theoretic realism offers of the different 
empirical links between different empirical models of different conceptual models in (perhaps) 
different theories. Detailed analyses of these empirical links will reveal common factors on 
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the reality side of the link (e.g. light blobs observed through different telescopes by different 
people at different times indicating - by careful analyses - a common factor called 
"Neptune") which entails the "same phenomenon". There is, however, no universal 
prescription for these analyses. 
Closely related to this is Putnam's so-called model-theoretic "paradox" (see Putnam, 
1978)205• Van Fraassen (1997: 18) points out that if the criteria narrowing down the relevant 
interpretation of the language in question are "solely internal" (ibid.} such that "certain 
sentences must come out true (since they reflect our intensions about how to use the 
language)" (ibid.), then, yes, it seems as if indeed practically any theory is true. Model-
theoretically speaking it is part of the basic conditions of science (here in contrast to 
mathematics and logic) that these criteria are never solely internal. A "successful" mapping 
between the individuals of an empirical model embedded into a conceptual model of a given 
theory and the entities and relations of some real system depends just as heavily on the 
nature of the real system as it does on the logical relations of satisfaction between the theory, 
its conceptual model(s}, and its empirical model(s). Van Fraassen (1997: 20) points out the 
trivial fact that not only does one such a mapping consist in Putnam's ideal case (see 
Endnote #205 above}, but indeed obviously many such mappings exist. The actual question 
thus is: how do we know which one to pick? Well, again, we do not do anything as trivial as 
merely "picking''. A "successful" mapping is determined both by our scientific activities that 
gel finally into a certain empirical model of a given theory, and by the real system of which 
the empirical model in question is offering a certain (scientific) image. That is why the notion 
of scientific truth model-theoretically interpreted is a referential notion without any necessary 
metaphysical content. 
Turning to a related issue, Van Fraassen (1997: 36) explains the problem concerning 
the "fixing" of the reference of language terms as follows: " ... each of our predicates has an 
extension, and might have had a different extension. But unless they have the right extension, 
we can't use our language to frame genuine, non-trivial empirical statements or theories. So, 
under what conditions do they have, or acquire, the right extensions?" (ibid.). Later on he 
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(ibid.:37) comments that we obviously do not do any kind of fixing and whether Nature does 
any kind of "glueing" is not really a sensible question - in any absolute sense I might add. 
This leads us to the historical note in the next section of this chapter that concerns the 
nominalist-realist divide regarding the nature of reference, and so the very definition of 
language terms (including so-called "universal terms"). Model-theoretically speaking, 
language has to be interpreted nominalistically so that science can be interpreted realistically. 
Only if we can handle the fact that there are no fixed one-to-one unique mappings between 
universal language terms and objects in reality, do we have a chance of making sense of 
underdetermination and the unfixability of Nature. Paradoxical as this may sound, this is the 
only non-metaphysical way to be a scientific realist. The suppleness of model-theoretic 
realism is the only answer to the seeming chaos of underdetermination - and also of 
"overdetermination", in the trivial sense of "Blue" not denoting only "truly blue" (whatever that 
may mean) objects. 
Promising research areas in philosophy of science that successfully use model-theory 
and its interpretation of science are for instance the work being done in the area of 
verisimilitude, and analyses of the entire experimental enterprise of science - the empirical 
aspect of science is extremely underrepresented in philosophy of science and a model-
theoretic account of science offers a challenge to philosophers to rectify this. 206 
6.2 Historical note 
Traditionally there are basically two views of language and its terms: nominalism and 
realism. Typically nominalists deny the existence of universals. That is they do not support 
the existence of the referents of general terms such as "flower'', or "blue". They claim the 
resemblances between particular entities are sufficient to justify application of the same 
general term to all of such entities, and thus deny the need to appeal to any other (universal) 
entity to classify individual things. Realists traditionally have protested that such an approach 
still implies at least a tacit implication of reliance on universals since the act of classification 
of things common to a certain set of individual entities implies a resemblance in some general 
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respect. In other words realism with regard to particulars rests on some kind of realism about 
at least some universals, namely those that are the reputed referents of bona fide natural kind 
terms. More recently, nominalism usually implies the refusal to acknowledge the existence 
of abstract entities in general, whether they be particular or universal. Nominalists thus have 
a rather less rigid approach than the typical (naive) realist attitude to the problem of reference 
in so far as they claim that general terms - i.e. "universals" - may exist only for the purpose 
of language and need not "correspond" to "real" entities at all. 
Before we discuss the model-theoretic position with regard to these issues, let us briefly 
examine the notion of an abstract entity or "universal" a little closer. The usual Platonic realist 
interpretation of these tenms concludes that abstract entities have necessary existence, given 
that they have no causes or effects and no spatio-temporal location. Traditionally universals 
are taken to be the supposed referents of general terms like "flower" and "blue" and as such 
are thought to be entities distinct from any of the particular things describable by these terms. 
Plalonists therefore claim that there has to be something by virtue of which all things 
describable as blue are indeed blue. Aristotelian thoughts on this issue however come down 
lo almost opposite claims: the universal "blue" exists only inseparably from the existence of 
particular blue things. According to Aristotle only particulars can be genuine subjects and so 
universals can only be predicates of subjects - and obviously then never be subjects of 
predication themselves. In the Platonist scheme of things though, it is entirely possible to 
have predications with universals as subjects. Aristotle claimed the universal to be grasped 
by the mental process of abstraction207 , while Plato thought the existence of universals to be 
completely mind-independent. 
In the twentieth century philosophers such as Russell and the early Wittgenstein 
continued in the more conservative realist tradition which seems to subscribe to the belief that 
there is only one language and only one reality and that these two should only be linked in 
one-to-one relations.206 Quine and Kripke also seem to have been fighting mainly on this side 
of the battle. The notion of a so-called "rigid" designator for instance supposedly captures the 
idea that throughout a// possible worlds there are words that refer to the same individual. The 
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relations can vary but never the basic entities. It is necessary that certain things are named 
in certain ways (or by certain terms).209 I think it probable that somehow underlying all such 
approaches is the belief in some notion of absolute truth such that it is not allowed to 
arbitrarily ascribe "reality" to general terms. Nancy Cartwright's work on the lying laws of 
physics offers an interesting - albeit perhaps not a "typical" - case in point. The need to 
claim that these laws "lie" seems to me to be the direct result of some kind of notion 
concerning absolute truth. Why else should it matter that these laws can be concretised in 
so many different ways?210 
During the last three or four decades there have been two kinds of reaction against the 
typical one-world-one-language account of the nature of abstract entities. The first radical 
reaction is offered to us by the so-called "postmodern" notions of language and world that, 
in their extreme forms, seem to imply that Rorty's smashing of the "mirror of nature" 
eliminated all the chances - if there ever were any - to be able to describe reality - as 
"Nature" - at all. A more rational, rather than radical, reaction to the strict realist account of 
the reference of general terms is offered by a model-theoretic realism. The defenders of such 
a realism try to get some kind of a grip on the many-to-many relations between language and 
the models in which the sentences of the relevant language are true, and show that "truth" 
should be interpreted referentially in model-theoretic terms and never in terms of an infinite 
cancelling or postponing of meaning. 
Within such an approach it is neither assumed - as in the case of defenders of 
formalism perhaps - that language expressions are merely "black marks" on white paper or 
air vibrations that can mean absolutely anything, nor is it claimed that abstract terms have 
any pre-determined reference or meaning. A model-theoretic realism escapes the extreme 
nominalist features of an approach such as that offered by so-called formalists because in 
model-theoretic terms not merely syntactical factors211 are at issue, but also - most 
importantly - issues of semantics come into play. Tarski, Montague, and Adams may be 
viewed as some of the pioneers of this stream in philosophical thought with regard to the 
nature of abstract terms. There is however among model-theoretic advocates also some 
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sympathy for the Platonic ideals. Perhaps Godel offers the best example of Platonism in the 
philosophy of mathematics while physicists such as Stephen Hawking may also be a bit 
tainted in this respect. In these - more Platonic - circles the mathematical tools most used 
are those of set theory and number theory. 212 Model-theoretic realists however give more 
attention to abstract algebras213 - concerned with notions such as rings, groups, and vector 
spaces. These notions allow one to work with terms that do not necessarily always refer to 
the same things. 
This is the basis of model-theoretic realism: the same language (theoretical) terms can 
refer to more than one entity in some model of the language (theory), ·and also the same 
object - or range of objects - in some real system can be given reference by more than one 
model. As mentioned above, it is these referential relations between language terms and the 
terms in the model of the language in question that may solve the problems concerning the 
referential relations of Quine and Duhem's underdetermination. 
Jaakko Hintikka (1989: 53) characterises the traditional nominalist-realist divide in terms 
of language as calculus and language as (the) universal medium. He (ibid.) explains the latter 
notion as essentially an attempt to " ... escape our language and ... look at it and its logic from 
the outside". This renders a model-theoretic realism "impossible" (ibid.) since the semantics 
- because of its supposed absolute character - of the relevant language becomes 
"inexpressible". From the more nominalist, "language as calculus", point of view however, the 
semantics of the relevant language becomes expressible to such a high degree that the 
notion of its interpretation as absolute becomes completely untenable. Hintikka (1989: 54) 
writes: "The term 'language as calculus' is not calculated to indicate that on this view 
language would be a meaningless jeu de caracteres - that is not the idea at all. Rather the 
operative word highlights the thesis that language is freely re-interpretable, like a calculus". 
This, essentially, is what the notion of "epistemological relativism214" in my account is meant 
to imply too. 
Hintikka (1989: 55) continues to point out that the re-interpretability of our language, 
according to the "language as calculus" view, implies that we can " ... chose freely also the 
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'universe of discourse' as it [the relevant language terms) is designed to apply to• (ibid.). This 
is very much in accordance with the fact that a model-theoretic realism claims to have the 
ability only to show that some theoretical terms are "about" certain aspects - systems - in 
reality. Given the abstractive selective nature of science - as discussed above in Chapters 
2 and 5 - and given this "free" choice of domain of interpretation215, it seems obvious that 
a model-theoretic realism of science is at least very promising. 
However, again, as Hintikka points out too (see above quote), this "choice" is not free 
to any absurd extent. In philosophy of science terms the "restraining" factor lies in the fact that 
a theory's terms - or some of them at least - may be shown to refer to some entities and 
objects of some real system not only because of the nature of the specific model interpreting 
the relevant theoretical terms at a certain time. Such an interpretation offers the necessary 
basic platform from which theoretical reference can be determined, but is by no means the 
final word. The final word is given by empirical data which constitute some empirical 
substructure of the relevant model on the one hand, and which represents a 
conceptualisation of features manifested by real interactions with the relevant real system on 
the other hand. 
Thus, it is in a sense both the "way'' in which the world "is" (conceptualised via the 
specific empirical model in question) and the theoretical - abstract - terms of the theory 
(interpreted via the specific conceptual model in question) that determine any articulation of 
possible reference. A model-theoretic realism thus displays a referential rather than a 
correspondence attitude towards the real systems science is "about". And, since the basic 
assumption of a model-theoretic realism is that science is about (human-independent) 
"Nature" via the descriptions and explanations of certain real systems offered by science's 
idealised models of the theory in question, any accusations of "rigging" the models of a theory 
such that the theory "really" refers - or anything akin to such claims - are rather absurd. 
In conclusion, the Aristotelian orientation of a model-theoretic realism can finally be 
given its rightful recognition. According to a model-theoretic realism such as mine, the general 
exists only in the particular. The meaning of the general and the particular are inseparably 
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entwined. My criticism against the non-statement approach is based on this notion of the 
nature of general terms, since merely "giving" the theory "in terms of' its mathematical 
structures leaves out any real interpretation of the nature and role of general terms in the 
interpretation of science. This might be viewed - and I am sure it is in certain circles - as 
a rather clever method of escaping the debates remarked on above. However it is my 
conviction that science cannot be made to be meaningful without these terms. 
The essential link between the general terms of scientific theories and their interpretation 
in the various models of the theory regulates the rest of the referential process. In this sense, 
I prefer not to speak of the "universal" terms of a theory since these terms never have 
absolute interpretations. The terms of a theory are "general" in the sense that they are the 
result of certain abstractive manipulations of the object of scientific investigation at a certain 
time. Their (particular) meaning can be "given back" only by interpreting them in the limited 
context of the various conceptual models of their theory and, finally, by finding an isomorphic 
relation between a substructure of the conceptual model in question and some empirical 
conceptualisation (model) of relevant experimental data. In this sense the notion of scientific 
'1ruth" becomes inextricably linked with that of reference, as it - given its model-dependent 
nature - should be. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Hilary Putnam's term. 
2. See Carnap (1958). 
3. Closely related to the structuralist approach is the approach of Ludwig (1990), which I 
shall not analyse here, but which is worth mentioning, since it is clearly important, 
although it does not receive much attention in the English literature on philosophy of 
science. 
4. Przelewski (1969) analyses the structure of scientific theories in terms of theories 
formulated in first-order predicate logic. He wants to develop an empirical semantics for 
such theories, and thus needs to offer some analysis of the empirical interpretation of the 
basic predicates of scientific theories. He offers this analysis in model-theoretic terms: 
"In part, an interpretation of a given language is identified with a model theoretic entity 
- a model M of language L. M assigns to each non-logical constant of L a suitable set-
theoretic entity as its denotation. Thus, e.g., a one-place predicate of Lis interpreted by 
M as denoting a certain set of objects from the universe of L. ... my ultimate aim [in 
(1969)) has been to answer the question ... how is an empirical interpretation possible 
... " (Przelewski, 1974:401, 402). Tuomela (1972b, 1974) goes to great lengths to point 
out the problems involved in Przelewski's assumptions concerning the fixing of the 
universe of the language L in advance - which Przelewski claims is necessary to do in 
order to "explain the fact of empirical interpretations" (Przelewski, 1974:404). 
5. See Przelewski and Wojcicki, 1969. 
6. Pearce and Rantala (1983) claim that they offer a view in which theories are "abstract 
systems" free of any explicit logical interpretation. This is very interesting, especially 
since it seems to allow for problems concerning theories too complex to reconstruct in 
elementary terms, and also since it makes it possible to allow the choice of logic to be 
an extra-logical (maybe philosophical?) issue. 
7. Note that in both the statement and non-statement approach the rational reconstruction 
of a scientific theory is given in terms of an uninterpreted language, which implies, in 
principle, the possibility of an unlimited number of interpretations of the language. 
However, in both cases the possible interpretations of the uninterpreted language are 
limited at least in the following senses. In the statement approach any interpretation must 
satisfy the axioms of the theory, and in the non-statement approach an interpretation 
must belong to the described class of structures. 
8. According to Tarski (1956) a model of theory Tis a possible realisation in which all valid 
sentences of the theory T are satisfied. 
9. "To define formally a model as a set-theoretical entity which is a certain kind of ordered 
tuple consisting of a set of objects and relations and operations on these objects is not 
to rule out the physical model of the kind which is appealing to physicists, for the physical 
model may be simply taken to define the set of objects in the set-theoretical model" 
(Suppes, 1960: 290, 291 ). Instead of "define" it would be preferable to say "be in one-to-
one correspondence with". Mathematical sets of non-mathematical objects are 
problematic. See my comments on this issue in Chapter 3. 
10. I shall from now on sometimes speak of Newton's "theory'' when referring to his laws of 
motion and his law of gravitation. 
11. See also Hesse, M. 1963. Models and analogies in science. As Redhead (1980, 149) 
remarks, Hesse does however point to the role of mathematical models in the 
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development of theories, although she pays much more attention to the role of models 
in science in terms of analogies. 
12. I am not implying here of course that these models are "necessarily true" depictions of 
systems in reality, but simply wish to point out that here at least the possibility of such a 
turn of events is possible, albeit by very complex ways. I shall come back often to this 
point. 
13. An example that nicely illustrates the relation between Hesse's analogous models and 
so-called iconic models is given in Da Costa & French, 1990: 250: They write "In a 
nucleus ... there are too few particles for a statistical treatment, and there is no overriding 
centre of force which would enable us to treat the forces between nucleus as small 
perturbations. For this reason, physicists have fallen back on the 'as if methods of attack, 
also known ... as the method of nuclear models. This method consists of looking around 
for a physical system, the 'model', with which we are familiar and which in some of its 
properties resembles the nucleus. The physics of the models are then investigated and 
it is hoped that any properties discovered will also be properties of the nucleus .... In this 
way the nucleus has been treated 'as if it were a gas, a liquid drop, an atom, and several 
other things". 
14. The arguments that Da Costa and French (1990: 260) offer in support of their claim that 
models can only be false do not have anything to do with mathematical models, but only 
with the use of models as iconic models. Therefore they can only be allowed to conclude 
that iconic models are false, which in the first place is rather obvious, given the 
analogous "as if' role of these models, and in the second place this kind of remark is not 
really very important in the context of surveying the model-theoretic (in terms of 
mathematical models) interpretation of science. 
15. Redhead (1980: 147) remarks that models are used as "impoverished theories" if a 
theory is so complicated that it is very difficult to draw any kind of empirical conclusion 
from it, since comparisons between the theory and experimental results prove to be too 
complex. He also shows clearly that the role of these kind of models is not to be confused 
with the role a Tarskian model plays in the process of science: - " ... the important 
ingredient ... [is] that [the model] and [the theory] logically contradict each other, so that 
we believe [the model] to be false insofar we believe [the theory] to be true" (Redhead, 
1980: 147). 
16. Note that also theories which are proved somehow empirically inadequate through 
experimental or some other type of empirical investigation, tum into "impoverished 
theories" - for example (Redhead, 1980: 147) Maxwell's kinetic theory of gases is now 
known as the billiard ball model of gases. 
17. See Ruttkamp, 1997a, as well as Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
18. In my scheme of things, only the "intended" model of some theory has the potential to 
develop into a "full-fledged theory''. See my explanation and discussion of these notions 
in Chapter 2. 
19. See Suppes's example of Mach's research in Suppes, 1960: 296. 
20. See Van Fraassen, 1980, pp.45ff., and Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
21. Suppes and Giere and Wojcicki all seem to think that scale models and - even more 
physical perhaps - models of aeroplanes and cars are at least part of the notion of a 
"physical" model. In my terms part of the conceptualising that culminates in the intended 
model may well be directed towards such a type of model - or not, depending on the 
particular line of research in question. (See Chapter 2.) 
200 
22. Note that "physical" here does not necessarily mean concretely physical, but merely 
seNes to show the more "direct" link with the real system of reality being examined. (See 
endnote #21 as well.) Any activity ending in the construction of a model is conceptual in 
the sense that various activities of abstraction and even idealisation are performed. As 
far as the very few times that an actual concrete model is built go - think for example 
of the model that Watson and Crick (see Giere, 1991) built of the DNA molecular 
structure - I would say that, usually, at the same time some kind of conceptual model 
is also created. 
23. Hausman's (1992, chapter 4) approach seems to bear me out here - he (Hausman, 
1992: 81) remarks for instance that "[e]ven though models in economics need not be as 
abstract as those which characterise mainstream theorising, they will never apply to 
economic reality cleanly. Insofar as one has hopes for economic theory at all, there will 
always be some need to divorce conceptual development and empirical application. 
'Unrealistic' model-making is unavoidable for theoretically inclined economists". 
24. This is supported by Harrod (in Wolfe, 1968: 189) as well, as he concludes his article by 
acknowledging that he would prefer that in science (including social science)" ... the word 
'model' should be confined to formulae relating to posited entities, viz. to entities that we 
can never directly obseNe and about the very existence of which we cannot be sure". 
And he (in Wolfe, 1968: 190) goes on to say that "[i]f we want to bring 'models' into 
economics, but to keep them meaningful, we might confine the term to a system of 
equations, not all of which are tautologies. Some at least might have adjustable 
parameters. It might be made a condition for the use of the word that some equations 
explicitly omit to take account of fringe influences". 
25. Some sections of this chapter will be published as Ruttkamp (1999a). 
26. Although not as common-sensical as Fine's (1986b) "natural ontological attitude" 
perhaps. 
27. One may ask how - and even if - it is possible to distinguish between conceptual and 
linguistic levels without giving a clear and valid answer to the question of whether it is 
possible to think without language. I am however not making rigid distinctions here. What 
I am doing, in fact, is to depict the development of scientific research by emphasising one 
by one the real, conceptual and linguistic aspects of this developmental process. And, 
moreover, I am claiming that there always is interplay between these aspects. 
28. See the conclusion to Chapter 5 for a little more on this issue. 
29. Remember that set theory and hence (most of) mathematics can be formulated in first-
order predicate logic. 
30. In a language such as L, we usually have the following eight categories of basic symbols 
available: 
• a countable infinite set {v;} of individual variables 
• a (possibly empty) set of individual constants 
• a nonempty set {Pal of predicate letters, and, associated with each predicate letter 
Pa• there is a positive integer ~(a) called the arity of Pa , which gives the number of 
individual variables which are predicated by Pa 
• a (possibly empty) set of function symbols 
• the equality symbol "=" 
• logical connectives (details not important for my purposes here) 
• quantifier symbols (ditto) 
• punctuation symbols (ditto). 
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31. A mathematical structure U =<A, {Ra}> consists of a set A, the domain of U, and a set 
of relations Ra (one for each a from some index set) defined on domain A. The sets A 
and {Ra} both may be infinite. A relation R, on domain A is defined as a set of ordered 
µ(a)-tuples of elements from domain A, where µ(a) is a unique non-negative integer 
associated with the relation Ra. 
32. In other words the mathematical structure U will count as an interpretation of the 
language L if and only if the arity of the relations Ra correspond to the arity of the 
predicate letters Pa· (That is, if ii( a) = µ(a).) In this case U is called a realisation of the 
language L (and we can say that Lis appropriate for the structure U). We call the relation 
Ra the value of Pa in the realisation U of language L. (If L has constant and function 
symbols, they are interpreted as elements of A and functions - of the proper arities -
on A.) 
33. E.g., consider the formula Pxy. If P is interpreted as the relation < and if x and y are given 
the values of 3 and 5 respectively, then we say that Pxy is true under that interpretation 
and we say that formula Pxy in language L is satisfied by the valuation in the domain of 
interpretation U, ascribing the given values to variables x and y. (Because 3 is indeed 
smaller than 5.) 
34. Note that a realisation of language L is in principle a realisation of all the sentences in L, 
and this implies that every sentence in L is either true or false in that particular 
realisation. 
35. Einstein referred to these convictions as "free conventions" (Holton, 1995: 464). "These 
themata, to which [he) was obstinately devoted, explain why he would continue his work 
in a given direction even when tests against experience were difficult or unavailable (as 
in General Theory of Relativity), or, conversely, why he refused to accept theories well 
supported by phenomena, but, as in the case of Bohr's quantum mechanics, based on 
presuppositions opposite to his own, ... "(ibid.: 457). 
36. Wojcicki (1994: 142) speaks of a "factual interpretation" of a theory that is determined by 
the "relevant world view'', or the relevant paradigm, research programme, or research 
tradition. He says: "One cannot understand an empirical theory and thus one can know 
neither what the theory is about nor how to form a theoretical model [my "intended" 
model) for specific problems relevant to the theory unless one has some idea what is the 
part (or aspect) of the world to which the theory refers, how this part is related to the 
others, which is the ontology of all these parts, and how both the claims of the theory and 
the empirical data on which it is based are related to the entities whose existence the 
ontology presupposes''. These factors are exactly the kind of factors that, in my terms, 
influence the construction of "intended" models, and that come into play again when the 
models specifically constructed with an eye on interpreting or applying the theory are 
created. 
37. Chalmers (1993, 202) gives another example of these events: "We may abstract the 
falling of [a) ... leaf from other aspects of its motion ... We then apply the appropriate 
fundamental laws [axioms of mostly "background" theories) to [this model) that [is) the 
result of our abstraction. We apply Newton's laws to the leaf as a mass subject to the 
gravitational attraction of the earth only, and derive the law of fall from it. Of course, since 
we have abstracted from winds, air resistance and the like, our model will not in general 
serve to describe the fall of any particular leaf. After all, the model is an abstraction. 
Nevertheless, provided we understand the leaf to have a capacity to fall, governed by 
Newton's laws, the theoretical treatment via the abstract model does explain the falling 
of the leaf, as distinct from its fluttering in the breeze". This is a point about which Nancy 
Cartwright has serious reservations, but with which I am in full agreement. See Chapter 
4 for more on Cartwright. 
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38. Einstein referred to the movement from conceptual structures or models to theories as 
a "creative leap" and in this sense referred to theories as "free creations of the human 
mind". 
39. Kepler's laws: 
• First law: All planets follow elliptical orbits (and not circular ones, as Copernicus believed) 
with the sun situated in one of the foci of the ellipse. 
• Second law: The line connecting the sun and a planet sweeps over equal areas of the 
planetary orbit in equal intervals of time. 
• Third law: The squares of the periods of revolution of different planets around the sun 
stand in the same ratio (i.e. is proportional to) the cubes of their mean distances from the 
sun. 
Newton's three laws of motion: 
• Every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a straight line, unless it 
is compelled to change that state by forces impressed on it. 
• Change of motion is proportional to the force impressed, and is made in the direction of 
the straight line in which the force is impressed. 
• The forces two bodies exert on each other are always equal and opposite in direction. 
His law of gravitation: 
• All material bodies attract each other with a force directly proportional to their masses 
and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. 
40. This is close to Cartwright's notions of the role of scientific explanation and description. 
See Chapter 5. 
41. See the examples of the discoveries of Neptune and Pluto, as well as other applications 
of Newton's theory in the following section. 
42. Another type of approach to the interpretation of language terms is offered by Hans 
Lenk's methodological or schema interpretationism. See for instance Lenk (1993), 
(1995). 
43. Whenever I speak of models of theories, I am referring to the notion of model in the 
Tarskian sense that a model of a theory is an interpretation of the theory under which the 
set of sentences comprising the theory is true. As mentioned in the previous section, at 
the start of theory formulation the intended "model" scientists work with is not (initially) 
such a mathematical model, although at the stage of theory interpretation it becomes 
obvious that such (intended) models can be easily adapted such that they also are 
elements of the set of all (mathematical) models of the theory in question. 
44. These terms are the terms traditionally referred to as "theoretical" terms. Note that 
therefore I do not follow in the footsteps of advocates of the traditional version of the 
statement approach, in the sense that I do not need the kind of inadequate and much too 
simple distinction they make between theoretical and observational terms in the language 
of the theory. Rather than this forced division, I propose an approach in which theoretical 
and observational terms, as well as the difficult "correspondence rules" or "bridge 
principles" supposedly acting between these kinds of terms, all have natural interrelated 
and co-dependent roles to play at various levels of the scientific process. 
45. I claim that Giere's theoretical models, W6jcicki's theoretical and semantic models, and 
Suppes's physical and set-theoretic models are all mathematical models in this sense. 
Some of these authors make a similar kind of distinction that I make between these 
models as "intended" models - W6jcicki's theoretical models and Suppes's physical 
models - and these models as "conceptual models" interpreting the theory - Giere's 
theoretical models, W6jcicki's semantic models, and Suppes's set-theoretic models; 
although not all of them seem to view all these notions as mathematical structures in the 
Tarskian sense. See Chapter 3. 
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46. Kuhn (1g77: 301, 302) also refers to the two conceptual movements needed to 
conceptually move from a theory to some real system - i.e. from the theory to a 
conceptual model of the theory, and then from that model, to an empirical submode! of 
it- albeit in slightly different terms, and even if he claims that these two "questions" are 
usually answered "together" in scientific practice. He (ibid.) asks: "How do scientists 
attach symbolic expressions to nature?", and then he (ibid.) writes: "That is, in fact, two 
questions in one, for it may be asked either about a special symbolic generalisation 
designed for a particular experimental situation or about a singular symbolic 
consequence of that generalisation deduced for comparison with experiment". 
47. And neithercan scientists. The best they can do is to react to unwanted models allowed 
by the theory by refining the theory's set of axioms in such a way that these models 
become impossible. But, obviously this is a very difficult task, especially in the first stages 
of the theory's formulation. And, moreover, trying to define these assumptions too finely, 
could in principle cancel the possibility of refining the theory in a positive way, i.e. in 
becoming aware of shortcomings or even errors in the formulation of the theory, via 
different models of it, offered by other interested scientists. Einstein, for instance, had a 
static universe as his intended model for his general theory of relativity. It so happened, 
however, that other physicists constructed models in which the universe is anything but 
static. Then Einstein, initially rather upset, changed his original set of axioms in order to 
prevent the possibility of constructing such models. (Afterwards he conceded that he 
made a big mistake because of the implications of the expansion of the universe and the 
"Big Bang" model.) 
48. " ... it is always legitimate for scientists to ask and sometimes possible for them to answer, 
questions about whether gasses are really composed of molecules or whether the earth 
really moves. Such questions cannot be rephrased as questions about the plausibility of 
our conceptions" (Bhaskar, 1g78:155). Well, the verification of our conceptual models 
depends on being able to show how experiments concerning the data in question may 
be linked to these models (via certain empirical models). However, what Bhaskar means, 
I think, is rather that science does not determine the structure of reality, but rather 
discovers it. 
4g. Obviously realist issues and the nature of scientific progress are related. I shall here refer 
to the model-theoretic realism I advocate only when necessary to illustrate or support my 
claims about the cumulative nature of scientific knowledge. The issue of model-theoretic 
realism will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
50. See Heidema, J. & H.J. Schutte (1g78). 
51. See Einstein, 1g56: 11ff., 65ff. 
52. Where i equals .f-1. 
53. See also other non-statement approach advocates, like Suppes (1g67, 1g8g), Wojcicki 
(1979, 1 gg4) and Van Fraassen (1980), discussed in Chapter 3. 
54. Think, for example, of students able to cite all the rules (or laws) of a specific area of their 
subject matter, who are still unable to apply this knowledge in any concrete way. 
55. In section X of The structure ... , Kuhn (1g7o: 126) asks: "But is sensory experience fixed 
and neutral? Are theories simply man-made interpretations of given data?". And he 
answered: " ... Yes! In the absence of a developed alternative, I find it impossible to 
relinquish entirely that viewpoint. Yet it no longer functions effectively, and the attempts 
to make it do so through the introduction of a neutral language of observations [Quine] 
now seem to me hopeless". In the Postscript, Kuhn (1970: 1 g3) tries to solve his problem 
by drawing clear distinctions between sensory "stimuli" and "sensations" or "perceptions". 
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He (ibid.) writes: "Notice now that two groups, the members of which have systematically 
different sensations on receipt of the same stimuli, do in some sense live in different 
worlds. We posit the existence of stimuli to explain our perceptions of the world, and we 
posit their immutability to avoid both individual and social solipsism. About neither posit 
have I the slightest reservation. But our world is populated in the first instance not by 
stimuli but by the objects of our sensations, and these need not be the same, individual 
to individual or group to group". 
And, he continues to say that it is because we have been conditioned to see a one-to-one 
mapping between stimuli and sensations, that we have such difficulty in recognising that 
the two viewers actually see different things. In reality, we should - and do - know that 
the same stimulus may produce very different sensations and that very different stimuli 
can produce the same sensations. 
56. See his article in Tauber, 1997. 
57. Kuhn describes (Tauber, 1997: 233) the meaning of these terms as "part of what one 
must have in the head to use the word properly". 
58. See Chapter 5 for more on these issues. 
59. See Cook, A 1994. The observational foundations of physics. Cambridge University 
Press. 
60. Newton "did not produce mere mathematical constructs or abstractions that were devoid 
of any content of reality other than 'saving the phenomena', but he did create what he 
conceived to be purely mathematical counterparts of simplified and idealised physical 
situations that could later be brought into relation with the conditions of reality as revealed 
by experiment and observation" (Sarlemijn & Sparnaay, 1989: 6). He also preferred 
synthetic geometry to Descartes's analytical geometry and even to his own calculus, 
because both the latter have levels of proof without any clear physical interpretation. 
Bishop Berkeley even referred to the infinitesimals in Newton's calculus as "the ghosts 
of departed quantities". 
61. Newton affirmed Aristotle's inductive-deductive method - he called it the "method of 
analysis and synthesis". Newton declared that "although the arguing from experiments 
and observations by induction be no demonstration of general conclusions, yet it is the 
best way of arguing which the nature of things admits of' (Newton, 1952: 404). 
62. "The correspondence between atomic structure and the solar system was thought to be 
self-evident" (Sarlemijn & Sparnaay, 1989: 7). 
63. Large sections from this chapter will be published in Ruttkamp (1999a). 
64. See Suppes (1954: 244). 
65. Obviously the axiomatisation of theories in a set-theoretical framework does not 
necessarily imply a non-statement approach - it is quite possible to stick to the 
statement approach and define a set of valid sentences corresponding to the set-
theoretic predicate by making use of the same axioms used to define the set-theoretic 
predicate in the first place. This would be closer to the model-theoretic approach spelled 
out in Chapter 2. 
66. Adams (1959) discusses the reduction of one paradigm of science to another, and so 
touches on some related questions of underdeterrninalion as well. 
67. Suppes (in Wojcicki in Humphreys, 1994:148,149) writes: "The more I think about 
scientific practice and reflect on how to give an accurate account of the complicated 
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processes that go into experimentation, the more I am persuaded that there are a large 
number of distinctions needed to describe experimentation thoroughly, especially as data 
are purified for quantitative, and even more statistical, analysis. It is a long way from 
running around the laboratory doing one thing and then another, to having a set of data 
as printout or on a computer screen ready for analysis. That process still needs much 
more thorough attention ... gruesome details of exactly how data are purified and 
selected for analysis, not to speak of details of how they are generated, which itself may 
involve, as equipment becomes increasingly complicated, many different independent 
tests of reliability and accuracy of equipment". 
68. See Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2 for an example of the precision that such a theory of 
measurement operates with. 
69. The issues concerned with this stage of science were addressed by Paul Galison in his 
book entitled How experiments end (1987), and the details have now been worked out 
to unbelievable depths in his follow-up Image and logic (1997). 
70. "The kind of co-ordinating definitions often described by philosophers have their place 
in popular philosophical expositions of theories, but in the actual practice of testing 
scientific theories a more elaborate and more sophisticated formal machinery for relating 
a theory to data is required" (Suppes in Morgenbesser, 1967: 62). 
71. I agree with Wojcicki (in Humphreys, 1994:130) that Suppes's set-theoretical position 
may reduce philosophy of science to no more than "selected problems of 
metamathematics". Wojcicki writes: "Needless to say, as long as an empirical theory is 
not provided with any factual interpretation, it remains merely a certain formal system. 
But ... one may wonder whether the differentia specifica allowing us to tell an empirical 
theory from a piece of pure mathematics does not consist in the fact that the former has 
some intended empirical applications". He points out that this was essentially Adams's 
(1959) argument. He started the idea of an empirical theory consisting of two classes of 
structures, the one the class of all the theory's realisations and the other the class of all 
intended applications which is a class of empirical structures (physical systems) of which 
the theory is expected to be true. Adams also pointed out that not every intended 
application necessarily has to be a realisation of the theory. Sneed modified these 
notions in the sense that he requires that no component of an intended application be T-
theoretical, while Adams saw the intended applications of structures of the same set-
theoretic type as the realisations of the theory itself. 
72. I am, of course, not denying the use of statistical methodology to clarify and determine 
as precisely as possible the chances of a theory's models having connections to some 
systems in reality. It is merely the case that I rather advocate an elaboration of Van 
Fraassen's notion of empirical adequacy taking the place of the traditional literal notion 
of the "truth of a scientific theory" than the mathematical tools of statistics being 
employed to answer these inherently philosophical questions about possible relations 
between science and reality. 
73. To be able to establish a representation theorem for a theory implies that it can be proved 
that there is a class of models of the theory such that every model of the theory is 
isomorphic to some member of this class. Suppes (1960:295) gives a few examples of 
such theorems, for instance, Cayley's theorem that every group is isomorphic to a group 
of transformations, and Stone's theorem that every Boolean algebra is isomorphic to a 
field of sets. 
74. Suppes (1988b:254) claims that one of the most important and valuable uses of 
representation theorems in philosophy of science is that they help to increase (scientific) 
understanding of the represented object. Well, yes, if the conceptual models and their 
empirical subsets are of a different logical type, then obviously this may be the case. 
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75. Or, in my terms, according to which the conceptual models and their empirical submodels 
are not necessarily of a different logical type, this simply means that, then, finally, the 
empirical interpretations of the theories in question may be examined. 
76. If a representation theorem is found for one science in terms of a second, the first has 
been {formally) reduced to the second - e.g. Adams (1959) was the first to give a 
rigorous proof of reducing rigid body mechanics to particle mechanics. 
77. The ''type" of a model is determined by the individual constant symbols, as well as by the 
relation and function symbols of the axiomatic calculus of the theory in question. 
78. The model-theoretic notions of both conceptual and empirical models also have this kind 
of clarifying effect. It is the case, as he (Suppes, 1989: 25) claims, that "A radically 
different situation often obtains in the comparison of theory and experiment. Theoretical 
notions are used in the theory which have no direct observable analogue in the 
experimental data. In addition, it is common for models of a theory to contain continuous 
functions or infinite sequences although the confirming data are highly discrete and 
finitistic in character .... Corresponding to possible realisations of the theory, I introduce 
possible realisations of the data. As should be apparent, from a logical standpoint 
possible realisations of data are defined in just the same way as possible realisations of 
the theory being tested by the experiment from which the data come. The precise 
definition of models of the data for any given experiment requires that there be a theory 
of the data in the sense of the experimental procedure, as well as in the ordinary sense 
of the empirical theory of the phenomena being studied". He (Suppes, 1989:25) gives two 
reasons why a possible realisation of a theory cannot be a possible realisation of its data: 
no actual experiment can include an infinite number of discrete trials, and the parameter 
of the experiment is not directly observable and is not part of the recorded data. Note that 
although in a model-theoretic approach none of this is denied, this still does not 
necessarily imply that different languages are needed to talk about the content of the 
conceptual models and their empirical substructures. 
79. Possible realisations of the theory cannot be possible realisations of the data (Suppes, 
1989: 25), since no actual experiment can include an infinite number of discrete trials and 
the parameters of an experiment are not directly observable and are not part of the 
recorded data. Jn other words, models of the experiment and models of the theory are 
of a different logical type. This is not necessarily the case in a model-theoretic account 
of science, as I have already pointed out often in the above. 
80. See Ruttkamp, 1997b, and the discussion related to these issues in Chapter 2. 
81. Sneed (1983: 350) claims that structuralism" ... is essentially a view about the logical 
form of the claims of empirical theories and the nature of the predicates that are used to 
make these claims". (The notion of 'predicates' is taken in the usual set-theoretic sense 
of characterising the type or species of sets of structures.) 
82. This is perhaps where the real choice between the statement and the non-statement 
approach lies. 
83. For formalised theories the entire (meta-) mathematical apparatus for studying theories 
and their models becomes available to the philosopher of science. One example of the 
tremendous usefulness of this approach is the study of verisimilitude. (See section 5.5.) 
84. Both Stegmuller and Sneed formulated reconstructions of parts of Kuhn's theory, 
touching on the role of the scientific community in the development of scientific theories 
(Stegmuller, 1976; Sneed, 1976). Sneed claims that" ... in order to make sense of what 
Prof Kuhn was telling us about scientific activity ... we found it convenient to ... employ 
a concept of scientific theory somewhat different from that commonly used by 
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philosophers of science-in-general" (Sneed, 1976: 119). He is referring here to the 
adoption of the "non-statement view" by him and StegmOller (and their followers). (Of 
course, Kuhn's work was not the only motivation in this regard, as Sneed himself 
acknowledges.) It is however interesting that such a precise formal reconstruction of 
Kuhn's incommensurability thesis as that offered by Sneed (1976) could have gone so 
relatively uncommented on in the philosophical community of the time. As already 
pointed out in the above, Sneed and StegmOller both reconstructed parts of Kuhn's 
philosophy of science, focussing especially on the notion of a member of some 
community "holding" a particular theory, which implies a concentration on the differences 
between normal and revolutionary science. 
Briefly, Sneed (1976: 120) defines "normal change" as change in the body of empirical 
claims of a theory, while "revolutionary change" consists in the changing of theories 
themselves. These notions can be very successfully treated by the structuralist 
programme, and StegmOller (1973) specifically showed that the relation of reduction can 
be of significant use in depicting the notion of scientific progress. 
85. Recall that in general, a model is a structure (interpretation) of the form <A1, •.• ,Am, R,, 
... , Rn> where the A are the "basic sets" or domains of the model (the ontology of the 
theory); and the R; are relations on the A;. Remember also that - at least for a language 
with a sound set of rules - satisfaction of the axioms implies satisfaction of the theory, 
for any interpretation. 
86. We all know that a theory usually has many different models, but they all have one thing 
in common, which Balzer, Moulines and Sneed (1987: 3) identify as the same structure, 
while I emphasise also the fact that they are all models of the same (linguistically 
expressed) theory. A theory offers one formulation which binds together all these models 
(e.g. think of a theory as a set of field equations). That is why the model-theoretic 
approach is the one that I choose. This approach offers the possibility to focus on the 
linguistic nature of the theory as we// as on its different models. Be that as it may, I do 
agree with Balzer, Moulines, and Sneed (1987: 3) that what is meant by models sharing 
the same structure, is that they all share the same conceptual framework (i.e. in my 
terms, they all have the same logical type or signature) and they all satisfy the same laws 
(theory). 
87. Sometimes also referred to as "conceptual determinations". 
88. " ... this distinction may be understood as the model-theoretic explication of the distinction 
between the 'analytic' and the 'synthetic' components within a particular theory" 
(Moulines in Schurz & Dom, 1991: 318). Or perhaps, in my terms, this may be viewed as 
the distinction between the themata and related context-specific factors, in so far as 
these co-determine the logical type (signature) of structures, and the linguistic formulation 
of the empirical claims suggested by the interpretation of the empirical data in question. 
89. See Balzer, Moulines, Sneed (1987: 19, 20). 
90. Briefly, the intensional description of I is a description in terms of the properties of I, while 
the corresponding extension of the set I denotes the elements of I - i.e. which elements 
of I have these (intensional) properties. 
91. In my terms, the elements of I would be representations of systems of the "real things". 
92. Without a distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical terms, structuralists simply 
say that a particular intended application is an element of Mp. If such a distinction is 
made, they say that a particular intended application belongs to the class of partial 
potential models, Mpp, which is formally derivable from Mp. 
208 
93. See Moulines in Schurz & Dom, 1991: 321, for an example of such an unwanted 
application. Also, recall Einstein's initial reaction to the models of his general theory of 
relativity implying a notion of the expansion of the universe rather than that of a static 
universe. 
94. Or by any interpretation of models of theories in formal terms, for that matter. 
95. Approximation has been left out of this discussion, simply because the inclusion of 
approximate relationships will only complexity matters needlessly, since this discussion 
is meant as a brief introduction into the structuralist programme. I think it suffices for my 
purposes to make it clear that within the structuralist programme all approximate relations 
can be defined formally and are definitely taken into account in their reconstructions of 
empirical theories. 
96. See Moulines in Shurz & Dorn, 1991: 324. 
97. This simply means that the set I has "a life of its own" (ibid.), in the sense that its 
endurance is not dependent on the endurance of its members. The issue is especially 
complex, because the "life" or nature of the class I that endures through time (or history) 
depends on the nature of the scientific community to which it is linked, which, in its turn, 
is also a "genidentical" entity. 
98. The reason why the description of the set of intended applications has to be informal, is 
given by the representation theorem, referred to in the above mentioned quote from 
Balzer, Moulines, and Sneed (1987: 38). Note, however that although the set of intended 
applications cannot be depicted in purely formal terms, constraints and intertheoretical 
links can be formulated formally by using structural descriptions of models of the theory. 
99. Sneed in Humphreys, 1994: 196 acknowledges this. 
100. "Intended" here refers not to the formulation stages of theory development as I have 
set it out in Chapter 2, but rather Balzer et al. want to focus on the particular 
application (interpretation in my terms) of a specific theory to a certain real system 
or "range of phenomena". 
101. Note again that Sneed and company take a theory element as the core of a theory 
plus its range of intended applications. (See Sneed (1976).) 
102. See Sneed (1976). 
103. "The intuitive idea is that a distinction may be drawn between what is ruled out by the 
structure of the theory's models Mand what is ruled out by restriction on the way that 
structure is applied 'across' a number of different applications C:' (Sneed, 1976: 124) 
- "Local applications [of theory T] may overlap in space and time, they may 
influence each other (even if they are separated in time and space), certain 
properties of T's objects may remain the same if the objects are transferred from one 
application to another one. Any connection of this sort will be captured by what we 
call constraints" (Balzer, Moulines, Sneed, 1987: 41). 
104. See Balzer, Moulines, Sneed, 1987: 46ff., Sections 11.2.3 and 11.4 for more detail. 
105. The sections of the structuralist programme dealing with these issues are very 
technical - see Balzer, Moulines, and Sneed, 1987: Section 11.3.2 pp.57ff.; and 
Section 11.3.4 pp.73ff. for more detail. 
106. See also Sneed (1976), and Balzer, Moulines, Sneed (1987). 
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107. This is done (ibid.) in such a way that the whole array of theoretical components 
satisfies the constraints C. 
108. See Balzer, Moulines, and Sneed (1987: 57ff). 
109. All of the above is of course set out in idealised terms since it is not, in this context, 
taken into account that the empirical claim associated with a particular theory 
element will always - according to the structuralists - be only approximately true. 
What is relevant to this thesis in this connection is not the overwhelming literature on 
the technical aspects of the question of approximate truth, but rather, and much more 
simply, investigating exactly what the structuralists envisage the theory core's 
function to be in all of this. The briefest answer is, obviously, that the theory core 
identifies the theory content. More precisely, the theory core defines a set of possible 
situations or ''ways things could be" (Sneed in Humphreys, 1994: 195), called 
content(K). I shall not go into any more detail as far as these issues are concerned, 
given the scope of this thesis. 
110. See Beth (1949), (1961), and Van Fraassen (1970). 
111. See Suppe (1967), (1973), and (1989). 
112. Note how such an approach focuses on the underdetermination of theories by 
models. This depiction of underdetermination differs though from that of a model-
theoretic account of science. See Chapter 5 for a discussion of these issues. 
113. "Beth's approach does not require or presuppose the complete formalisation of the 
theory under analysis .... His approach takes into account the essential role of 
models in science. In Beth's account, the mathematics is not part of the physical 
theory, but is used to construct the theoretical framework. The theoretical reasoning 
of the physicist is viewed as ordinary mathematical reasoning concerning the 
framework .... Finally, Beth's approach makes possible the use of formal semantic 
concepts and methods" (Van Fraassen, 1970:337, 338). Van Fraassen believes 
(1970:338) Beth's approach to be much closer to the actual foundational work done 
in physics than any variations of the statement approach. 
114. Van Fraassen (1970) points out that Wilfred Sellars has since the late fifties been 
arguing for precisely such a meaning structure for the language of science. See 
Sellars (1957:225 - 308), and (1963, chapters 4, 10 and 11). 
115. See Section 2.4 again. 
116. The context-dependency of mathematical models does however also enter in their 
view of scientific theories in sofar as they - especially Suppe (1973: 151ff.) -
discuss the "extra-theoretical factors" determining for instance the experimental 
design of a theory. These factors include "regularities" (ibid.) such as other theories, 
laws or known regularities about the phenomena in question. 
117. Giere (1983: 271) explains that a physical system " ... is defined by a set of state 
variables and system laws that specify the physically possible states of the system 
and perhaps also its possible evolutions". Giere offers the example of classical 
thermodynamics which may be understood as defining an ideal gas in terms of three 
variables: pressure, volume, and temperature, and then specifying that these are 
related by the law PV = KT. (See also Suppe, 1973: 132.) 
118. Van Fraassen (1970: 130-132) discusses three types of law: 
• Laws of succession are relations of succession indicating the various sequences of 
states various physical systems will assume over time. These relations are such that 
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the sequences may be deterministic or statistically determined, continuous or 
discrete. These laws (as far as they are non-statistical) thus select the physically 
possible trajectories in a particular state-space. 
• Laws of coexistence are equivalence relations indicating which states are equivalent 
to which others, if the associated law is deterministic. If it is statistical it indicates 
which states are equally probable, i.e. it selects the physically possible subsets of the 
given state-space. 
• Laws of interaction (either deterministic or statistical) determine which states result 
from the interaction between various systems. These laws are combinations of the 
first two kinds of law. 
119. Suppe (1973: 136) elaborates on Beth's discussion of the usage of propositions and 
uses this elaboration to discuss the semantic relations between theory-formulation 
languages, theories, physical systems, and phenomena. He then defines a 
formulation of a theory as a set or class or "collection" of propositions which are true 
of the theory. Such a formulation usually consists of a few specified propositions with 
all deductive consequences of the specified propositions under some "logic". These 
propositions are in a language called the "theory-formulation language", and usually 
forms a subset of the propositions of that language. The following basic features of 
a theory formulation may be identified (Suppe, 1973: 137 - 138): 
• A set of elementary propositions in the theory-formulation language specifies that a 
certain physical parameter p has as value a certain physical quantity q at time t, such 
that an elementary proposition q, is true of state s in the theory's domain if at time t, 
s has q as the value of the parameter p. 
• For each elementary proposition q, there is a maximal subset h(<)i) of the theory's 
domain such that q, is true of all the states in that subset. 
• The function h from elementary propositions to subsets of the theory is called the 
satisfaction function for the set of elementary propositions. 
• Elementary propositions may be compounded together in accordance to the logic of 
the theory- the logic is such that every compound proposition is true of at least one 
state which is - according to the associated theory - physically possible; thus 
obviously the logic of a theory is theory-dependent and different theories may have 
different logics. (Suppe's (1973: 137) illustration: classical particle mechanics impose 
a Boolean algebra mod-2 and quantum theory imposes a non-distributive lattice.) In 
Beth and Van Fraassen's terms (Van Fraassen, 1970: 335) the logic of the theory is 
essentially a syntactic description of the set of valid sentences and the semantic 
entailment relation in that language. 
• A language of description is determined by the set of elementary propositions, the 
theory, the satisfaction function h, and the logic of the theory; this language is 
obviously a sublanguage of the theory-formulation language; this language can 
describe any physically possible state in a physical system. 
• It might be possible that the logic of the theory enables one to deduce logical 
consequences of propositions in the language of description. However, usually the 
language of description has to be incorporated into a more complex language with 
an amended logic - namely none other than the theory-formulation language -
which can express the laws of the theory and deduce predictions. 
• The truth conditions for the theory-formulation language are specified in terms of the 
relations (laws) of the theory and the truth conditions for the language of description. 
• A formulation of a theory is a set of propositions deductively closed under the logic 
of the theory-formulation language such that every proposition in the set is true of the 
theory. 
• Finally, the theory-formulation language may be a natural or an artificial language, 
but typically is a language such as "scientific English". 
For analysing semantical relations holding between propositions in the expanded 
theory-formulation language and phenomena, Suppe (1973: 140ff.) offers a operationalist 
account of factual truth that I shall not discuss here. 
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120. Especially non-relativistic physical theories typically use mathematical models to 
represent the behaviour of a certain kind of physical system - Van Fraassen 
(1970:328) gives as examples the use of Hilbert space in quantum mechanics, and 
the use of Euclidean 2n-space [sic.] as phase-space for n particles in classical 
mechanics. (He probably means" ... for a system with .11 degrees of freedom ... ". For 
.11 particles 6n-space is neededl) 
121. This is very much in agreement with my idea of a (conceptual) model of a theory and 
relations linking it to some real system via some empirical model offering a "snap 
shot" view of the real system at a specific time. 
122. "For each elementary statement U there is a region h(U) of the state-spaces H such 
that U is true if and only if the system's actual state is represented by an element of 
h(U). (We also say that these elements satisfy U ... )"(Van Fraassen, 1970:329). 
123. This notion of a "satisfaction function" characterises exactly the kind of relation I see 
involved in determining the possible isomorphic embeddings of empirical models into 
conceptual models of some theory. 
124. Van Fraassen's semi-interpreted language thus in these terms consists of the 
elementary statements connected to a certain physical system, the specific state-
spaces in question, and the satisfaction function in question. 
125. See Van Fraassen (1970: 337). 
126. "For our purposes, a scientific theory has two components. One is a family of 
[theoretical] models .... The second is a set of theoretical hypotheses that pick out 
things in the real world that may fit one or another of the models in the family" (Giere, 
1991 :29). 
127. See my discussion of this issue in Chapters 4 and 5. 
128. Think of Suppes's hierarchy of models. See also my discussion of the 
underdetermination issue in Chapter 5. 
129. See Wartofski (1979: 19). 
130. He (Giere, 1984:13) gives as example of a theoretical hypothesis the statement that 
"The positions and velocities of the earth and moon in the earth-moon system are 
very close to those of a two-body particle Newtonian model (with specified initial 
conditions)". 
131. Another example of a notion of approximation by degree, as noted by Giere 
(1985:80), can be found in Beth's state-space approach in terms of the value r of a 
magnitude m at a time t in a given state-space. This notion also fits both my and 
Suppes's approaches to these "empirical" relations. 
132. "I agree with contemporary students of probability, induction, and the foundations of 
statistics that the individual hypothesis is a useful unit of analysis. On the other 
hand, I reject completely the idea that one can reduce the rationality of the scientific 
process to the rationality of individual agents. The rationality of science is to be found 
not so much in the heads of scientists as in the objective features of its methods and 
institutions" (Giere, 1983:270). He also (like Suppes, Van Fraassen, and Suppe) 
reflects on the complex nature and role of data in the testing of theoretical 
hypotheses: " ... in order to determine whether a proposed model fits the world one 
needs some information about the part of the world in question. But not all 
information is relevant. We will use the term data ... to refer to the special information 
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that may be relevant to deciding whether the model in question does fit" (Giere, 
1991 :29). Giere (1991 :37-40) offers a detailed programme for the evaluation of 
theoretical hypotheses, but I will not go into the finer points of that here. 
133. Wojcicki's empiricism has some far reaching consequences that could not have been 
accommodated by classic empiricism. Newer forms, like that of Van Fraassen, are 
more flexible though. The classic version views observations in terms of the fixed 
point of view of the idealised "normal objective observer", while Wojcicki now offers 
a more flexible empiricism in so far as the experimental accessibility of specific states 
of affairs depends heavily on the competence of the experimenter and her technical 
capabilities. 
134. See my comments on this matter above, and in Ruttkamp (1997a, 1997b). 
135. This is Suppes's notion of a "physical" model and my notion of an "intended" model. 
136. See Wojcicki's examples in this regard in Humphreys, 1994:134 - 136. 
137. See Wojcicki in Humphreys, 1994:135. 
138. "The fact that formation of a theoretical model presupposes formation of a model of 
the data as well as the fact that formation of a model of the data can be controlled 
by the requirement of consistency of the model with the corresponding theory are of 
key significance for proper understanding of the interplay between the data and the 
theories, and thus for proper accounting for both the corrigibility of the data and the 
falsifiability of the theoretical claims" (Wojcicki in Humphreys, 1994: 137). 
139. Wojcicki (in Humphreys, 1994: 138) writes " ... let me point out that theoretical models 
are not empirical systems, unless we consider them to be empirical systems of some 
hypothetical or possible worlds. The reason is quite obvious. Even though the objects 
a model involves are supposed to be real ... still these objects are postulated to 
satisfy certain theoretical assumptions ... which they may not actually satisfy. A 
theoretical model is just a certain theoretical construct, an abstract entity, even if 
some of its parts appear to be parts of physical reality''. See also Endnote #9 and 
Chapter 3 where I - referring to Suppes and Moulines - already drew attention to 
questionable attempts to mix conceptual and physical objects (by making the latter 
elements of mathematical sets). 
140. Wojcicki (in Humphreys, 1994:140) apparently does see this, though: "There is no 
question that, on many occasions, the search for a theoretical model for a question 
Q is the search for a semantical model of a specific theory T such that this particular 
model will be the right one to examine question Q. This is the situation that obtains 
whenever one believes that T is the theory which allows for solving Q. If the 
formation of a theoretical model is from the very beginning meant to consist in 
selecting the right semantical model then, of course, the notion of a semantical 
model is prior to that of a theoretical one .... Newtonian particle mechanics was 
viewed as the right theory to solve the question Q 1 concerning Mercury's movement. 
However there are numerous occasions when the search for a model for Q starts 
when one does not consider any theory to be directly applicable to Q. Bohr's model 
of the atom, which in fact was a model of some specific problems on the dynamics 
of the particles of which the atom was believed to be composed, was certainly not 
meant to be a semantic model of the official theory; rather it was meant to be a 
certain tentative theory of the phenomenon. ... [Here] [t]he construction of a 
theoretical model precedes any semantic considerations and in this sense it is prior 
to the latter .... the idea of a model is central for two, in a sense, opposite activities: 
applying theories and forming them. The interplay between the two is what largely 
determines the dynamics of science ... Now, while the concept of semantic model is 
213 
central for the former, the theoretical model is central for the latter". 
141. This is what Wojcicki (1979: 159) is getting at when he remarks that" ... there is an 
evident need for a term which both when a theory is being constructed and when it 
is finally set up can be applied to denote those parts of the theory that provide a 
relatively complete account of particular regularities of phenomena in the scope of 
the theory". 
142. See also W6jcicki's (1979: 161 - 163) example illustrating these problems. 
143. This implies that propositions in the theory-formulation language may refer to and 
describe some physical system because a physical system in the theory-induced 
class of systems restricts the theory to a single sequence of states. 
144. These notions form the core of Giere's "constructive realism" (Giere, 1985). 
145. Nancy Cartwright's recent attacks (1989, 1994a, 1994b, 1995a) on "fundamentalism" 
seem rather pointless from this viewpoint (see the next chapter). 
146. Some sections of this chapter will be published in Ruttkamp (1999a) and (1999b). 
147. And so they should be, given that they form part of human scientific knowledge 
which, from the beginning, simply is based on activities of abstraction, because that 
simply is how we humans know anything. 
148. My italics. 
149. We have already agreed that fundamental laws are indeed too simple and abstract 
to be directly about any aspect of reality. 
150. She also remarks in Cushing, Delaney, and Gutting (1984: 135) that" ... abstractness 
and scientific realism are two different issues, and not all varieties of abstractness 
bear equally on questions of descriptive completeness, accuracy, and truth. This is 
so with our notion [of abstraction], where notions become more and more abstract 
as less and less explanatory information about them is given". 
151. Both Cartwright and I view these models as idealisations, although we differ about 
the implications of the ideal nature of these models for the process of science, as will 
be discussed below. 
152. Cartwright, 1983, chapter 8. 
153. Cartwright's "phenomenological laws" remind one very much of Suppes's (1989) 
models of data. 
154. I shall elaborate on this in Section 4.3. 
155. See also Chalmers (1987: 82) for confirmation of this interpretation. 
156. See Chapter 5. 
157. Well, this is true of fundamental laws too - Newton says openly he offers no 
hypotheses concerning the reasons why his laws of gravitation are true. 
158. See also my notes concerning Newton's mechanics offering an explanation of 
Kepler's laws in Chapter 2. 
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159. I cannot go along with Laymen's "normative description" of explanation though, since 
the "truth" of fundamental laws can only be "discovered" by studying the models 
interpreting them and investigating their empirical adequacy. 
160. Remember that Cartwright takes scientific theories to be a set of fundamental laws 
- like Maxwell's equations - from which explanations in physics are supposed to 
start. 
161. This is one more reason for the importance of theories or fundamental laws in the 
process of science. One theory may have infinitely many "incompatible" models (i.e. 
models that are not isomorphic) and "the facts" may be valid in all of these. Even 
though Cartwright will probably not agree that it is possible to give a realist slant to 
the double underdetermination of models, it shows clearly a way in which the notion 
of theories seems indeed to have an organising and classifying nature in her terms. 
162. Cartwright claims (1983: 150) a model realistic in this second sense to be in need of 
more bridge principles than one realistic in the first sense. The best explanation for 
this is, I think, the fact that she sees the mathematical representation as being closer 
to - or perhaps mainly identical to - the theory. 
163. As she explains (Cartwright, 1983: 152-154): "The second definition of 'simulacrum' 
in the Oxford English Dictionary says that a simulacrum is 'something having merely 
the form or appearance of a certain thing, without possessing its substance or proper 
qualities"'. 
164. She offers Maxwell's treatment of the radiometer as a further example - Cartwright, 
1983: 154-155. 
165. Cartwright illustrates this accusation with the following remarks: "Not all radiometers 
that meet Maxwell's two descriptions have the distribution function Maxwell writes 
down; most have many other relevant features besides. This will probably continue 
to be true no matter how many further corrections we add. In general ... the bridge 
law between the medium of a radiometer and a proposed distribution can hold only 
ceteris paribus" (Cartwright, 1983: 155). 
166. There are cases in which we believe phenomenological laws to be soundly deducible 
from a certain set of fundamental laws, but find that the actual deduction is extremely 
difficult. These cases, however, do not prove in any way either that 
phenomenological laws ''typically" cannot be deduced from fundamental ones, or that 
the "all things being equal" and additional assumptions needed in such deductions 
may be found to "contradict" the original (set of) fundamental law(s). 
167. Cartwright offers the problem of superconductivity as illustration - see Cartwright, 
Shomar and Suarez, 1995: 142 - 149. 
168. Note that, in principle, it is possible to deduce the movement of "Neurath's bill" 
perfectly from Newton's laws. The real system is in this case simply too complex to 
be able to actually make this deduction in practise. 
169. Cartwright refers to this too. 
170. As the criticism of "fundamentalist realist" theories of science aptly shows. 
171. She offers the finer detail of her arguments supporting this claim in Nature's 
capacities and their measurement (1989) by distinguishing between abstraction, 
idealisation, and concretisation, and offering a discussion of the problem of "material 
abstraction" (which refers to the problems arising from the fact that no universal 
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recipe can be given for the movements from theory to concrete situations). 
172. In a nutshell, that is what this thesis is all about. 
173. While working in her usual context of theoretical physics, Cartwright most often views 
theories very mathematically, as sets of field equations or whatever. 
174. This notion of capacities is close to Popper's propensities. See Popper (1990). 
175. In addressing the testability of causal claims, Cartwright uses probabilities, while the 
Humean tradition reduced causal laws to probabilities. She says: "I defend a very 
different understanding of the concept of Natural Law in modem science from the 
'Laws = universal regularities' account ... We aim in science, I urge, to discover the 
natures of things; we try to find out what powers or capacities they have and in what 
circumstances and in what ways these capacities can be harnessed to produce 
predictable behaviours. I call this the study of natures because I want to recall the 
Aristotelian idea that science aims to understand what things are, and a large part 
of understanding what they are is to understand what they can do, regularly and as 
a matter of course. Regularities are secondary. Fixed patterns of association among 
measurable quantities are a consequence of the repeated operation of factors that 
have stable capacities (factors of this kind are sometimes called 'mechanisms') 
arranged in the 'right' way in the 'right kind' of stable environment" (Cartwright, 
1995c: 277). Ceteris paribus clauses can, however, it seems, not be escaped - "In 
order to generate a prediction [or, give an explanation] we must figure out how to 
combine the laws together and how to cash-out their ceteris paribus conditions -
and we must do so in a way that takes into account the specific material 
circumstances of the situation under consideration" (Cartwright, 1995a: 155). The 
way to do this then, is to assume the existence of capacities (as has already been 
pointed out) - "The point is that the fundamental facts about nature that ensure that 
regularities can obtain are not again themselves regularities. They are facts about 
what things can do" (Cartwright, 1995a: 156). 
176. For instance, she claims that standard philosophical accounts of probabilistic 
causality actually employ a concept of causation that is much stronger than the 
concept of a mere causal law and gives (Cartwright, 1989: 142) the following 
formula, which she calls "Principle CC', to illustrate this: "C causes E" if and only if 
the probability of Eis greater with C than without C in evety causally homogeneous 
context. According to her (1989: 143) the point with regard to this formula is that it 
is universally quantified, and thus represents a concept of causality powerful enough 
to be taken as a concept of capacity as well. 
177. See Cartwright (1989: 193). 
178. Some sections of this chapter will be published as Ruttkamp (1999b). 
179. In a recent spirited defense of "causal realism" Christopher Norris (1997) also offers 
a criticism of the anti-realism implied by Van Fraassen's "constructive realism". (See 
Norris, 1997, chapters 6 & 7.) 
180. I have already briefly commented on this issue in Chapter 4. 
181. See Spurrett (1998) for a thorough discussion of this aspect of Bhaskar's 
transcendental realism. 
182. Hacking (1983: 3) also sets out the debate in these tenms. 
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183. Speaking of the "contingenf' nature of data is not meant to sound frivolous, but rather 
to refer to the verification of the validity of data via the various models of some 
scientific theory. 
184. Here I agree with Kuhn's (1977: 267) description of the "intimate and inevitable 
entanglement of scientific observation with scientific theory" that leads - as Kuhn 
(ibid.) also remarks - to a certain skepticism concerning the production of a "neutral 
observation language". 
185. I thank Professor Johannes Heidema of the Department of Mathematics, Applied 
Mathematics, and Astronomy at the University of South Africa for this metaphor. 
186. Nancy Nersessian (1984: 153) writes that a discussion of a concept of meaning that 
would be adequate for scientific theories should be given in terms of the following 
two factors. The study of nature and an analysis of language, as well as an analysis 
of "actual scientific practices concerning meaning" (ibid.). She (ibid.) claims that it is 
impossible to separate questions of meaning from the "network of beliefs (theoretical, 
methodological, metaphysical, common sense) and problems (theoretical, 
experimental, and metaphysical) which provides the 'motive force' in meaning 
construction" (ibid.). She (Nersessian, 1984: 156) continues to describe the meaning 
of a scientific concept as "a two-dimensional array which is constructed on the basis 
of its descriptive/explanatory function as it develops over time. I will call this array a 
'meaning scheme'". (This reminds somewhat of Davidson's (1984) "conceptual 
schemes".) The need for something like any of these notions of meaning or 
conceptual schemes in examining the process and progress of science is taken care 
of in a model-theoretic account of science in terms of intended, conceptual, and 
empirical models of scientific theories. 
187. See Chapter 2. 
188. I shall not say anymore on this last point - i.e. the additional metaphysical content 
of realist theories. I have already pointed out during the discussion of Cartwright's 
notion of capacities and Bhaskar's notion of tendencies above, that model-
theoretically speaking these kinds of musing are not necessary at all. The 
discussions of the relations between science and reality in the first parts of this 
chapter also support this claim. The first two sets of problems - i.e. approximate 
truth and related issues, and underdetermination - will be discussed in Section 5.5. 
189. Suppe (1973:161) defines a theory formulation as a set of propositions which are 
true of the theory. Such a formulation usually seems to consist of a few specified 
propositions with all the deductive consequences of those propositions under some 
"logic" of the theory. 
190. A science like physics cannot exist at all if it were not to use rich mathematical 
structures and the deductive methodology of mathematics and restrict itself to 
empirical models only. For example, no physical measuring process can ever 
produce an irrational number as result, although interpreting some of these results 
necessarily assumes the existence of such numbers. 
191. Bhaskar uses the terms "transduction" or the "transfactual nature of laws" to refer to 
the applicability of scientific laws specifically outside the domain of actual experience. 
"In the full analysis of Jaw-like statements we are thus concerned with a new kind of 
conditional ... [These conditionals] take us to a level at which things are really going 
on irrespective of [their] actual outcome" (Bhaskar 1978: 51). These "normic" 
conditionals are transfactual rather than counterlactual because they don't describe 
what would happen but rather what is happening, albeit in an unmanifested way. 
Bhaskar (1986:100) claims a scientist is always certain that, given some effect, 
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something is producing the effect in question - her only doubt is about what exactly 
that "something" may be. In this sense, as claimed above, the function of scientists 
is primarily to produce a theory which correctly describes - or adequately explains 
- the mechanism by means of which the effect in question is produced. In asserting 
a "normic" statement, one is asserting the operation of a mechanism, irrespective of 
its results (here is referred to the fact that tendencies of mechanisms do not have to 
become manifest or be realised or actualised in open - i.e. "real" - systems). 
Hence, the fact that our knowledge can be both universally applicable and rarely 
instantiated can only become intelligible if we presuppose the (transitive and 
intransitive) stratification of the world. 
192. See Chapter 3. 
193. See Clarke (1998) as well. 
194. Philosophers such as Richard Boyd (1994) and Ernan McMullin (1993) also endorse 
the notion of approximate truth, although they each offer their own version of it. 
195. The inherent problems of the notion of approximate truth are clearly discussed in 
Laudan's (1981b) A confutation of convergent realism. See also Part I of Donovan, 
A., L. Laudan, & R. Laudan (1988). 
196. Laudan (in Cushing, Delaney, and Gutting, 1984: 91) offers the example of 
Newtonian optics in this respect. There is nothing in reality that corresponds - not 
even approximately- to Newtonian corpuscles. Think also of the well-known notion 
of ether as the medium through which light moves that was in place for hundreds of 
years in various forms, and was finally thrown out of the framework of science by 
Einstein's notions of special and general relativity. One need not concur with Laudan 
on this point. There is much more continuity over time in the models relevant to these 
examples than he seems to give credit for. Put simply: the present-day view of 
photons of light has much in common with Newton's model of light corpuscles. 
Similarly today's fields in space-time share many of the functions of the ether. Model-
theoretic realism ascribes these common features of models (of successive theories) 
over time to their empirical links to features of systems in reality. (See also in 
Chapter 2 my discussion of the nature of scientific progress in model-theoretic 
terms.) 
197. Note for instance that although the Ptolemaic theory's predictions were more 
accurate than the Copernican heliocentric theory of our solar system, Copernicus's 
theory still "eliminated" the Ptolemaic one. How can such occurrences in science's 
processes be explained? Well, an established theory (or model of some theory) has 
a whole foundational structure of developments and refinements to lean on that a 
"new" theory (or model) does not immediately have at its disposal. Although it is 
generally taken that a "newer" theory can explain "more• than an "older" theory, it is 
not necessarily the case that the level of accuracy of the "new" theory will be as high 
as that of the "old" theory from the beginning. Also, it must be kept in mind that the 
accuracy of the "old" theory (or model) might be an "unnatural" accuracy, in the 
sense of resuscitating - in Lakatos's terms - already degenerative research 
programmes via ad hoc additions. 
198. See Lakatos, (1978). 
199. lntertheoretic relations are for instance equivalence, theoretisation, and reduction. 
200. Sneed (1983: 364) describes the notion of a theoretical individual kind term as 
follows: "Intuitively, a TIKT for a given pre-theoretically described set of intended 
applications !'denotes the set of all theoretical individuals that could be used in some 
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way to make members of !'into Mpp's". 
201. This is essentially my notion of empirical adequacy too - i.e. that theories with the 
same empirical models (although they may be embedded into different conceptual 
models) are empirically equivalent. 
202. Van Fraassen (1980: 60) also remarks on the fact that in the various axiomatisations 
of mechanics offered during our century - such as the one offered by McKinsey, 
Sugar & Suppes (1953) - the terms "mass" is treated in almost as many ways. 
Another effective - and perhaps more interesting - example of these issues is 
given by the measurement problems in quantum mechanics which is even more 
complex as far as the underdetermination of the underlying microscopic state by the 
observable macroscopic phenomena is concerned. Van Fraassen (1980: 62, 63) 
discusses this issue as well. 
203. See Chapter 3. 
204. Note that, in principle, the language in question need not be a formal language at all. 
Almost any kind of scientific linguistic expression may be formalised in some first-
order language and its interpretations re-constructed in a model-theoretic way. 
205. Briefly, Putnam's argument comes down to the following: Take T1 to be an "ideal" 
theory in all possible senses, except that it is objectively true. Assume that "THE 
WORLD" can be divided into infinitely many pieces. Take T1 to claim that there are 
infinitely many things (such that, in this case, T1 is objectively correct about the 
world). Then, by the completeness theorem, and given that T1 is consistent and has 
only infinite models, T1 has a model of every infinite cardinality. Then, if we choose 
a model M of the same cardinality as "THE WORLD" and we map the individuals of 
M one-to-one into the pieces of "THE WORLD", and we then use this mapping to 
define relations of M directly onto "THE WORLD", the result is a satisfaction relation 
"SAT' which is a "correspondence" between the terms of the language Land the sets 
of parts of ''THE WORLD" such that T1 comes out true of "THE WORLD" - provided 
that "true" is interpreted as meaning TRUE(SAT). The paradoxical implication of 
Putnam's argument is that if the criteria we formulate to determine the truth of certain 
sentences are indeed so/e/y internal (implying that these sentences "must come out 
true" (Van Fraassen, 1997: 18)), then "practically any theory is true" (ibid.). I.e. the 
dilemma is - or seems to be - that if we cannot talk about "THE WORLD" then we 
cannot say anything about the extensions to our predicates in "THE WORLD"; but 
if we can indeed describe - talk about - elements in "THE WORLD'', then we can 
distinguish between right and wrong assignments of predicates of extensions to our 
predicates in a rather trivial manner. See Putnam (1978), Lewis (1984), and Van 
Fraassen (1997) for more detailed definition and discussion of this argument. 
206. E.g. Galison (1987) and (1997) offer a treasure trove for the philosopher in this 
respect. 
207. See Chapter 5. 
208. Think of the notion of so-called "picture theories", and of logical atomism, for 
instance. 
209. This seems to be the basic idea of Kripke's Naming and necessity (1980). 
210. Of course she also is referring to the idealised nature of the models interpreting the 
fundamental laws of physics when she speaks of the falsity of these laws. That is 
however a different issue, addressed already in Chapter 4. This does not take away 
though the issue concerning her attitude towards the reference of the theoretical 
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terms in these laws. 
211. See Lewis (1970) for a good illustration of the syntactic scheme of things. 
212. Perhaps the reason for this is simply the historical psychological "feeling" that 
numbers and sets are somehow unique entities {floating around somewhere). 
213. Abraham Robinson {for instance 1986) developed the model-theoretic structure of 
algebra in this way. 
214. See Chapters 2 and 5. 
215. Hintikka (1989: 55) remarks that this domain can be so particular that it can be 
characterised as" ... a 'small world'. that is, a relatively short course of local events 
in some nook or comer of the actual world". 
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